• Research
  • About
  • Experts
Carnegie India logoCarnegie lettermark logo
Technology
{
  "authors": [
    "Se Young Jang"
  ],
  "type": "other",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
  ],
  "collections": [
    "Korean Peninsula"
  ],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
  "programAffiliation": "NPP",
  "programs": [
    "Nuclear Policy"
  ],
  "projects": [],
  "regions": [
    "East Asia",
    "South Korea"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Nuclear Policy"
  ]
}

Source: Getty

Other

Bringing Seoul into the Non-Proliferation Regime

Pressure by the United States was less decisive in forcing South Korea to ratify the NPT in 1975 than commonly assumed.

Link Copied
By Se Young Jang
Published on Sep 20, 2017

Source: Wilson Center

The Effect of ROK-Canada Reactor Deals on Korea's Ratification of the NPT

In this Nuclear Proliferation International History Project (NPIHP) Working Paper, Se Young Jang challenges the the common narrative that US pressure forced South Korea to ratify the NPT in 1975. Using new evidence from international archives, Jang finds that the decisive pressure came from a different country—Canada.

Key Findings

Pressure by the United States was less decisive in forcing South Korea to ratify the NPT in 1975 than commonly assumed. Records show that a consensus to ratify the treaty was reached within the ROK government by early March 1975—before the US applied meaningful pressure.

  • Although the US Embassy in Seoul forwarded its suspicions of the ROK’s nuclear ambitions during 1974, the inter-agency intelligence assessment concluding that the ROK had launched a nuclear weapons program was completed only in late February 1975. While the White House was still determining its response to the report, the ROK government had already decided to ratify the NPT up to the level of the Prime Minister.
  • In January 1975, the State Department confirmed that no specific actions had been taken to make the NPT ratification a condition for any US dealings with South Korea.

There is little evidence that the 1975 Congressional resolution calling on the EX-IM bank to defer financing for reactor construction in Korea had an impact on ROK decision-making. The short time between the introduction of the resolution to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on March 7th and the notification of ROK President Park’s decision to ratify the NPT by the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs on March 8th suggests the events were not directly related.

South Korea joined the NPT to secure the sale of Canadian heavy-water reactors, whose sale had been made contingent on ratification. The ROK government chose to pursue the plutonium route to a bomb in 1972, making the acquisition of heavy-water reactors critical to the entire project.

  • Evidence from Korean and Canadian archives show that the strengthened safeguards Canada placed on its nuclear reactors after the May 1974 Indian nuclear test played a decisive role in South Korea’s decision to ratify the NPT.
  • South Korea’s Foreign Minister first mentioned that Korea might consider ratifying the NPT if it were a precondition for the sale of a CANDU reactor during his visit to Ottawa in November 1974.
  • On January 20, 1975, Canada announced that they would reconsider the sale of reactors if South Korea refused to ratify the NPT. Three days later, ROK ministers recommended that President Park Chung Hee accept the Canadian ultimatum to secure the sale of two heavy water reactors (CANDU and NRX). Park approved the decision on March 7, 1975.
  • In December 1975, Canadian Secretary of External Affairs also asserted that South Korea had ratified the NPT upon Canada’s suggestion.

The South Korean government did not regard NPT ratification as the end of its military nuclear pursuits. South Korea’s program was not formally suspended until December 1976—over one-and-a-half years after the Korean National Assembly ratified the NPT in March 1975.

  • ROK officials still regarded the import of a NRX reactor to be possible at the time they chose to ratify the NPT under Canadian pressure. However, archival records show that Canadian officials saw any future sale of a NRX reactor to be unlikely.
  • South Korea’s negotiations with France to acquire a nuclear reprocessing facility continued even after the ROK ratified the NPT. US and Canadian concerns over the French reprocessing deal would stall the sale of Canadian reactors until 1976.

This paper was originally published by Nuclear Proliferation International History Project at Wilson Center

Read the paper
Se Young Jang
Former Nonresident Scholar, Nuclear Policy Program
Nuclear PolicyEast AsiaSouth Korea

Carnegie India does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie India

  • Commentary
    On Thin Ice: Bhutan’s Diplomatic Challenge Amid the India-China Border Dispute

    This piece examines the strategic implications of Bhutan’s diplomatic efforts amid its border dispute with China, highlighting the thin ice it walks on to achieve a resolution without compromising its vital relationships.

      Shibani Mehta

  • Commentary
    A Quad Initiative on Digital Public Infrastructure

    With India set to host the sixth Quad Leaders' Summit in 2024, there is every opportunity for this minilateral to not only develop a DPI initiative but also execute pilots in the Indo-Pacific. This essay shares a rationale for how the four Quad countries could achieve this goal.

      Rudra Chaudhuri, Aadya Gupta

  • Commentary
    India’s Quest for Advanced Technology in the Era of Export Controls

    How can India navigate export control measures at a time when it is also entering into technology-centric partnerships with other nations to secure enhanced access to advanced technology?

      Konark Bhandari

  • Article
    Impasse at the LAC: An Examination of the 2013, 2014, and 2015 Standoffs

    This article examines the significance of the 2013, 2014, and 2015 border standoffs between India and China. It presents a detailed account of the border crises and how the two countries tried to manage them.

      Shibani Mehta

  • Commentary
    China and India Aren’t Reaching a Strategic Détente

    Contrary to some recent analyses, this commentary explains why a strategic détente between India and China is unlikely.

      Saheb Singh Chadha

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie India
Carnegie India logo, white
Unit C-4, 5, 6, EdenparkShaheed Jeet Singh MargNew Delhi – 110016, IndiaPhone: 011-40078687
  • Research
  • About
  • Experts
  • Projects
  • Events
  • Contact
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie India
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.