• Research
  • About
  • Experts
Carnegie India logoCarnegie lettermark logo
{
  "authors": [
    "Thomas de Waal"
  ],
  "type": "commentary",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
    "Carnegie Europe",
    "Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center"
  ],
  "collections": [],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Europe",
  "programAffiliation": "",
  "programs": [],
  "projects": [],
  "regions": [],
  "topics": [
    "Economy"
  ]
}

Source: Getty

Commentary
Carnegie Europe

Georgia’s Perpetual Street of Protest

The anger is not all about Russia. The Georgian Dream government is increasingly unpopular with large segments of the population

Link Copied
By Thomas de Waal
Published on Jun 21, 2019

Georgia is an angry democracy. A recent Gallup survey found that 27 percent of Georgians said they felt angry “yesterday.” That was more than enough to bring large numbers of protestors out onto Rustaveli Avenue, Tbilisi’s traditional arena of protest on the night of June 20 — who were then met with extreme violence in the form of tear-gas and rubber bullets from the Georgian police. 

Russians may be surprised at how quickly and violently events unfolded in the Georgian capital in response to the appearance of one Russian Duma deputy in the parliament. After all, on a people-to-people level, relations between the two countries have improved markedly since the 2008 war. One million Russian tourists visited Georgia last year.

This does not reckon with how feelings of anger and humiliation towards the Russian state have persisted since 2008. Had Sergei Gavrilov been an ordinary participant in the parliamentary session on June 20, he would probably have got away it. Yet the sight of him sitting in the speaker’s chair—“occupying” the speaker’s chair—in the parliament chamber was genuinely offensive to many Georgians. 

The same Georgian can welcome a Russian tourist to his shop or vineyard but categorically reject any restoration of diplomatic relations with Moscow while Russian troops remain in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In other words, improving people-to-people relations have stabilized the relationship between the two countries, but cannot resolve the deep political differences.  

The anger is not all about Russia, however. The Georgian Dream government is increasingly unpopular with large segments of the population. The urban professional classes in Tbilisi resent the shadowy unaccountable figures who are running the country from behind the scenes. The popularity rating of the godfather of Georgian Dream, Bidzina Ivanishvili, has dropped sharply in recent times and the man who was hailed as a savior in 2012 is now the most “negatively viewed” politician in Georgia. 

Ivanishvili is clever enough and Georgia has enough of a democratic culture to heed calls for change. So the man who should have been sitting in the speaker’s chair on June 20, Irakli Kobakhidze, has paid the price for this error of judgment and resigned. Never a popular politician, Kobakhidze is the ritual sacrifice Georgian Dream party makes for its mistakes.

Yet, the anger always spills out on the streets. There are some political forces in Georgia who want to force regime change from the street and are looking for pretexts to do it. Former president Mikheil Saakashvili urged his supporters to come out on the streets yesterday. He still has a loyal television channel Rustavi-2 to broadcast his message. A small number of these protestors made maximalist demands—the resignation of the whole government—and some of them tried to storm the parliament building.

This points to a persistent weakness of Georgia. Its politics is so polarized that there is no single leader who can speak for the whole nation. Formerly, in some circumstances, Patriarch Ilya II could fulfil that role, but the 86-year-old church leader now lacks the physical strength to do so. The big names—nominal head of state President Salome Zurabishvili, behind-the-scenes leader Bidzina Ivanishvili, former leader Saakashvili—are all engaged in aggressive rhetoric that divides and does not unite. 

Instead, as before Georgians are looking to make change in political life from the street, from one specific street—Rustaveli Avenue.  In 1956, 1978, 1989, 1991, 2003, 2007 and 2012 and again in the last two days, Rustaveli has been the stage-set for political drama, sometimes bloody, sometimes peaceful. 

It is unfortunate that, despite having built democratic institutions, Georgia is still resolving its disputes in this way. A decade ago, the Georgian author Guram Odisharia wrote, “Without the emergence of a new political culture, without a harmonic relationship between the authorities and society, the people’s hopes will always be deceived and the main player in our country’s political history will be Rustaveli Avenue and not Georgian politicians.” 

The same unfortunate scenario played out again in Tbilisi in the last two days.

About the Author

Thomas de Waal

Senior Fellow, Carnegie Europe

De Waal is a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe, specializing in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus.

    Recent Work

  • Commentary
    Europolis, Where Europe Ends

      Thomas de Waal

  • Commentary
    Taking the Pulse: Is It Time for Europe to Reengage With Belarus?

      Thomas de Waal, ed.

Thomas de Waal
Senior Fellow, Carnegie Europe
Thomas de Waal
Economy

Carnegie India does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie India

  • Commentary
    The Impact of U.S. Sanctions and Tariffs on India’s Russian Oil Imports

    This piece examines India’s response to U.S. sanctions and tariffs, specifically assessing the immediate market consequences, such as alterations in import costs, and the broader strategic implications for India’s energy security and foreign policy orientation.

      Vrinda Sahai

  • Paper
    India-China Economic Ties: Determinants and Possibilities

    This paper examines the evolution of India-China economic ties from 2005 to 2025. It explores the impact of global events, bilateral political ties, and domestic policies on distinct spheres of the economic relationship.

      Santosh Pai

  • Commentary
    TRUST and Tariffs

    The India-U.S. relationship currently appears buffeted between three “Ts”—TRUST, Tariffs, and Trump.

      Arun K. Singh

  • Article
    Can Geopolitical Alignment Seal the India-EU FTA?

    This article argues that the geopolitical circumstances have never been more conducive, not merely for the early conclusion of the free trade agreement (FTA) between India and the EU, but also for crafting a substantive and comprehensive strategic partnership.

      Mohan Kumar

  • Article
    A Path Out of Tunisia’s Economic Crisis

    President Kais Saied has won a second term in office, but his country is facing a host of problems that necessitate urgent reforms, above all preventing the possibility of a financial meltdown. 

      Ishac Diwan, Hachemi Alaya, Hamza Meddeb

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie India
Carnegie India logo, white
Unit C-4, 5, 6, EdenparkShaheed Jeet Singh MargNew Delhi – 110016, IndiaPhone: 011-40078687
  • Research
  • About
  • Experts
  • Projects
  • Events
  • Contact
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie India
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.