The lack of a coordinated response from Arab states to the war in Gaza has been seen as a failure. But this assumes that Arab unity was ever a reality. For decades, Arab publics have been calling for a unified stance on the Palestinian question, against Israel, but Gaza has exposed how thin the Arab consensus has become. This fractured foreign Arab policy is not a situation born overnight, but underlines that Arab states tend not to organize their behavior around shared causes, but around national interests, risk management, and regime survival.

Historically, the idea of a unified Arab stance on Palestine is deeply rooted in regional political memory. Yet, in reality, Arab governments never shared a common policy agenda toward Palestine. Emergency summits and collective statements created a semblance of unity, but never resulted in tangible actions to resolve the Palestinian problem. National and diplomatic priorities were always less about shaping outcomes and more about reaffirming legitimacy. Gaza has exposed how this model of Arab consensus, rooted in symbolism rather than coordination, has lost much of its political credibility.

The Gaza war reignited Arab public anger over Palestine, expressed through mass protests, online mobilization, and renewed boycott campaigns. However, such pressure had very little influence over foreign policy decisions. In most Arab states, diplomacy and security relations with Israel have been shaped by other considerations. Gaza uncovered the limits of public pressure in systems in which accountability mechanisms remain weak.

The limited Arab reaction during the Gaza war was rooted in deeper factors. Economic vulnerability was a major constraint in determining Arab responses. Many states operate under severe financial burdens, driven by high debt levels, reliance on foreign aid, and exposure to the fluctuations in global markets. Countries such as Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq depend heavily on financial assistance from the United States and faced structural economic challenges that hindered them from engaging in any level of escalation against Israel. Even wealthier Gulf states were inhibited by their integration into the global market and Israeli investment flows in their countries. Measures such as energy leverage and trade disruptions carried risks that Arab governments were unwilling to take on behalf of the Palestinian cause. This limited room for maneuver with Israel did not eliminate sympathy for Gaza, but it shaped, and still shapes, how that sympathy is expressed mainly in rhetorical rather than confrontational ways.

Security dependence on the United States further complicated the Arab situation. Most Arab states rely on U.S. military aid, arms supplies, and intelligence cooperation to manage threats from within the region and globally. Washington’s ceiling on Arab governments has always constrained any meaningful Arab response toward Palestine. That is why reactions to Gaza took place within defined political boundaries and confining security architectures.

Beyond external constraints, the internal Arab political order itself has always been complicated in ways that undermine collective action. The region is characterized by rivalry, mistrust, and authoritarian governance systems. In such systems, control of public opinion and restrictions on political participation weaken the ability of societies to translate popular solidarity with Palestine into organized, sustained, and effective pressure on decisionmakers. Authoritarian governance fragments collective action, prioritizes regime stability over regional coordination, and hinders the emergence of coherent, impactful Arab responses to the Palestinian question.

A result of all these constraints is engagement in mostly symbolic politics, reflected in vague statements, aid deliveries, and diplomatic gestures, but nothing of political substance. The Arab response, therefore, was focused on visibility rather than impact, and reassurance rather than pressure. However, this does not mean the Gaza war had no consequences. It complicated normalization efforts and raised the level of popular rejection of engagement with Israel. The central lesson of Gaza was not that Arab states failed to formulate a collective and effective response, but that expectations of Arab unity were simply not realistic.

Gaza did not change Arab foreign policy; it showed how deeply Arab action was limited and entangled in many political fractures. Realistically, big moves are not possible in the current regional climate. However, that does not mean that nothing can be done. Arab governments retain room for coordinated, low-cost actions that can move beyond symbolism. These include selectively leveraging energy and trade relations where feasible, using existing diplomatic channels to sustain pressure in multilateral forums, institutionalizing humanitarian assistance rather than treating it as episodic charity, and engaging in international legal and accountability mechanisms to internationalize the cost of Israel’s actions. 

None of these steps require breaking security alliances or risking regime stability. However, together they would signal a shift away from a performative consensus to issue-specific coordination. Civil society, meanwhile, should be listened to more responsibly, as it can bring the tragedy of Gaza before the international community and increase scrutiny of Israel to stop its actions in Palestine. It’s time for Arab states to unify around Gaza in a way that aims to achieve tangible results, beyond slogans and summits that achieve nothing.