The conflict did not reshape Arab foreign policy; on the contrary it exposed its limits.
Angie Omar
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Source: Carnegie
For Immediate Release: May 28, 2002 Promise, Peril for U.S. in India-Pakistan Rivalry
Experts Urge U.S. to Use Ties to Promote Nuclear Stability
In the wake of reports that top U.S. officials believed Pakistan may have mobilized its nuclear forces in the India-Pakistan border conflict of 1999, a timely Carnegie Endowment working paper calls on Washington to use its influence on the subcontinent to promote nuclear stability. Based on policy briefs and discussions commissioned and organized by the Stanley Foundation in October 2001, "A New Equation: U.S. Policy toward India and Pakistan after September 11" both cautions and guides the U.S. role in this 21st century game of nuclear brinkmanship. "Tensions in South Asia are increasing dangerously," says Joseph Cirincione, director of the Carnegie Non-Proliferation Project. "This paper is an essential reminder that the war on terror must complement, not supplant, the work to prevent the spread or use of nuclear weapons."
The preface and first essay are by former Carnegie Endowment visiting scholar Lee Feinstein, who was a member of the State Department team charged with responding to the 1998 India-Pakistan nuclear tests. His essay examines the uncharted territory of simultaneous strong U.S. relations with India and Pakistan since 9/11. Feinstein urges the administration to resist ignoring nonproliferation issues, noting that key decisions by India and Pakistan on their nuclear programs remain open. The second essay, by James Clad, evaluates the foreign policy objectives of India and Pakistan and notes that the "strange outcome" of 9/11 might provide an "unexpected chance to get down to fundamentals" over Kashmir.
The third essay, by Lewis Dunn, identifies new and enduring nonproliferation priorities for U.S. policymakers. Dunn pays special attention to the tension between promoting programs intended to enhance nuclear security, and the requirement to observe legal prohibitions on nuclear assistance to India and Pakistan. The final essay, by David Albright, examines the security of Pakistani nuclear weapons and technology in light of the increased concern over nuclear terrorism and the prospect of an "Islamic bomb."
For copies, contact pubs@ceip.org, or go online at www.ceip.org/pubs.
Lee Feinstein, former deputy head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, is a Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund. James Clad is the former Henry R. Luce Foundation Research Professor of Southeast Asian Studies in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. Lewis A. Dunn is senior vice president at Science Applications International Corporation. David Albright is president and founder of the Institute for Science and International Security.
# # #
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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