• Commentary
  • Research
  • Experts
  • Events
Carnegie China logoCarnegie lettermark logo
{
  "authors": [],
  "type": "pressRelease",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
  ],
  "collections": [],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "ctw",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
  "programAffiliation": "SAP",
  "programs": [
    "South Asia"
  ],
  "projects": [],
  "regions": [
    "North America",
    "United States",
    "China"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Military",
    "Foreign Policy",
    "Nuclear Policy"
  ]
}
REQUIRED IMAGE

REQUIRED IMAGE

Press Release

Press Release: Space and Security - China’s Antisatellite Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective

Link Copied
Published on Jun 22, 2007

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: June 22, 2007

- NEWS RELEASE - 

WASHINGTON, June 22--In a provocative new policy brief, Ashley J. Tellis challenges the conventional wisdom that China’s antisatellite test (ASAT) was a protest against U.S. space policy, arguing instead that it was part of a loftier strategy to combat U.S. military superiority and one that China will not trade away in any arms-control regime.

Far from a response to assertive U.S. space policies, Tellis contends in Punching the U.S. Military’s “Soft Ribs”: China’s Antisatellite Weapon Test in Strategic Perspective that the ASAT test was part of a more ambitious goal—namely defeating superior U.S. conventional forces, both in a potential war over Taiwan, as well as other long-term, geopolitical scenarios.  The author states that Chinese analyses of U.S. military operations since Dessert Storm concluded that U.S. military might depends inordinately on space-based systems for its operational effectiveness and hence must be targeted if China is to be able to stand up to the enormity of U.S. conventional military power. 

Key conclusions:

  • China’s strategists have concluded that efforts to defeat U.S. military power should not aim its capacity to deliver overwhelming conventional firepower from long distances, but instead target its weakest links, namely its space-based capabilities and their related ground installations.
  • China is highly unlikely to abandon its counterspace program, as doing so would condemn its armed forces to inevitable defeat against U.S. power.  Consequently, it will not enter into any arms-control regime that would further accentuate its competitors’ military advantages. 
  • The U.S. domination of space—which underwrites both its civilian and military advantages—is at risk, and therefore necessitates a series of remedial investments.
  • The growing Chinese capability for space warfare implies that a major conflict in the Taiwan Strait would entail serious deterrence and crisis instabilities. 

Notes:

  1. To read this Policy Brief, go to www.carnegieendowment.org/SouthAsia
    Direct link to the PDF: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb_51_tellis_final.pdf
  2. Ashley J. Tellis is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment, specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues. 
  3. To request an interview with Tellis, please contact Trent Perrotto, Communications Manager, 202-939-2372, tperrotto@ceip.org
  4. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is a private, nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing cooperation between nations and promoting active international engagement by the United States. Founded in 1910, its work is nonpartisan and dedicated to achieving practical results.  The Endowment has added operations in Beijing, Beirut, and Brussels to join the longstanding offices in Washington and Moscow as part of its transformation into the first global think tank.

###

MilitaryForeign PolicyNuclear PolicyNorth AmericaUnited StatesChina

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie China

  • Commentary
    China Financial Markets
    Who Paid for China’s Last Debt Cleanup, and Who Will Pay for the Next?

    China’s banking crisis in the 2000s was resolved by transferring the costs to households through financial repression—a decision that recapitalized the banks while exacerbating the structural imbalances that continue to shape the Chinese economy today.

      Michael Pettis

  • Robot arm with disposable test tube virus sampling in laboratory
    Commentary
    Caught in the Middle: Chinese Biotech Firms’ Divergent Responses to U.S. Sanctions

    Chinese biotech companies have been on the receiving end of U.S. economic coercion. Yet their responses have differed significantly because firm and state interests are not uniformly aligned. For Washington, treating all Chinese tech firms the same, irrespective of their actual interests, risks pushing them farther into Beijing’s corner.

      Xue Gong

  • An aerial drone photo taken on June 4, 2026 shows a wind-photovoltaic power storage station of Huadian Inner Mongolia New Energy Co., Ltd. as part of the Horinger data center cluster green energy supply demonstration project, in Hohhot, north China's Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region.
    Commentary
    Are Data Centers the Solution to China’s Renewables Excess Capacity?

    China’s latest energy plan explicitly calls for integrating data centers into the electricity system, particularly connecting them to green energy. It appears Beijing wants to use compute as a source of domestic demand to absorb renewables excess capacity.

      • Damien Ma

      Damien Ma

  • Commentary
    Emissary
    Trump and Xi Are Angling for Three Years of Stability

    But their "principal to principal" model will only be as effective as the political strength of each leader back home.

      • Damien Ma

      Damien Ma

  • Commentary
    China Sells Stability Amid American Volatility

    U.S. unpredictability has allowed China to capitalize on its positioning as the “responsible great power”. Paradoxically, the more China wins the perception game, the more likely expectations will rise for Beijing to deliver not just words but to demonstrate with its deeds.

      Chong Ja Ian

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie China
Carnegie China logo, white
Keck Seng Tower133 Cecil Street #10-01ASingapore, 069535Phone: +65 9650 7648
  • Research
  • About
  • Experts
  • Events
  • Contact
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie China
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.