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Source: Getty

In The Media

Obama's Afghanistan Strategy

Obama’s Afghanistan strategy makes two welcome changes to existing strategy: It limits U.S. objectives to fighting al-Qaeda stationed in Pakistan, and it focuses on training the Afghan army, who will ultimately lead the war.

Link Copied
By Gilles Dorronsoro
Published on Mar 30, 2009

Source: The Washington Post

Obama's Afghanistan Strategy Obama's speech is a first effort to articulate a comprehensive strategy after years of what can best be described as no strategy. Two points are welcome. First, he is limiting U.S. objectives in Afghanistan to fighting al-Qaeda and offering greater resources to achieve this more delineated goal. Since al-Qaeda is based mainly in Pakistan, Obama's new policy gives more resources to stabilize Pakistan and to fight radical movements there. Second, the president's statement that he will send 4,000 men to train the Afghan army is important because it may allow for the Afghanization of the war and create the conditions for a responsible withdrawal.

But these hopeful signs are tempered by real challenges. Sending $1.5 billion annually to Pakistan may help stabilize the country, but it won't eradicate al-Qaeda's activities on the border. Sending hundreds of American civilians to assist the Afghan government, as Obama suggests, may weaken Afghan state institutions. Already undermined by the American tendency to work directly with provincial governors and autonomous nongovernmental organizations, the Afghan state may now also face a nationalist backlash by a population that sees its institutions as not only ineffective but controlled by foreign forces.

Finally, Obama's proposal for negotiating with the Taliban is based on the false notion that the insurgency is largely made up of paid fighters who can be bought off. In fact, the Taliban have limited but real social support, and it is doubtful it can be split.

About the Author

Gilles Dorronsoro

Former Nonresident Scholar, South Asia Program

Dorronsoro’s research focuses on security and political development in Afghanistan. He was a professor of political science at the Sorbonne in Paris and the Institute of Political Studies of Rennes.

    Recent Work

  • Paper
    Waiting for the Taliban in Afghanistan

      Gilles Dorronsoro

  • Paper
    Afghanistan: The Impossible Transition

      Gilles Dorronsoro

Gilles Dorronsoro
Former Nonresident Scholar, South Asia Program
Gilles Dorronsoro
SecurityMilitaryForeign PolicyNorth AmericaUnited StatesSouth AsiaAfghanistanPakistan

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

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