Deep Impact—Fukushima and the Future of Nuclear Power

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In The Media

Deep Impact—Fukushima and the Future of Nuclear Power

Since the accident at Japan's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power, countries have reviewed the safety of their nuclear infrastructure and plans for expansion, with some choosing to cease their nuclear programs altogether.

By Mark Hibbs

Published on Apr 13, 2012

Source: Jane's Intelligence Review

In the aftermath of fact-finding missions carried out by Japanese authorities, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and other nuclear safety bodies, it appears likely that the March 2011 nuclear disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi power plant could have been avoided.

Although the Japanese government and nuclear industry have not formally acknowledged this, Japan's reactor owners and oversight bodies have responded to the accident by preparing to implement safety enhancements at the country's nuclear power plants, which, had they been in place at Fukushima at the time of the disaster, would have prevented the accident. Internationally, government agencies regulating more than 400 nuclear reactors worldwide have sought to uncover any vulnerabilities to externally caused events that might result in a similar catastrophe.

Before the onset of the Fukushima nuclear crisis, which was triggered by a huge earthquake and tsunami that struck the plant on 11 March 2011, more than 30 countries were considering establishing their own nuclear power programmes, and global nuclear energy production was projected to triple over the next 50 years. Dubbed a 'nuclear renaissance' by energy analysts and the international media, countries looking to meet increasing energy demands were enticed by the relatively low operating costs and reduced carbon emissions offered by nuclear power - particularly at a time when the industry had managed to recover its reputation following serious accidents at Three Mile Island in the United States in 1979 and at Chernobyl in the Soviet Union in 1986.

However, the Fukushima crisis has clearly set back the tide of interest in nuclear 'new builds' and has curbed power production in those states with existing nuclear programmes - including Japan. The revelation that, like the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl incidents before it, the Fukushima crisis largely resulted from errors of judgment will be a key factor in decisions by governments, regulators and the general public regarding the use of nuclear power in the months and years ahead.

This article was originally published in Jane's Intelligence Review.

About the Author

Mark Hibbs

Nonresident Senior Fellow, Nuclear Policy Program

Hibbs is a Germany-based nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. His areas of expertise are nuclear verification and safeguards, multilateral nuclear trade policy, international nuclear cooperation, and nonproliferation arrangements.

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Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

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