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Source: Getty
In any crisis, even in the midst of a pandemic, there is a moment where everybody might benefit from taking a deep breath and thinking clearly about the way forward.
Source: Hill
China’s foreign ministry — not unlike the U.S. State Department’s own checkered reputation in the United States — has a reputation among some in China for too often apologizing to foreign government positions and, in these fraught times, for committing the crime of excessive reasonableness. The foreign ministry’s strategy for mitigating such accusations, not surprisingly, is to employ a spokesperson who can protect the ministry from such critics, and demonstrate that the foreign ministry is not full of apologists as it is often accused, but rather is one that can fight back, and fight back hard. Enter foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian.
On March 11, a lightyear ago in coronavirus time, Zhao Lijian tweeted that “it might be the US army” that brought the disease to China, an accusation that had been making its way across China’s very active blogosphere where just about anything goes, provided it doesn’t include criticism of the Beijing government.
Former Nonresident Senior Fellow, Asia Program
Ambassador Christopher Robert Hill is currently an adjunct professor at Columbia SIPA. He is a former career diplomat, a four-time ambassador, nominated by three presidents, whose last post was as ambassador to Iraq.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
Chinese biotech companies have been on the receiving end of U.S. economic coercion. Yet their responses have differed significantly because firm and state interests are not uniformly aligned. For Washington, treating all Chinese tech firms the same, irrespective of their actual interests, risks pushing them farther into Beijing’s corner.
Xue Gong
China’s latest energy plan explicitly calls for integrating data centers into the electricity system, particularly connecting them to green energy. It appears Beijing wants to use compute as a source of domestic demand to absorb renewables excess capacity.
Damien Ma
But their "principal to principal" model will only be as effective as the political strength of each leader back home.
Damien Ma
U.S. unpredictability has allowed China to capitalize on its positioning as the “responsible great power”. Paradoxically, the more China wins the perception game, the more likely expectations will rise for Beijing to deliver not just words but to demonstrate with its deeds.
Chong Ja Ian
Hanoi and Beijing have long treated each other as distant cousins rather than comrades in arms. That might be changing as both sides draw closer to hedge against uncertainty and America’s erratic behavior.
Nguyễn Khắc Giang