Principles for Reforming the Nuclear Order

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In The Media

Principles for Reforming the Nuclear Order

The "first nuclear order" inherited from the Cold War is under growing pressure. Before discussing how a reformed nuclear order could be built, it is necessary to identify and discuss the basic principles defining the old order. Without this understanding the current effort will fail.

By George Perkovich

Published on Oct 20, 2008

Source: Ifri Security Studies Center Proliferation Paper No. 22

The creation of a rules-based regime for managing nuclear technology and preventing its proliferation for weapons purposes is a historically remarkable achievement. Its foundation is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system established in the late 1950s, which reflected the recognition that nuclear material and technology needed to be closely monitored with common standards if the benefits of atomic energy were to be widely and safely shared. The cornerstone of this regime is the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which recognized that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons required the provision of major incentives to states that might otherwise seek these weapons. These incentives were security – agreement by "your" neighbors not to acquire nuclear weapons, and by the established nuclear-weapon states to protect you – technological cooperation, and the promise of a more equitable nuclear future when no one possesses nuclear weapons.

Click here for other Proliferation Papers published by the Institut Français des Relations Internationales' (Ifri) Security Studies Center.

Nuclear Policy

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

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