• Research
  • Diwan
  • About
  • Experts
Carnegie Middle East logoCarnegie lettermark logo
LebanonIran
{
  "authors": [
    "Christophe Jaffrelot"
  ],
  "type": "legacyinthemedia",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
    "Carnegie India"
  ],
  "collections": [],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "ctw",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
  "programAffiliation": "SAP",
  "programs": [
    "South Asia"
  ],
  "projects": [],
  "regions": [
    "South Asia",
    "India"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Political Reform"
  ]
}

Source: Getty

In The Media

State and Parivar

The Rashtriya Swayamasevak Sangh, a paramilitary volunteer organization in India, no longer relies solely on grassroots growth. Its groundwork is now supplemented by statism.

Link Copied
By Christophe Jaffrelot
Published on Feb 23, 2017

Source: Indian Express

Traditionally, the RSS focused on the transformation of society by “reforming” people at the grassroots level. This is what the shakha technique is all about: Dr K.B. Hedgewar, the founder of the movement, introduced it in the 1920s in order to attract children, to shape their mindset according to the “right” samskar. Hence the key role of the pracharaks who dedicate their life to the organisation and appear as the role models swayamsevaks are supposed to emulate. This variant of the guru-shishya relationship made no room for the state and politics at large. M.S. Golwalkar, the successor of Hedgewar, claimed that the RSS aimed to “mould the ‘inner man’ after an ideal”, something only ground work at the social and psychological levels could do. As a result, Golwalkar focused on the shakha network and refused to support any political party till the 1950s. When he resigned himself to do so with the creation of the Jana Sangh, this party remained very reluctant towards all kinds of statism.

The chief ideologue of the Jana Sangh — and of the Sangh Parivar at large — Deendayal Upadhyaya, opposed the socialist agenda of Nehru primarily for this reason. In his book Integral Humanism, he argued that in the Indian tradition, social relations prevailed in which “the king and the state were never considered supreme”. That was partly due, in his view, to a deep rooted sense of decentralisation: “The mightiest of the kings did not ever disturb the panchayats. Similarly there were associations on the basis of trade. These two were never disturbed by the state; on the contrary, their autonomy was recognised”.

 

Such a viewpoint had affinities with the Gandhian repertoire since Mahatma Gandhi was also eager to promote a stateless India, where villages would live in semi-autarky. But it was diametrically opposed to Nehru’s policy. In his critique of the first five-year plans, Upadhyaya adopted a Gandhian tone: “By taking up programmes of heavy industries”, he argued, “the (Planning) Commission intended to bring about a structural change in our society. Their aim is to build an industrial in place of an agricultural society. But we cannot build a pyramid from the top downwards”.

Today, the BJP is probably more Nehruvian than Gandhian, not in abstracto — because it fundamentally followed none of them — but in the sense that it believes more in the state-oriented top-down modus operandum than in a bottom-up philosophy. Certainly, Narendra Modi has called on the Indian citizens to behave properly, something Gandhi did repeatedly in his own way. That was the sub-text of the Swachh Bharat scheme — whose symbol, unsurprisingly, has been the Mahatma’s spectacles. Similarly, his 2014 Red Fort speech requested parents to make sure that their sons respected girls and invited them to adopt non-selfish conduct: “Brothers and sisters”, he said, “can someone please tell me as to whether he or she has ever introspected in the evening after a full day’s work as to whether his or her acts have helped the poor of the country or not, whether his or her actions have resulted in safeguarding the interest of the country or not, whether the actions have been directed in country’s welfare or not?”

But the promotion of virtuous citizenship, beyond this kind of rhetoric, has not been as strong as that of an assertive state. Not only has politics become pervasive in a new manner, with the prime minister saturating the public space — not necessarily on moral subjects — but policies have epitomised a new kind of dirigism.

While the election manifesto of the BJP claimed, in 2014, that India had wasted 70 years because “Governance in these decades was marred by lack of trust, leading to excessive controls and lack of people’s participation”, till today, the Modi government has adopted a state-dominated logic in key domains.

First, the liberalisation of the economy has not proceeded more quickly than under the Congress-led UPA regime. Not only have privatisations not been more numerous, but India has not made very significant progress according to the World Bank’s ease of doing business index — it now occupies rank 130 (out of 190). This month, the Heritage Foundation, an American think tank, has even downgraded India in its yearly report on the basis of its Index of Economic Freedom. India has slipped from 123rd to 143rd rank and joined the “mostly unfree” economies category.

More importantly, the demonetisation measure has been justified by RSS ideologues in quasi coercive terms. S. Gurumurthy, for instance, declared about this move: “Nothing happens in India through persuasion, which is why determined action by the government is justified.”

Certainly, the moral discourse inherited from the socio-psychological repertoire of the RSS showed some resilience, since the PM himself justified demonetisation by the fight against corruption and congratulated Indian citizens for the sacrifice they were doing for the nation, standing in long queues with no slogans or protests. But the dominant idiom was statist and top-down. Venkaiah Naidu explained, in a piece in this paper, that demonetisation was “a part of the grand ‘cultural revolution’ that the PM is working on. The entrenched old order needs to make way for a new normal. This cultural revolution, impinging on all walks of public and private life, amounts to shaking up the system”. These words echo those of Golwalkar who wanted to build a new man too.

The project presented by Gurumurthy and Naidu is equally ambitious, since it intends to reshape public and private life, but it does not use the same route. The RSS of yesterday worked at the grassroot level and tried to rally people around the absolutist plan of a perfectly unified society. Today, the state is the relevant agency. Hence the use of communist notions, like “cultural revolution”, a Maoist invention. China has also been presented as a model by another heavyweight of the government, Nitin Gadkari, who said in the Davos World Economic Forum Annual Meeting, that India aspired to be “a global economic superpower and (that) it would need to work at the same speed as China in terms of policies, administration and decision making processes” to fulfill this ambition.

Whether such developments are compatible with democracy remains to be seen, but an important shift has occurred in the Sangh Parivar towards a statist style, which is now supplementing the groundwork of the RSS.

This article was originally published in the Indian Express.

About the Author

Christophe Jaffrelot

Former Nonresident Scholar, South Asia Program

Jaffrelot’s core research focuses on theories of nationalism and democracy, mobilization of the lower castes and Dalits (ex-untouchables) in India, the Hindu nationalist movement, and ethnic conflicts in Pakistan.

    Recent Work

  • Research
    The BJP in Power: Indian Democracy and Religious Nationalism
      • Rahul Verma
      • +4

      Milan Vaishnav, Rahul Verma, Rukmini S., …

  • Article
    Ceasefire Violations in Kashmir: A War by Other Means?

      Christophe Jaffrelot

Christophe Jaffrelot
Former Nonresident Scholar, South Asia Program
Christophe Jaffrelot
Political ReformSouth AsiaIndia

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center

  • Commentary
    Sada
    Navigating Danger: Syrian Refugees in Lebanon Risk Returning

    A humanitarian crisis in Lebanon deepens, and Syrian refugees face a perilous choice: remain in a war-torn environment or return to Syria where they risk encountering significant dangers and discrimination. There are significant challenges and risks to their search for safety in Syria.

      Haid Haid

  • Commentary
    Diwan
    Disquiet on the West Asian Front

    In an interview, Abhinav Pandya discusses the multiple facets of India’s ties with the Middle East.

      Armenak Tokmajyan

  • Paper
    Borders Without a Nation: Syria, Outside Powers, and Open-Ended Instability

    In Syria’s border regions, changes in demographics, economics, and security mean that an inter-Syrian peace process will require consensus among main regional powers that Syria must remain united, that no one side can be victorious, and that perennial instability threatens the region.

      Kheder Khaddour, Armenak Tokmajyan

  • Research
    The Military and Private Business Actors in the Global South: The Politics of Market Access

    The interaction of national armed forces and private business sectors offers a useful lens for viewing the politics of numerous countries of the so-called Global South. A rising trend of military political activism—often accompanied by military commercial activity—underlines the importance of drivers and outcomes in these relationships.

      Yezid Sayigh, Hamza Meddeb

  • Rally organized by lawyers from the Toulouse Bar to protest against the arrest of their Tunisian colleague Sonia Dahmani and journalists, in front of the consulate in Toulouse, southwest of France, on May 16, 2024
    Commentary
    Diwan
    Why Tunisia Lost Faith in Democracy

    For many in the society, the post-Ben Ali years were mainly about successive economic crises and political instability.

      Jasmine Khelil

Get more news and analysis from
Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center
Carnegie Middle East logo, white
  • Research
  • Diwan
  • About
  • Experts
  • Projects
  • Events
  • Contact
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
Get more news and analysis from
Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.