• Research
  • About
  • Experts
Carnegie India logoCarnegie lettermark logo
AI
{
  "authors": [
    "Dmitri Trenin"
  ],
  "type": "legacyinthemedia",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
    "Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center"
  ],
  "collections": [],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center",
  "programAffiliation": "",
  "programs": [],
  "projects": [],
  "regions": [
    "North America",
    "United States",
    "East Asia",
    "South Korea",
    "China",
    "Japan",
    "Russia",
    "North Korea"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Foreign Policy"
  ]
}

Source: Getty

In The Media
Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center

Russia-NK Opening Sends Message to Region

By reactivating its policy on Pyongyang, Moscow is sending messages to Seoul, Tokyo, Washington, and Beijing, which should be properly understood.

Link Copied
By Dmitri Trenin
Published on Dec 2, 2014

Source: Global Times

The recent visit to Russia by a special representative of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has highlighted Moscow's new opening to Pyongyang. It comes after other visits and meetings between Russians and North Koreans that have become more frequent of late. 

Evidently, Russia is bidding to play a more active role on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia as a whole. By reactivating its policy on Pyongyang, Moscow is sending messages to Seoul, Tokyo, Washington and Beijing. These should be properly understood.

The message to Seoul is that Moscow has regained a bit of influence in the North, which it can use in dealing with the South. This can refer both to stability-building economic projects, such as the proposed Trans-Korean gas pipeline and the rail link, and to security concerns such as the nuclear issue and the military standoff across the Demilitarized Zone.

Clearly, Moscow expects Seoul to stay away from the US-led sanctions drive against Russia. The Kremlin regards the sanctions as a means of war, and considers the sanctioning countries as unfriendly.

If Seoul wants to keep the good relationship with Moscow that emerged at the end of the Cold War, and even fill part of the niche vacated by Germany, it needs to protect its economic ties to Moscow from US pressure to curtail them.

The message to Tokyo is different. Japan has already crossed the line, in terms of anti-Russian sanctions. In response, Russia is toughening its position toward Japan. The window for resolving the long-running territorial dispute over the South Kuril Islands has closed. Rather than balancing China, as Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had hoped, Moscow is getting closer to Beijing, in both energy and military spheres.

Russia is also bolstering its own geopolitical and military presence in Northeast Asia. Following Washington's policy on Russia has its costs for Tokyo.

Washington, which now brands Russia as a member of the new "axis of evil," alongside the IS and Ebola, has, for the first time since the end of the Cold War, gained a major adversary.

Even though most Americans continue to see Russia as a declining power, the new confrontation promises to be long and tough. US strategic planners will have to factor Russia back in also in the Pacific, where China has emerged at the pinnacle of the Kissingerian triangle of Washington, Moscow and Beijing.

The message to Beijing is more subtle and much friendlier. Russia recognizes China's strength, respects its interests, and regards it as a close partner, valuing highly the relationship with it.

At the same time, Russia sees itself as a great power in its own right, which acts out of its own set of interests and underlying values.

To Beijing, Moscow can be a friend, but not a follower. Russian and Chinese positions on a great number of issues may coincide or overlap, but even there Moscow will act as its own man.

The Chinese will appreciate it: The Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s unraveled when the Russians failed to understand that China, even in its relative and temporary weakness at the time, never stopped thinking of itself as a great power, second to none.

Pyongyang may be tired of Beijing relaying US messages to them. North Koreans may hope to gain something from Moscow, which is now back in long-term conflict with Washington.

However, they, too, need to see the limits of their old game of playing one sponsor off another. To be a real player, North Korea needs to step out of its isolation and reenter the region.

Restarting the Six-Party Talks, as the North Korean leader suggested in his message to Russian President Vladimir Putin, is the right first step. Sending that message through Moscow, under the present circumstances, is a smart move.

This article originally appeared in Global Times.

About the Author

Dmitri Trenin

Former Director, Carnegie Moscow Center

Trenin was director of the Carnegie Moscow Center from 2008 to early 2022.

    Recent Work

  • Commentary
    Mapping Russia’s New Approach to the Post-Soviet Space

      Dmitri Trenin

  • Commentary
    What a Week of Talks Between Russia and the West Revealed

      Dmitri Trenin

Dmitri Trenin
Former Director, Carnegie Moscow Center
Foreign PolicyNorth AmericaUnited StatesEast AsiaSouth KoreaChinaJapanRussiaNorth Korea

Carnegie India does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie India

  • Commentary
    India Signs the Pax Silica—A Counter to Pax Sinica?

    On the last day of the India AI Impact Summit, India signed Pax Silica, a U.S.-led declaration seemingly focused on semiconductors. While India’s accession to the same was not entirely unforeseen, becoming a signatory nation this quickly was not on the cards either.

      Konark Bhandari

  • Commentary
    The Impact of U.S. Sanctions and Tariffs on India’s Russian Oil Imports

    This piece examines India’s response to U.S. sanctions and tariffs, specifically assessing the immediate market consequences, such as alterations in import costs, and the broader strategic implications for India’s energy security and foreign policy orientation.

      Vrinda Sahai

  • Paper
    India-China Economic Ties: Determinants and Possibilities

    This paper examines the evolution of India-China economic ties from 2005 to 2025. It explores the impact of global events, bilateral political ties, and domestic policies on distinct spheres of the economic relationship.

      Santosh Pai

  • Commentary
    NISAR Soars While India-U.S. Tariff Tensions Simmer

    On July 30, 2025, the United States announced 25 percent tariffs on Indian goods. While diplomatic tensions simmered on the trade front, a cosmic calm prevailed at the Sriharikota launch range. Officials from NASA and ISRO were preparing to launch an engineering marvel into space—the NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar (NISAR), marking a significant milestone in the India-U.S. bilateral partnership.

      Tejas Bharadwaj

  • Article
    Hidden Tides: IUU Fishing and Regional Security Dynamics for India

    This article examines the scale and impact of Chinese IUU fishing operations globally and identifies the nature of the challenge posed by IUU fishing in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). It also investigates why existing maritime law and international frameworks have struggled to address this growing threat.

      Ajay Kumar, Charukeshi Bhatt

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie India
Carnegie India logo, white
Unit C-4, 5, 6, EdenparkShaheed Jeet Singh MargNew Delhi – 110016, IndiaPhone: 011-40078687
  • Research
  • About
  • Experts
  • Projects
  • Events
  • Contact
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie India
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.