Nuclear Prevention and Red Lines: The Case of Iran

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In The Media

Nuclear Prevention and Red Lines: The Case of Iran

Although there is no precedent for a preventive UN Security Council resolution, it should be more effective in making clear to Iran the negative consequences of its actions than any post facto curative measure.

By Pierre Goldschmidt

Published on Mar 22, 2010

Source: Paper prepared for IISS-CFR Workshop

Nuclear Prevention and Red Lines: The Case of IranPrecautionary measures have not been sufficiently applied to preventing against the risks of nuclear proliferation. Iran has repeatedly crossed red lines regarding its nuclear program with impunity. The best way to prevent the Iranian nuclear crisis from escalating would be for the UN Security Council (UNSC) to adopt a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter deciding that if Iran were to produce high enriched uranium, to separate plutonium, or to notify its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a number of strong and well-defined sanctions would automatically be implemented without requiring a further UNSC resolution. Although there is no precedent for such a preventive UNSC resolution, it should be more effective in making clear to Iran the negative consequences of its actions than any post facto curative measure.

About the Author

Pierre Goldschmidt

Former Nonresident Senior Associate, Nuclear Policy Program

Goldschmidt was a nonresident senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment.

Recent Work

Article
A Realistic Approach Toward a Middle East Free of WMD
- Pierre Goldschmidt
Article
Serious Deficiencies Exposed by Latest IAEA Safeguards Implementation Report
- Pierre Goldschmidt

Security Nuclear Policy Nuclear Energy Middle East Iran Gulf

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

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