Bombs Away? Being Realistic About Deep Nuclear Reductions

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In The Media

Bombs Away? Being Realistic About Deep Nuclear Reductions

Skeptics and supporters alike tend to ignore the practical realities of deep nuclear reductions. Nuclear-armed states will only agree to deep reductions if several demanding conditions are met.

By James M. Acton

Published on Mar 19, 2012

Source: Washington Quarterly

There are about 22,000 nuclear warheads in the world today. Reducing that number—eventually to zero—is a major element of U.S. President Barack Obama’s foreign policy. To date, his administration’s progress toward this goal has been modest, even with agreement on a new round of U.S.–Russian cuts with the New START treaty.

Nonetheless, opponents of his agenda, particularly in Congress, worry that any further arms control will pitch the United States down a slippery slope toward zero. Simultaneously, supporters increasingly complain that Obama has not been bold enough. Their frustration, which is felt in capitals across the world, risks compromising the willingness of key states to support important U.S. foreign policy objectives, especially those related to nonproliferation.

Neither these fears nor these frustrations are fair. Skeptics and supporters tend to ignore the practical realities of deep reductions. Nuclear-armed states will only agree to deep reductions if at least three demanding conditions are met.

Full text available in the Washington Quarterly.

About the Author

James M. Acton

Jessica T. Mathews Chair, Co-director, Nuclear Policy Program

Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

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Nuclear Policy North America United States Caucasus Russia

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

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