• Research
  • Diwan
  • About
  • Experts
Carnegie Middle East logoCarnegie lettermark logo
LebanonIran
{
  "authors": [
    "Karim Sadjadpour"
  ],
  "type": "legacyinthemedia",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
  ],
  "collections": [
    "Arab Awakening"
  ],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "menaTransitions",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
  "programAffiliation": "MEP",
  "programs": [
    "Middle East"
  ],
  "projects": [],
  "regions": [
    "Middle East",
    "Iran",
    "Syria"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Political Reform"
  ]
}

Source: Getty

In The Media

Iran Will Be Central No Matter the Outcome

No country stands to lose more from the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria than its lone regional ally, the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Link Copied
By Karim Sadjadpour
Published on Aug 9, 2012

Source: New York Times

No country stands to lose more from the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria than its lone regional ally, the Islamic Republic of Iran. For this reason, no country has offered more financial and strategic aid to try and keep afloat a drowning Bashar Assad than Tehran.

The Iran-Syria alliance is a not a natural bond between nations, but a tactical-cum-strategic alliance between two authoritarian regimes. Mutual contempt for Saddam Hussein’s Iraq brought them together in 1980, and mutual fear and loathing (in that order) of the United States and Israel has helped sustain them.

Iran’s interests are to ensure that Syria remains a geo-political ally and a thoroughfare to Hezbollah. Given their lack of confidence that a Sunni-ruled, post-Assad order in Damascus would guarantee these interests, they’ve doubled and tripled down on Assad, even as civilian casualties in Syria approach 20,000. In this context, international diplomatic efforts by Kofi Annan or others to compel Tehran to abandon Assad are all but futile.

In the words of Iranian envoy Saeed Jalili, who met Bashar Assad Tuesday in Damascus, “Iran will absolutely not allow the axis of resistance, of which it considers Syria to be a main pillar, to be broken in any way." In other words, if the ends are opposing the United States and Israel, almost any means can be justified.

Iran’s combination of agility and chutzpah, however, should not be underestimated. When the Assad regime finally loses Damascus, Tehran will likely try and take credit for his exit, and use their petro-dollars to cultivate and co-opt his successors, much like they did in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein.

What’s important to Tehran is not the sectarian identity of the men who run Damascus, but their ideological outlook. Can they be partners in resistance?

In contrast to Iraq, however, where their Shiite brethren were a demographic majority, Iran will be working with an increasingly sectarian Sunni population whom they’ve been indirectly complicit in massacring the last two years.

Consequently, until then, Tehran will continue to advocate and pursue two objectives—Assad staying and calm restored—that are irreconcilable and bloody.

This article was originally published in the New York Times.

About the Author

Karim Sadjadpour

Senior Fellow, Middle East Program

Karim Sadjadpour is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he focuses on Iran and U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East.

    Recent Work

  • Q&A
    What’s Keeping the Iranian Regime in Power—for Now

      Aaron David Miller, Karim Sadjadpour, Robin Wright

  • Q&A
    How Washington and Tehran Are Assessing Their Next Steps

      Aaron David Miller, David Petraeus, Karim Sadjadpour

Karim Sadjadpour
Senior Fellow, Middle East Program
Karim Sadjadpour
Political ReformMiddle EastIranSyria

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center

  • Article
    Smuggling and Civil Peace on Lebanon’s Border: The Case of Summaqiyyeh

    The Lebanese authorities’ clampdown on illicit cross-border activity threatens to leave inhabitants of the historically neglected village, and the wider Akkar region, in an economically precarious position.

      Mohanad Hage Ali

  • Commentary
    Diwan
    A Military Balance Sheet in the U.S. and Israeli War With Iran

    In an interview, Jim Lamson discusses the ongoing regional conflict and sees an unclear picture when it comes to winners and losers. 

      Michael Young

  • Commentary
    Diwan
    Egypt’s Discrete Role in the Ceasefire with Iran

    Cairo’s efforts send a message to the United States and the region that it still has a place at the diplomatic table.

      • Angie Omar

      Angie Omar

  • Commentary
    Diwan
    Realism and the Lebanon-Israel Talks

    Beirut’s desire to break free from Iranian hegemony may push it into a situation where it has to accept Israel’s hegemony.  

      Michael Young

  • Commentary
    Diwan
    The United States and Iran Have Agreed to a Two-Week Ceasefire

    Spot analysis from Carnegie scholars on events relating to the Middle East and North Africa.

      Michael Young

Get more news and analysis from
Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center
Carnegie Middle East logo, white
  • Research
  • Diwan
  • About
  • Experts
  • Projects
  • Events
  • Contact
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
Get more news and analysis from
Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.