Paper
James M. Acton, Ankit Panda
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Source: Getty
In The Media
Why Do We Need 'Hypersonic' Strike Weapons, Exactly?
It’s hard to dispute the notion that before spending billions of dollars on a new weapon, the Pentagon ought to be able to explain what it’s for. So it’s surprising how often this rule isn’t followed. Take the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon.
Published on Sep 17, 2014
Source: Defense One
It’s hard to dispute the notion that before spending billions of dollars on a new weapon, the Pentagon ought to be able to explain what it’s for. So it’s surprising how often this rule isn’t followed.
Take the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon. Just tested last month, it’s the latest candidate technology being developed for the Defense Department’s Conventional Prompt Global Strike program, an effort to develop long-range, ultra-fast, non-nuclear weapons. Following a successful test in 2011, hopes were running high ,but the booster rocket went out of control and was deliberately destroyed shortly after its launch from Alaska. If the test had gone to plan, the rocket would have released a glider that would then have flown—without power—for about 4,000 miles across the Pacific at many times the speed of sound.
Members of Congress will undoubtedly want to know about the causes of this failure and whether a do-over is warranted (which it may well be since the glider itself never got the chance to perform). But they should also be asking tough questions about how this weapon fits into broader U.S. defense strategy.About the Author
James M. Acton
Jessica T. Mathews Chair, Co-director, Nuclear Policy Program
Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Nuclear Weapons and the Future of American Power
- The Latest Iran Deal Ignores the Lessons of the PastCommentary
James M. Acton
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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