Charles Krauthammer has been an influential columnist and longtime critic of arms control and multilateral non-proliferation treaties. In February 2004, the American Enterprise Institute will present Dr. Krauthammer, who "profoundly influenced both American foreign policy doctrine and debate," with the Irving Kristol Award for making "extraordinary intellectual or practical contributions to improved government policy, social welfare, or political understanding." Those who support and want to reinforce the non-proliferation regime have a responsibility to understand the criticisms of the regime. Below are excerpts from two of Krauthammer's articles that AEI cites as highlights of his writing:

"At the dawn of the 21st century, the task of the new administration is to develop a military and foreign policy appropriate to our position of overwhelming dominance. In its first four months in office, the Bush administration has begun the task: reversing the premises of Clinton foreign policy and adopting policies that recognize the new unipolarity and the unilateralism necessary to maintain it."

"[W]hat [Bush] proposed was a radical new nuclear doctrine: the end of arms control. Henceforth, the United States would build nuclear weapons, both offensive and defensive, to suit its needs - regardless of what others, particularly the Russians, thought. Sure, there would be consultation - no need to be impolite. Humble unilateralism, the oxymoron that best describes this approach, requires it: Be nice, be understanding. But, in the end, be undeterred."

"By summarily rejecting Kyoto, the Bush administration radically redefines the direction of American foreign policy: rejecting the multilateral straitjacket, disenthralling the United States from the notion there is real safety or benefit from internationally endorsed parchment barriers, and asserting a new American unilateralism."

"Multipolarity, yes, when there is no alternative. But not when there is. Not when we have the unique imbalance of power that we enjoy today - and that has given the international system a stability and essential tranquility it had not known for at least a century."

"Unlike other hegemons and would-be hegemons, we do not entertain a grand vision of a new world . . . we are essentially a status quo power. We have no particular desire to remake human nature, to conquer for the extraction of natural resources, or to rule for the simple pleasure of dominion . . . Our principal aim is to maintain the stability and relative tranquility of the current international system by enforcing, maintaining, and extending the current peace."

"[One of our goals is] to maintain the peace by acting as the world's foremost anti-proliferator. Weapons of mass destruction and missiles to deliver them are the greatest threat of the 21st century. Non-proliferation is not enough . . . It may become necessary in the future actually to preempt rogue states' weapons of mass destruction, as Israel did in 1981 by destroying the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq."

"Preemption is, of course, very difficult. Which is why we must begin thinking of moving to a higher platform. Space is the ultimate high ground. For 30 years, we have been reluctant even to think about placing weapons in space, but it is inevitable that space will become militarized. The only question is: Who will get there first and how will they use it? The demilitarization of space is a fine idea and utterly utopian. Space will be an avenue for projection of national power as were the oceans 500 years ago."

"[O]verwhelming American power is good not just for the United States but for the world. The Bush administration is the first administration of the post-Cold War era to share that premise and act accordingly. It welcomes the U.S. role of, well, hyperpower. In its first few months, its policies have reflected a comfort with the unipolarity of the world today, a desire to maintain and enhance it, and a willingness to act unilaterally to do so. It is a vision of America's role very different from that elaborated in the first post-Cold War decade - and far more radical than has generally been noted."

"[D]emocracy can be imposed by force, as both Germany and Japan can attest. But those occurred in the highly unusual circumstance of total military occupation following a war for unconditional surrender. Unless we are willing to wage such wars and follow up with the kind of trusteeship we enjoyed over Germany and Japan, we will find that our interventions on behalf of democracy will leave little mark, as we learned with some chagrin in Haiti and Bosnia…" - (Weekly Standard, 4 June 2001)

"Why should the United States take seriously, morally seriously, as Americans do, the pronouncements and decisions of that preeminent international governor, the U.N. Security Council?"

"The problem with contemporary liberalism is that it believes this nonsense. It sincerely believes that multilateral action-and, in particular, action blessed by the U.N.-is in and of itself morally superior to, and more justifiable than, the United States unilaterally asserting its own national interest."

'It is hard to think of an administration in American history with a greater mania for writing, signing, ratifying, and producing international agreements than the Clinton administration. From the very beginning, its principal foreign policy goal has been to secure signatures on a dizzying array of treaties on chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear testing, nuclear nonproliferation, and anti-ballistic missiles. (And, if not for Pentagon pressure, it might even have signed the disastrous treaty banning land mines.)" - (New Republic, 15 March 1999)