Paper
Ashley J. Tellis
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Source: Getty
Testimony
China's Space Capabilities and Their Impact on U.S. National Security
China’s current military space program is oriented towards exploiting space to the advantage of its conventional military operations, denying space to superior adversaries, and preparing for struggles over space control by integrating space into its own military operations and, as required, developing its own space-related deterrent and warfighting capabilities.
Published on May 20, 2008
Source: Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
China’s military space capabilities presently are manifested in five distinct areas: (i) space launch capabilities; (ii) the TT&C network; (iii) space orbital systems; (iv) connectivity to military operations; and (v) counterspace technologies. When combined with its access to foreign platforms or services, these indigenous systems provide China’s military forces with sufficient supporting capabilities today within its borders or at some distance around them. The new SIGINT/ELINT platforms, electro-optical and SAR imagery satellites, and dedicated data relay satellites, likely to be launched within the next decade will enable the PLA to expand its battlespace awareness and targeting capabilities tremendously, support its regional presence and projection operations in East and Southeast Asia and in the Indian Ocean, and fill the missing links required to complete its area and access denial strategy vis-à-vis the United States across the entire western Pacific. The maturation of China’s space and counterspace capabilities thus reflect the larger challenges facing the United States as it reacts to the rise of Chinese power. How well Washington responds to this development will determine not only its future capacity to dominate the high ground but also a variety of outcomes terrestrially.
The full text of the written testimony is available to the left.
About the Author
Ashley J. Tellis
Former Senior Fellow
Ashley J. Tellis was a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
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Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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