Report
Sharon Squassoni
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Source: Getty
Other
Grading Progress on 13 Steps Toward Nuclear Disarmament
All NPT states agreed in 2000 to lay out a practical path toward nuclear disarmament – the 13 Steps. While some steps toward disarmament have been taken, much more needs to be done.
Published on May 8, 2009
Source: Carnegie Endowment
All NPT states agreed in 2000 to lay out a practical path toward nuclear disarmament—the 13 Steps. Are these still the right steps? How far have we come? Sharon Squassoni assesses the progress of the declared nuclear-weapon states (United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom) on the steps, and recommends measures to breathe new life into the 13 Steps or a similar package.
Recommendations:
- The 13 Steps are still the currency of the nuclear bargain, but need updating. New approaches, like Japan's "11 Benchmarks for Global Nuclear Disarmament" deserve attention.
- U.S. leadership is critical, but not enough. Other states, nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states, must do their part.
- Recent Russian initiatives are helpful, but nuclear weapons deserve less, rather than more emphasis in their security policies.
- India, Israel, and Pakistan – all weapon states outside the NPT – must be included in the disarmament dialogue.
About the Author
Sharon Squassoni
Former Senior Associate, Nuclear Policy Program
Squassoni came to Carnegie from the Congressional Research Service. She also served for nine years in the executive branch. Her last position at the State Department was director of Policy Coordination in the Nonproliferation Bureau.
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Recent Work
Nuclear PolicyNuclear EnergyNorth AmericaUnited StatesEast AsiaChinaCaucasusRussiaWestern EuropeUnited KingdomFrance
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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