Paper
George Perkovich
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Source: Getty
In The Media
How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Nonproliferation
The realization that both the United States and the Soviet Union shared an interest in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons led to a 1968 agreement that existing nuclear weapons states would work toward nuclear zero if other states agreed not to develop nuclear weapons.
Published on Jul 10, 2011
Source: BloggingHeads TV
Speaking on Bloggingheads, Carnegie’s George Perkovich explained that during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union realized that they had a shared interest in keeping other nations from acquiring nuclear weapons. As a result, they began a series of negotiations that culminated in 1968 with the creation of a framework to rid the world of nuclear weapons. The basic premise of the agreement was that the five countries that currently had nuclear weapons agreed to eventually get rid of their weapons if other nations around the world agreed not to try to acquire nuclear weapons. In return for this pledge, Perkovich explained, the nuclear weapons states promised aid in the development of atomic energy.
About the Author
George Perkovich
Japan Chair for a World Without Nuclear Weapons, Senior Fellow
George Perkovich is the Japan Chair for a World Without Nuclear Weapons and a senior fellow in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Nuclear Policy Program. He works primarily on nuclear deterrence, nonproliferation, and disarmament issues.
- How to Assess Nuclear ‘Threats’ in the Twenty-First Century
- “A House of Dynamite” Shows Why No Leader Should Have a Nuclear TriggerCommentary
George Perkovich
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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