Michael D. Swaine
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}Source: Getty
America's New Asia Initiative: Pivot or Stumble?
The execution of America’s strategic 'pivot' to Asia, and China's response, are combining to deepen mutual suspicions and potentially destabilize the entire area.
Source: National Interest

At that time, Washington moved decisively away from viewing China ominously as a rising "strategic competitor" (to quote George W. Bush) and toward significant levels of Sino-U.S. cooperation in combating terrorism and dealing with a growing array of common problems, from climate change to global economic instability. This shift brought Washington’s approach back into line with an earlier, long-standing U.S. policy of fostering greater Sino-American engagement while conducting low-key military hedging against the possibility of a future hostile China.
With President Obama and Secretary Clinton's recent trips to the South and Western Pacific, expanding U.S. involvement in multilateral economic and security-related fora, and a strengthening of Washington's traditional military alliances, the United States is now signaling an intention to move back toward the pre-9/11 strategic focus on a rising China. That focus places a premium on explicitly balancing against and constraining Chinese power and influence across the region.
This piece was originally published at the National Interest. Click here to continue reading.
About the Author
Former Senior Fellow, Asia Program
Swaine was a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies.
- What Kind of Global Order Should Washington and Beijing Strive For?Other
- A Smarter U.S. Strategy for China in Four StepsCommentary
Michael D. Swaine
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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