Alexander Gabuev, Temur Umarov
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A “Soft Alliance”? Russia-China Relations After the Ukraine Crisis
The danger for the EU in the rapprochement between Russia and China lies in the fortification of the Russian economy against sanctions and in an increased assertiveness for China.
Source: European Council on Foreign Relations
A $400 billion deal to export gas to China, a $24.5 billion currency swap agreement, opening up to Chinese participation in infrastructure projects: from an initially apprehensive reaction to China’s economic rise, Putin’s Russia has made a dramatic turn toward China after sanctions were imposed last year.
In “A ‘Soft Alliance’? Russia-China Relations After the Ukraine Crisis,” Alexander Gabuev discusses how Putin sees in its Asian pivot a way to strengthen the most vulnerable parts of its economy: dependence on the European energy market, dependence on Western capital markets, and dependence on technologies.Gabuev further explores the change in the relationship between the two powers. According to the brief, the danger for the EU in this Eastern rapprochement lies in the fortification of the Russian economy against sanctions and in an increased assertiveness for China.
Gabuev sees two possible options for an EU response:
- Seek to isolate Russia further by developing sanctions with the US against third-country companies that do business with sanctioned Russian entities.
- Create other options for Russia by allowing Japan and South Korea not to uphold the sanctions regime.
Gabuev writes: “The longer Russia is forced to orient itself toward China, the more important the consequences will be. Some key elements such as arms deals and Chinese control over key resource deposits may become irreversible and have a lasting effect on Russia, European interests, and global security—even after Putin has left office.”
The full version of this publication is available at the European Council on Foreign Relations.
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About the Author
Director, Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center
Alexander Gabuev is director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. Gabuev’s research is focused on Russian foreign policy with particular focus on the impact of the war in Ukraine and the Sino-Russia relationship. Since joining Carnegie in 2015, Gabuev has contributed commentary and analysis to a wide range of publications, including the Financial Times, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, and the Economist.
- Why Are China and Russia Not Rushing to Help Iran?Commentary
- With Putin in Charge, Russia’s Vassalage to China Will Only DeepenCommentary
Alexander Gabuev
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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