This Carnegie analysis is taken from the Iraq chapter of Deadly Arsenals and is the final piece in a three part series.

U.N. Resolution 1284, adopted in December 1999, calls for the streamlining of economic sanctions and for their eventual suspension once UNMOVIC has reported that Iraq is cooperating with U.N. resolutions on dismantling its WMD. This resolution remains the legal basis for continuing to control Iraq's assets, but Iraq has refused to allow UNMOVIC on the ground, insisting that the sanctions should be lifted since it has disarmed to the extent called for by U.N. resolutions. U.N. Resolution 1284 places no limits on the volume of petroleum that Iraq can export for humanitarian needs.

While the sanctions against Iraq have not unraveled altogether, support in the Arab world and from European allies for them has eroded, and China and Russia are eager to resume economic ties with Iraq. An Anglo-American effort in the summer of 2001 to restructure the oil-for-food program failed to receive the support of the Security Council. While lifting most restrictions on Iraq's imports of civilian goods, the proposed resolution sought to diminish Saddam Hussein's ability to circumvent the U.N. escrow account; to tighten the embargo on dual-use technology that could aid Iraq's WMD program; and to continue the blockade on the sale of conventional arms. With Russia set to veto the resolution, the Security Council voted, instead, to continue the existing oil-for food-program.

Disturbing images of the effects of ten years of sanctions against Iraq, combined with escalating violence in Israel and the West Bank, have decisively shifted the sympathies of the "Arab street" to the once-pariah regime of Saddam Hussein. With the back drop of a collapsing Middle East peace process, sympathy for the Palestinian and Iraqi people has worked in Saddam Hussein's favor, even after September 11. Arab governments have found that their publics are in no mood to continue isolating Saddam Hussein. The United States has recognized that its political success in pursuing its policy toward Iraq is, at least in part, connected to the success of its policy in the Levant.

In public, at least, these governments, including U.S. allies in the region, have begun to be circumspect in their support of the policy of sanctions and no-fly zones. Among the conservative Arab Gulf states, all except Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have flouted the sanctions and shown an interest in resuming ties with Saddam Hussein's regime. Diplomatic and economic relations even between Iraq and Syria have been restored for the first time since the 1990 Gulf War, opening an oil pipeline that adds to Baghdad revenues from illegal oil sales. Iraq also has an oil exchange program with Jordan and Turkey. The United States hopes to reverse this trend with a new hard-line policy to remove Saddam Hussein from power. By early 2002, it appeared that military action was all but certain, hampered only by the continuing conflict in Afghanistan and near-war in Israel.

This Carnegie analysis is taken from the Iraq Chapter in Deadly Arsenals.

Additional Resources:

• "A Brief History of Iraq's Nuclear Weapon Program - Part I - Background," Carnegie Analysis Part I of III, 22 August 2002
• "A Brief History of Iraq's Nuclear Weapon Program - Part II- Weaponization," Carnegie Analysis Part II of III, 27 August 2002
• "Iraq: A New Approach," Special Carnegie Report, 5 September 2002
• Iraq Chapter from Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction
• More on Deadly Arsenals
• Iraq Country Resource Page
• Hearings on Iraq
  
  

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