The Thai-Cambodian conflict highlights the limits to China's peacemaker ambition and the significance of this role on Southeast Asia’s balance of power.
Pongphisoot (Paul) Busbarat
Deradicalization programs will likely remain a necessary part of larger counter-radicalization and counterterrorism strategies. To succeed, deradicalization programs must include affective, pragmatic, and ideological components and considerable aftercare.
Source: Rand Corporation

A key question is whether the objective of these programs should be disengagement or deradicalization of militants. Disengagement entails a change in behavior (i.e., refraining from violence and withdrawing from a radical organization) but not necessarily a change in beliefs. A person could exit a radical organization and refrain from violence but nevertheless retain a radical worldview. Deradicalization is the process of changing an individual’s belief system, rejecting the extremist ideology, and embracing mainstream values.
There is a view in the scholarly community that deradicalization may not be a realistic objective and that the goal of terrorist rehabilitation programs should be disengagement. Deradicalization, in fact, may be particularly difficult for Islamist extremists because they are motivated by an ideology that is rooted in a major world religion. The tenets of the ideology, therefore, are regarded as religious obligations.
Nevertheless, deradicalization may be necessary to permanently defuse the threat posed by these individuals. If a militant disengages solely for instrumental reasons, when the circumstances change, the militant may once again take up arms. Conversely, when deradicalization accompanies disengagement, it creates further barriers to recidivism.
Moreover, there may be a tipping point. When enough exmilitants renounce radical Islamism, the ideology and the organizations that adhere to it are fatally discredited. Even short of this tipping point, as greater numbers of militants renounce extremism, radical Islamist organizations will experience greater hurdles in attracting adherents and sympathizers within the Muslim community.
Studies of those who leave gangs and criminal organizations, exit from cults and religious sects, and withdraw from terrorist organizations suggest that individuals follow a similar trajectory when leaving a criminal or extremist group. Certain lessons can be derived from this trajectory.
Former Associate, Middle East Program
Boucek was an associate in the Carnegie Middle East Program where his research focused on security challenges in the Arabian Peninsula and Northern Africa.
Angel Rabasa
Stacey L. Pettyjohn
Jeremy J. Ghez
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
The Thai-Cambodian conflict highlights the limits to China's peacemaker ambition and the significance of this role on Southeast Asia’s balance of power.
Pongphisoot (Paul) Busbarat
Beijing believes that Washington is overestimating its own leverage and its ability to handle the trade war’s impacts.
Rick Waters, Sheena Chestnut Greitens
Tapping our network of China experts in the region, Carnegie China offers this latest “China Through a Southeast Asian Lens” report to offer preliminary assessments of whether the U.S. effort to reshape the global trading order will lead countries in the region to tilt toward Beijing.
Selina Ho, Khin Khin Kyaw Kyee, Joseph Ching Velasco, …
Because strategic, economic, and ideological perceptions of China contain multiple, sometimes contradictory facets in Southeast Asia, receptions of and responses to Beijing diverge across and within state lines.
Evan A. Feigenbaum, Chong Ja Ian, Elina Noor
Most Southeast Asian states behave as if the actions of their Northeast Asian neighbors and the Philippines will be sufficient to maintain a regional status quo from which they can benefit.
Chong Ja Ian