Has Fereydoun Abbasi Been Called to Order?

Article

Has Fereydoun Abbasi Been Called to Order?

The latest statements made by the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization regarding the country's willingness to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency do not bode well for the success of the recent Russian initiative to reinvigorate multilateral nuclear talks.

By Pierre Goldschmidt

Published on Sep 9, 2011

At the end of August it was reported¹ that Fereydoun Abbasi, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organisation, had suggested that “Iran is ready for increased cooperation with the IAEA on the condition the U.N. watchdog limit the number of points it wants clarified,” adding “As long as we don’t receive these questions in an official manner, we cannot respond.”

On September 5 Dr. Abbasi told the semi-official ISNA news agency, “We propose that the agency [IAEA] keep Iran’s nuclear program and activities under full supervision for five years provided that sanctions against Iran are lifted.”² However, he didn’t explain what he meant by “full supervision.”

The day after ISNA published a short and little noticed message³ quoting Fereydoun Abbasi as saying “Iran has fully cooperated with the IAEA so far and would accept no more obligations” and “our cooperation is limited to the regulations and standards of the IAEA, providing that it respects Iran’s rights and does not include the implementation of additional protocol cooperation.”

The change of tone in a week’s time is quite remarkable. First Dr. Abbasi suggests that Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA could be increased (admitting thereby that it is far from perfect) and that he would be prepared to clarify a number of points raised by the IAEA as long as they are limited and in writing. A week later he declares that Iran has fully cooperated with the IAEA so far, and would accept no more obligations, likely meaning not even answering the questions raised by the IAEA concerning “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear activities.

Dr. Abbasi suggested on September 5 that Iran would accept full IAEA supervision of its nuclear activities during five years provided sanctions against Iran are lifted. This again acknowledges that Iran is not fully cooperating with the IAEA and doesn’t meet the repeated requests of the IAEA Board of Governors that Iran “implement transparency measures which extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and include access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military owned workshops and research and development locations.”⁴

The day after, the same Dr. Abbasi rejects the idea of accepting more obligations and the implementation of the Additional Protocol.

What has happened internally in the meantime will likely remain a mystery, but it doesn’t bode well for the future and the chances of success of the recent Russian initiative.

^{1. “Iran atomic chief says fuel swap talks finished, will deal with IAEA”, The Daily Star of Lebanon, 30 August 2011.}^{http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2011/Aug-30/147546-iran-atomic-chief-says-fuel-swap-talks-finished-will-deal-with-iaea.ashx#axzz1XRpS5zru}

^{2. “Iran proposes full IAEA supervision of its nuclear program for 5 years if sanctions lifted”, AP, 5 September 2011.}^{http://ca.news.yahoo.com/iran-proposes-full-iaea-supervision-nuclear-program-5-194212521.html}

^{3. “Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA has exceeded the standards limit : Abbasi », ISNA, 6 September 2006.}

^{4. IAEA Board Resolution adopted on 24 September 2005, GOV/2005/77.}^{http://isna.ir/isna/NewsView.aspx?ID=News1841312&Lang=E}

Middle East Iran Nuclear Policy

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie China

Commentary
Beyond the Putin-Kim Alliance: How Can the International Community Engage China to Contain Nuclear Risks Over the Korean Peninsula?
Faced with an increase in strategic maneuvering by Moscow and Pyongyang, Beijing will not sit idly by and allow Putin and Kim to shape the security environment on its behalf.
Tong Zhao
Commentary
China’s Evolving Economic and Security Role in the Middle East
The advantage that China has over other global powers, especially America, is that its foreign policy is closely aligned with those of many of the Middle Eastern countries.
Jin Liangxiang, Maha Yahya, Hesham Alghannam
Commentary
Missile Defense and the Strategic Relationship among the United States, Russia, and China
China views U.S. missile defense as posing a greater potential threat to China’s nuclear deterrent than other U.S. military capabilities.
Tong Zhao, Dmitry Stefanovich
Commentary
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Has Jeopardized the China-EU Relationship
“It’s not so clear how we’re going to get out of this.”
Paul Haenle, Philippe Le Corre
Commentary
What the Russian War in Ukraine Means for the Middle East
It’s about managing oil prices, bread prices, and strategic partnerships.
+8
Amr Hamzawy, Karim Sadjadpour, Aaron David Miller, …

More Work from Carnegie China

Commentary

Beyond the Putin-Kim Alliance: How Can the International Community Engage China to Contain Nuclear Risks Over the Korean Peninsula?

Faced with an increase in strategic maneuvering by Moscow and Pyongyang, Beijing will not sit idly by and allow Putin and Kim to shape the security environment on its behalf.

Tong Zhao

Commentary

China’s Evolving Economic and Security Role in the Middle East

The advantage that China has over other global powers, especially America, is that its foreign policy is closely aligned with those of many of the Middle Eastern countries.