The supposed threats from China and Russia pose far less of a danger to both Greenland and the Arctic than the prospect of an unscrupulous takeover of the island.
Andrei Dagaev
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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: Novemeber 19, 2003
With Duma elections in early December and the recent arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, there has been much speculation on the evolving presidency of Vladimir Putin and the future of Russia. In a new policy brief, Dmitri Trenin argues that a full picture of Russia’s future must consider the situation in Chechnya. In The Forgotten War: Chechnya and Russia’s Future he says that the Bush and Putin administrations have misleadingly folded Chechnya into the war on terror, when it’s really a massive roadblock hampering Russian modernization and transformation.
While labeling Chechnya as a terrorism problem is a mistake, critics have done little better by defining Chechnya as a human rights challenge. The perennial conflict in the Caucasus affects Russian policy, Russian society, and Russia’s quality as an U.S. ally. The conflict is hampering the formation of a civic Russian nation, gives undue influence to the military and security services, and blocks meaningful military reform. The policy brief outlines potential solutions for Russian leaders and urges both the U.S. and Russian administration to understand that the Chechen war is denying Russia international prestige and power.
Prior to September 11th, George W. Bush depicted Russia’s war with Chechnya as “gruesome,” an “atrocious violations of human rights,” and a “brutal military operation.” In 2002, he softened his position, saying Putin “handled it as best he could. He did what he had to do to save life.” How did such an abrupt turnabout take place? Where on the spectrum of expressing outrage to lending support should US policy lay? And what does the Chechnya conflict mean for Russia now and in the future? In this paper, Dmitri Trenin outlines the history of this complicated struggle, with proposed actions by Russian and American leaders.
Read the full brief online at www.carnegieendowent.org/pubs.
Dmitri Trenin is senior associate and deputy director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. He specializes in Russian foreign and security policy. He retired from the Russian Army in 1993, after a military career that included participation in the strategic arms control negotiations in Geneva.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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