The supposed threats from China and Russia pose far less of a danger to both Greenland and the Arctic than the prospect of an unscrupulous takeover of the island.
Andrei Dagaev
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}REQUIRED IMAGE
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, US policy toward Russia has combined elements of principled pragmatism, selective engagement, and containment.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
The supposed threats from China and Russia pose far less of a danger to both Greenland and the Arctic than the prospect of an unscrupulous takeover of the island.
Andrei Dagaev
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