Source: Carnegie

Originally published in the Financial Times, October 30, 2002

A senior Russian official argued to me recently that it was useless at this stage in the Chechen conflict to seek a political solution. The only real option for Russia, he said, was to hang on for as long as it took to wear down the other side until it abandoned terrorism and accepted a solution within the frontiers of the existing state. It would be wrong to dismiss this argument out of hand, for it does contain some good sense. But, as the events of the past week in Moscow demonstrate, it also embodies a profound and dangerous folly.

It is a grim truth that for long periods in many conflicts - Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka - there is no possibility of a negotiated solution until one or both sides have become so exhausted that they are prepared to abandon their maximalist positions. There is no sign that Chechen militants and their Islamist allies are battle weary.

It is also true that even then there will still be irreconcilable elements with whom there is no point in trying to talk. Unfortunately, in the case of Chechnya this includes most of the Chechen warlords, whose men are doing the fighting. Simply urging talks with President Aslan Maskhadov is inadequate.

It is just possible - though hardly likely - that the shock of the Moscow theatre hostage crisis will lead to a reconsideration of Chechen policy by the Russian government. For while it has fuelled Russian public anger against the Chechens, the failure of the security establishment has also damaged President Vladimir Putin's prestige. If the war continues, more such attacks are inevitable. Meanwhile, the atrocious behaviour of the Russian forces in Chechnya, far from leading to victory, is only creating more and more Chechen radicals.

Western governments and commentators should think hard, and speak openly, about what they mean in practice. They should also ask whether specific proposals are practicable or desirable. If they do not, their moralising can appear glib, irresponsible and self-serving, a posture that serves neither the Chechen nor the Russian victims of this conflict.

A solution cannot simply involve an agreement with Mr Maskhadov and Russian military withdrawal, if only because the Chechen president does not control the great majority of the fighters. No Russian government will agree to a deal leading to a repetition of the situation after the Russian withdrawal of 1996. In the following years, Mr Maskhadov utterly failed to establish his authority and kidnapping gangs and international Islamist militants made Chechnya a base for repeated attacks on Russia.

Nor would the west be wise to urge an early and complete Russian retreat. Like Russia, it cannot afford the risk of a new safe haven for Islamist terrorism. In principle, large-scale western peacekeeping forces and a huge international reconstruction package would be highly desirable - but even if Moscow were ever to agree to this, is it really likely that western states would come up with such an offer?

If there is to be any possibility of a long-term settlement, both the Kremlin and Mr Maskhadov will therefore have to make big concessions. Russia must accept a political process leading to the possibility of eventual Chechen independence. It must discipline its troops and punish those guilty of atrocities.

Mr Maskhadov will have to admit his own past failures and those of Chechen society as a whole. Given the Chechens' proven inability to create a functioning state, he and his followers must recognise that the path to in-dependence will be a long one. It must involve the long-term presence of Russian troops as a guarantee against another victory by the militants.

More important, Mr Maskhadov must break publicly and completely with the international Islamist and Chechen militants. If these forces refuse to accept the kind of settlement I have sketched, Mr Maskhadov will have to fight against them on Russia's side.

Such terms would be horribly difficult for both sides to swallow. Many more years of mutual attrition, I fear, will pass before they appear more palatable. Yet I see no other possibility of eventual peace. So when urging a political solution, the west should remember its obligation to formulate a concrete plan and to press it on both sides of this conflict.

The writer is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and author of Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power