Commentary
Ulrich Kühn
{
"authors": [
"Ulrich Kühn"
],
"type": "other",
"centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
],
"collections": [],
"englishNewsletterAll": "ctw",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"programAffiliation": "NPP",
"programs": [
"Nuclear Policy"
],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"Russia"
],
"topics": [
"Nuclear Policy"
]
}
Source: Getty
Other
With Zapad Over, Is It Time for Conventional Arms Control in Europe?
Even though arms control cannot prevent deliberate escalation, at least confidence-and-security-building measures could diminish the risk of unintended escalation. But the political realities in Moscow and Washington are not promising for conventional arms control in Europe.
By Ulrich Kühn
Published on Sep 27, 2017
Source: War on the Rocks
Perhaps like no other exercise since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia’s recently concluded Zapad (West) exercise was of serious concern to NATO’s easternmost members. It provided ample opportunity for pundits to engage in hysteria about Russian intentions.
No seasoned NATO official expected the exercise to be the not-so-secret cover for a Russian invasion of the Baltic States – which could easily become the overture to World War III. Rather, the real problem with Zapad is that it underscored once more the precarious state of security in Europe.
Since Crimea, much has been written about NATO’s unpreparedness for potential Russian aggression and the need for a deterrence-by-denial approach to prevent deliberate escalation by Moscow. But an essential ingredient of NATO defense policy remains strangely absent from the debate―how to address insecurity by means of arms control.
Arms control on its own cannot prevent deliberate escalation. If a nation decides to go to war, it will go to war regardless of what arms control arrangement is in place. This is why NATO has, quite correctly, put the onus on deterrence, assurance, and defense in its initial response to the Ukraine crisis. But arms control, and in particular transparency and crisis communication channels, can help to limit the risk of unintended escalation. This may take the form of inadvertent escalation through general misunderstanding of the other party’s intention, or of accidental escalation through lower-grade military incidents that gradually become more severe.
Because NATO also decided at its 2016 Warsaw Summit to remain open to dialogue with Russia, and since Germany, in particular, has only recently made a renewed push for conventional arms control in Europe, it makes sense to ask whether a novel conventional arms control arrangement could provide for more security in addition to NATO’s deterrence and assurance approach. At the same time, to add a much-needed reality check, we must ask whether the political level of U.S.-Russian relations allows for a new approach.
This article was originally published in War on the Rocks
Read the article
About the Author
Ulrich Kühn
Nonresident Scholar, Nuclear Policy Program
Ulrich Kühn is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the head of the arms control and emerging technologies program at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg.
- Why Arms Control Is (Almost) Dead
- Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO PlaybookReport
Ulrich Kühn
Recent Work
Carnegie India does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Carnegie India
- After the Border Clash, Will China-India Competition Go Nuclear?Commentary
Asia’s two largest nuclear powers have never threatened each other with nuclear weapons. How much will the recent deadly border clashes between China and India change the security landscape?
Toby Dalton, Tong Zhao, Rukmani Gupta
- Reintegrating Central AsiaCommentary
With contributors from various Central Asian nations and beyond, this issue of Seminar provides a selection of perspectives about the past, present, and future trajectory of Central Asia, and the growing role of external actors, particularly India, China, Russia, and the EU in this evolving and dynamic space.
Rhea Menon, Sharanya Rajiv, 64592
- Reintegrating Central Asia: The ProblemCommentary
The rise of China as an economic powerhouse in Asia, along with rapid globalization, has brought Central Asia back in the limelight as a bridge connecting the established markets of the West with the emerging markets of the East.
Rhea Menon, Sharanya Rajiv
- India and Russia: Connecting Eurasia And The Indo-PacificCommentary
The special and privileged strategic partnership between India and Russia now spans across both Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific.
Sharanya Rajiv, 64592
- Raja-Mandala: If Breaking With China is Hard for America, Making Up With Russia Might Be HarderCommentary
The rejigging of the political relations between the United States, China, and Russia might present New Delhi with fleeting strategic opportunities that need to be seized quickly.
C. Raja Mohan
