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Article

On the Road: Interview with Qazi Mohammed Amin Waqad

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By Anatol Lieven
Published on Oct 24, 2001

Source: Carnegie

Peshawar, October 12, 2001

Introduction
Qazi Mohammed Amin Waqad comes from a distinguished religious family of Kot District, Nangrahar Province (chief city, Jalalabad), a Pashtun-dominated area on the border with Pakistan. His title, Qazi, indicates an islamic judge. Waqad was a member of the islamist political movement which developed in the late 1960s and early 1970s in opposition to the administrations of King Zahir Shah and his cousin and supplanter General Daud. He later fought as a commander against the Communists and the Soviet intervention forces, joining the Hezb-e-Islami party led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

This party received the lion's share of US assistance (as channeled by Pakistani intelligence) and this and its subsequent record in inter-Mujahedin warfare made it widely hated by other Mujahedin groups. As a leader of that party Qazi Waqad was "Minister of Communications" (and almost entirely empty title) in the ill-fated Mujahedin government which tried to replace the Communists after 1992. Like Hekmatyar, Waqad has for several years been in opposition to the Taliban, with whom however he is supposed also to have had intermittent contacts.

He subsequently broke with Hekmatyar, though the break is probably not complete to judge by the arrival of an emissary from Hekmatyar (now in Iran) during my interview. Waqad appears to be one of the men whom Pakistan is trying to build up as a pro-Pakistan Pashtun alternative to the Taliban—though it is very unclear just how much support within Afghanistan he and men like him may now have. One way he may be seeking to bolster his support is through nationalism—for as appears from this interview, Waqad has become a strong Pashtun nationalist. His proposal that the Loya Jirga should take place in Jalalabad, in his own province and the heart of Pashtun territory, is a clear move to ensure Pashtun dominance of the assembly and exclude as far as possible the Northern Alliance and the non-Pashtun minorities.

“America has done wrong in its attack on Afghanistan. We condemn the 11th September incident and the killing of innocent people. But America in its search for revenge is also killing innocent civilians, which we also condemn. The continuation of this war is not a solution for the Afghan problem. Instead, the UN should come to Afghanistan and work for a peaceful solution. The UN should occupy Jalalabad and set up a Loya Jirga and a neutral consensus government there, supported by Pakistan and other Muslim states. Only UN troops from Muslim countries should come to protect that government, which should replace the Taliban and solve the problem of Osama bin Laden.

Zahir Shah should only have a role if the Afghan people themselves decide this. We don't oppose Zahir Shah, but we think that it is bad that the West has made him a hero while the Muslim world has made Osama a hero. Anyway, Zahir Shah is thousands of miles away in Europe. He has not been to Afghanistan for almost thirty years. When he comes here and we can sit down and talk with him, we will decide whether to support him or not?

But if the US wants to impose a government of Zahir Shah that would not mean a solution, but more bloodshed. Any government must represent the Mujahedin, the Taliban, the ethnic minorities, and the interests of neighbouring Muslim states. All these have a role to play. No one can deny that the Taliban too have deep roots in Afghanistan and must play a role. But because America is bombing the Taliban, and helping the enemies of the Taliban, of course they are not ready for compromise. This is a mistake of America. And it is a mistake of America to take Abdul Haq or any other commander and give all help to him to try to conquer Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, every man is equal because every man has a gun. If the Afghans see one man beinbg imposed on them from outside, they will pick up their guns and kill him.

In the North, Ismail Khan with the support of Iran is threatening Herat, and general Dostam with the support of Russia is threatening Mazar. When the Taliban ruled Mazar, they treated the local Tajiks and Uzbeks harshly, in reprisal for their atrocities. So if the Northern Alliance capures Mazar, their men will take revenge on the local Pashtuns, and Britain and the US will be responsible.

The US is telling the Pashtuns to be silent and wait. But Pashtuns are the majority in Afghanistan. We cannot be just spectators while Russia, Iran and others help their clients to conquer Afghanistan?

All this being so, it is not likely that the Taliban will split. Rather they will go on fighting, and more Pashtuns will join them. If you have no alternative to the Taliban, then whatever you do will only strengthen the Northern Alliance. America has only one idea, to get rid of the Taliban, but this will create a vacuum which will be filled by anti-Pashtun forces. This is wrong, and a recipe for continued civil war. The Pashtuns will never live under the rule of the minorities. In particular, we still remember the strocities of Dostam, Ismail Khan and others. That is why they welcomed the Taliban in the first place, because they saved the people from these cruelties. I have always been against the Taliban, and I do not want to fight America, but if America helps the Northern Alliance to capture Mazar and elsewhere, then I too will have to go to fight against America.”

About the Author

Anatol Lieven

Former Senior Associate

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Carnegie India does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

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