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A tracker that presents each allegation of non-compliance made by the Trump administration and assesses them.
Is Tehran complying with its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran deal?
There has been a robust and useful public debate about Iranian compliance, with critics pointing to a long list of claimed problems, to which other analysts have responded. More recently, Trump administration spokespeople have effectively winnowed the long list of criticisms, focusing on a smaller number of supposed Iranian violations. In some instances, the spokespeople have made fairly detailed claims about noncompliance. In other cases, they have been vaguer.
Presumably, the issues highlighted by administration spokespeople are the strongest case they can make, drawing on full access to U.S. intelligence reporting as well as the monitoring information that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) makes available to JCPOA participants but not to the public. As a result, it is necessary to take each of the administration’s claims of Iranian noncompliance seriously. This web resource aims to do so by assessing each of these claims against the publicly known facts of the case.
As of October 3, 2017, senior Trump administration officials have identified the following claims of Iranian noncompliance with its nuclear-related obligations under the JCPOA:
Iran has exceeded agreed-upon limits on its heavy water stocks.
Iran has exceeded agreed-upon limits on its centrifuge numbers.
Iran has imposed limits on IAEA access to nuclear facilities.
Problems have arisen in the implementation of Section T, in which Iran commits not to engage in specific activities that could contribute to the development of a nuclear weapon.
Two further claims are addressed that do not relate to compliance with the provisions of the nuclear deal but are frequently referenced by the administration:
Iran is not meeting the “spirit” of the deal.
Iran has continued its ballistic missile program despite UN Security Council prohibitions.
Thus far, as the authors have argued elsewhere, the Trump administration has not made a persuasive case that Iran is in noncompliance with the JCPOA.
There have been challenges in implementation. Some of these challenges are the inevitable consequences of the JCPOA’s many complexities and innovations. Some have resulted from Iran trying, unsurprisingly, to interpret ambiguous provisions in its favor. Moreover, Tehran did, on two occasions, violate clear limits by stockpiling, for brief periods, slightly more heavy water than permitted. That said, its heavy water violations were rapidly resolved, and Iran has complied with findings by the Joint Commission (which was set up to implement the agreement) to resolve ambiguous provisions.
This list of claims and the accompanying analysis will be updated as necessary.
Jump to section“In February 2016—just a month after the agreement was implemented—the IAEA discovered Iran had exceeded its allowable limit of heavy water. Nine months later, Iran exceeded the heavy-water limit again. Both times, the Obama Administration helped Iran get back into compliance and refused to declare it a violation.”
“Remarks on Iran and the JCPOA,” American Enterprise Institute, September 5, 2017
Stephanopoulos: “But they are complying with the agreement.”
McMaster: “—spinning too many centrifuges, having too much heavy water.”
Interview on This Week with George Stephanopoulos, September 17, 2017
Note: McMaster’s comments on centrifuges are addressed here.
Heavy water can be used as a neutron moderator in some kinds of nuclear reactors. These reactors can have proliferation implications because they do not require enriched uranium and can be used to produce plutonium that is particularly suitable for use in nuclear weapons.
In 2016, Iran twice exceeded the JCPOA’s 130 metric ton limit on heavy water: in February by roughly 900 kilograms, or about 0.7 percent, and in November by roughly 100 kilograms, or about 0.08 percent.
Iran challenged the interpretation that it is subject to a hard cap of 130 metric tons of heavy water. The deal requires that heavy water in excess of this quantity “be made available for export to the international market . . . and delivered to the international buyer.” Iran argued that since there were no potential buyers, it could keep the excess. The other participants in the JCPOA did not accept this position and insisted that Iran comply with the cap.
Several days after exceeding the 130 metric ton cap, in both the first and second instances, Iran shipped heavy water to Oman for storage, where it was verified by the IAEA, thereby bringing Tehran back into compliance with the JCPOA limit.
Iran’s decision to exceed its heavy-water limit twice on the basis of a specious reading of the JCPOA raises questions about whether Tehran is seeking to implement the deal as a whole in good faith. That said, the immediate proliferation implications of the excess were very limited, since Iran does not have a heavy-water reactor that can be used to produce plutonium.
As required under the JCPOA, Iran’s Arak heavy-water reactor was permanently disabled. It will be rebuilt under U.S. and Chinese supervision using a design that does not allow the production of plutonium in quantities useful for building nuclear weapons.
Iran’s Zero Power Reactor also does not produce plutonium in quantities useful for building nuclear weapons.
The heavy-water episodes did have some positive aspects. First, the IAEA immediately detected and reported the problem despite the fact that it does not normally monitor heavy-water stocks, demonstrating that an innovative aspect of the JCPOA was both politically and technically operative. Second, the JCPOA’s other participants remained unified in insisting on a strict interpretation of Iran’s nuclear commitments. Third, in both instances of a violation, Iran quickly remedied the overage when confronted.
Stephanopoulos: “But they are complying with the agreement.”
McMaster: “—spinning too many centrifuges, having too much heavy water.”
Interview on This Week with George Stephanopoulos, September 17, 2017
Note: McMaster’s comments on heavy water are addressed here.
Iran’s nuclear program uses centrifuges to enrich uranium. Low enriched uranium (at a typical enrichment level of 5 percent or below) can be used to fabricate fuel for nuclear power reactors; by contrast, high enriched uranium (at a typical enrichment level of 90 percent or above) can be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The number of centrifuges that a state operates is one factor that influences breakout time, that is, the time required to manufacture enough nuclear material for one nuclear weapon.
The JCPOA limits both the number and type of centrifuges Iran is permitted to use. Along with limitations on the quantity and enrichment level of low enriched uranium that Iran is allowed to possess, this limitation ensures that the JCPOA extends Iran’s breakout time from roughly two months to one year.
The JCPOA restricts Iran to 5,060 centrifuges at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (the only facility at which Iran is permitted to produce and accumulate enriched uranium) for ten years. These centrifuges may only be Iran’s original model, called the IR-1. This limit reduced by roughly two-thirds the number of centrifuges at this facility.
The IAEA has confirmed, in each of its quarterly reports since the implementation of the JCPOA, that Iran has not exceeded this limit at any time.
Iran is also allowed a limited R&D program into more advanced centrifuge types (though it may not accumulate enriched uranium in the process). The JCPOA describes the limits imposed on these activities. Moreover, like all other states that adhere to an enhanced IAEA safeguards agreement known as the Additional Protocol, Iran must inform the IAEA about its plans for R&D into the fuel cycle (enrichment and reprocessing) for the next ten years. In Iran’s case, this document is known as its “long-term enrichment and enrichment R&D plan” (since the JCPOA prohibits Tehran from engaging in reprocessing activities for fifteen years). Iran agreed to be bound by this plan, which contains even more detailed limits on centrifuge R&D and related activities. (The plan, quoted below, has not been widely reported but has not been released to the public.)
In its most recent report, the IAEA stated that “Iran’s enrichment R&D with and without uranium has been conducted using centrifuges within the limits defined in the JCPOA.”
Given the vagueness of McMaster’s statement, it is difficult to know exactly what he was referencing. However, there have been public reports suggesting Iran has operated up to thirteen IR-6 centrifuges for R&D purposes. In its long-term enrichment plan, Iran committed to operate “roughly 10,” leading to a disagreement between the JCPOA participants as to the meaning of “roughly.” (This quotation comes from the enrichment plan Iran submitted to the IAEA in compliance with the JCPOA. It has not been released to the public.) Some participants suggested a limit of eleven machines; others believed that roughly is a more permissive modifier, perhaps allowing for thirteen. Reportedly, the United States reached agreement with France, Germany, and the UK on the lowest proposed bound of eleven centrifuges. Iran has not accepted this conclusion but is now complying with it.
Assuming that McMaster was indeed referring to IR-6 centrifuges, there is no obvious meaning to the limitation “roughly 10.” Indeed, this limitation is one of several examples of complex, innovative aspects of the JCPOA that, unsurprisingly, require careful consultation within the Joint Commission created by the deal. Indeed, in such a complicated agreement, some ambiguities are inevitable, and the Joint Commission was created precisely so that such ambiguities could be resolved quickly and professionally. In this instance, there reportedly was no common understanding among the participants other than Iran—or even among the United States, the UK, France, Germany, and the EU—on what “roughly” means. Once these participants agreed on the most restrictive interpretation, Iran implemented this interpretation while not formally accepting it.
Moreover, if Iran did operate as many as thirteen IR-6 centrifuges for a brief period, it would not meaningfully advance its R&D efforts more quickly than permitted.
In general, it is not surprising that Iran would seek a more permissive interpretation of ambiguous limits, while other participants would seek a less permissive interpretation. The real test of the JCPOA is whether participants are able to work cooperatively to address disagreements. In this instance, they were, with Iran abiding by the lower bound on its IR-6 program. In addition, key limits in the JCPOA—those that restrict Iran’s production of enriched uranium and plutonium—are not ambiguous.
“The biggest concern is that Iranian leaders—the same ones who in the past were caught operating a covert nuclear program at military sites—have stated publicly that they will refuse to allow IAEA inspections of their military sites.
How can we know Iran is complying with the deal, if inspectors are not allowed to look everywhere they should look?”
“Remarks on Iran and the JCPOA,” American Enterprise Institute, September 5, 2017
Prior to the implementation of the JCPOA, Iran had a long history of attempting to build nuclear facilities in secret, without declaring them, as required, to the IAEA. Indeed, many experts believe that the single greatest technical challenge facing the IAEA is the detection of undeclared centrifuge enrichment plants. Moreover, Iran is also suspected to have conducted R&D relevant to the manufacture of nuclear weapons on military sites. Credible verification therefore demands that the IAEA be permitted to search for undeclared facilities on military sites.
Monitoring and verification in the JCPOA rest on three pillars:
First, Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, which the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) required Iran to conclude with the IAEA, gives the IAEA information about and access to all nuclear material and activities in Iran.
Second, Iran agreed to provisionally apply the Additional Protocol, which was designed to enhance the IAEA’s ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities through multiple measures, such as greater transparency on nuclear activities, including enrichment, and greater access to both declared and undeclared facilities (through provisions known as complementary access).
Third, the JCPOA contains additional transparency measures that go beyond monitoring and inspection requirements in other countries. These include: (in some cases continuous) monitoring of sensitive facilities, equipment, and materials that are not usually under IAEA surveillance, including all uranium mines and stocks (for twenty-five years), centrifuge parts and production facilities (for twenty years), excess centrifuges (for fifteen years), and heavy water stocks and production facilities (for fifteen years). If Iran wanted to develop a clandestine nuclear program, it would be unable to divert any of this equipment or these materials without risk of being caught almost immediately. As a result, it would likely be forced to build multiple new facilities, which would also raise the risk of being detected.
There are no limitations whatsoever—in Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, its Additional Protocol, or the JCPOA—to inspections taking place on military sites. Indeed, before implementation of the JCPOA, Iran permitted the IAEA to access military sites on occasion (though not on a consistent basis).
In fact, the JCPOA contains provisions (in Annex I, Section Q) to ensure more rapid access to undeclared sites, including military ones, than would be possible under Iran’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement or Additional Protocol.
All of these transparency and access requirements can be enforced by the Joint Commission through a specified dispute resolution process. If Iran does not resolve a potential dispute to the satisfaction of any other single participant (including the United States), that member can refer the issue to the UN Security Council, where any of the permanent five members (again, including the United States) can, by itself, force the snapback of all UN sanctions lifted by the JCPOA.
As of October 3, 2017, the IAEA has not raised any access issue to the Joint Commission to begin the dispute resolution procedure.
The IAEA’s quarterly reports have specifically confirmed that its personnel have been given the required access rights, including the unique JCPOA provisions described above and the Additional Protocol’s complementary access provisions.
The Trump administration has not accused the IAEA of trying to conceal any unresolved access requests. In fact, Haley summarized her meetings in Vienna by calling herself “impressed by the IAEA team and its efforts.” Rather, her accusation relates to the possibility that Iran, in the future, might not live up to its obligations.
If there had been any meaningful failure on Iran’s part to live up to the access and transparency requirements in its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, the Additional Protocol, or the JCPOA, it seems evident that these issues would have been raised to the Joint Commission for resolution. The fact that this has not happened strongly indicates that any access questions have been well within the IAEA’s normal experience and have been resolved to the agency’s and the JCPOA participants’ satisfaction.
It is true that Iranian officials have publicly denied that the IAEA would be allowed to inspect self-declared military facilities. It is also accurate that Iran has permitted such access in the past and that the IAEA has categorically rejected any such limitation, as Director General Yukiya Amano stated flatly to the Associated Press that the agency “has access to [all] locations without making distinctions between military and civilian locations.” Access to military sites could become an issue in the future, but in advance of any request, it would be wrong to assume that Iran will block access.
“If the Iran nuclear deal is to have any meaning, the parties must have a common understanding of its terms… it appears that some countries are attempting to shield Iran from even more inspections. Without inspections, the Iran deal is an empty promise.”
Official statement issued following media reports that the IAEA had sought clarification regarding the implementation of Annex I, Section T of the JCPOA, September 28, 2017
Note: Haley’s statement also mentioned the question of IAEA access to military sites, which is discussed here.
While producing enough nuclear material is the primary challenge in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, a would-be proliferator must also develop various nonnuclear components and systems to ensure that the weapon can be detonated when required and that it is not accidentally detonated at other times.
Annex I, Section T of the JCPOA prohibits Iran from conducting various activities that would not necessarily involve nuclear material, but “could contribute to the development of a nuclear explosive device.” These provisions represented a significant innovation since the IAEA has usually regarded its “legal authority to investigate possible parallel weaponization activity [as] limited, absent some nexus linking the activity to nuclear material.”
The IAEA is responsible for verifying all of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments, as set out in Annex I of the JCPOA, which includes Section T. In its most recent reports on Iran, the IAEA has confirmed explicitly that its verification and monitoring activities extend to Section T.
In the event that the IAEA found evidence that Iran had been illicitly conducting an activity prohibited by Section T and requested access to the site, the JCPOA would require Iran to grant such access. Specifically, the IAEA would likely use its inspection authorities under the Additional Protocol first. Should these prove insufficient, the IAEA would use expedited access procedures provided for in Annex I, Section Q of the JCPOA that apply when “the IAEA has concerns regarding undeclared nuclear materials or activities, or activities inconsistent with the JCPOA, at locations that have not been declared.” (italics added for emphasis)
The IAEA has reportedly asked the Joint Commission (which was set up to oversee implementation of the JCPOA) for clarification about the precise scope of the IAEA verification activities anticipated by Section T, such as whether Iran is required to submit a declaration related to this section. IAEA Director General Amano told the press “our tools are limited.”
Despite this somewhat inartful phrasing, Amano did not appear to be asking for clarification about whether the IAEA has the right and responsibility to verify Iranian compliance with Section T since, as noted above, the IAEA’s quarterly reports already confirm that it is doing so.
Given the complex, innovative nature of the JCPOA, it is not surprising that implementation questions have arisen. Section T, in particular, always seemed likely to draw requests for clarification, since the IAEA has only limited experience monitoring the “weaponization” activities prohibited by this section.
Indeed, the Joint Commission was set up precisely to provide such clarifications. As of October 3, 2017, it has done so on a number of issues quickly and professionally—though some have been thornier than others. It is important that questions related to Section T implementation are similarly resolved in a way that does not prevent timely IAEA verification, both to ensure the effective implementation these provisions and to demonstrate that the Joint Commission can muster sufficient unity to ensure the long-term viability of the JCPOA. If the United States seems uncommitted to the successful implementation of the JCPOA, it is likely to be more difficult rather than less so to use the Joint Commission to reach common understandings with Russia and other participants on technically complicated and politically sensitive topics.
That said, Haley’s comments were not so much a direct accusation of noncompliance against Iran as they were criticisms of Russia for reportedly trying to limit the scope of the IAEA verification activities related to Section T. Presumably, any specific concern about Iran’s undertaking weaponization activities would be raised by the administration directly, not in the form of a complex complaint about Joint Commission deliberations.
Russia has long-standing concerns about the IAEA’s overstepping its mandate, though it has been a constructive, flexible partner in negotiating and implementing the JCPOA. Even if Moscow is being less helpful on this issue, Russian noncooperation is not the same as Iranian noncompliance and is not currently preventing an important part of the agreement from being implemented.
“If you go back and read the preamble to the JCPOA, the nuclear agreement, there clearly was an expectation between the parties . . . that by dealing with this nuclear threat we would lower the tension between Iran and the rest of the world and we would create conditions for Iran to rejoin the community of nations.”
Interview on Face the Nation, September 17, 2017
“[The President] has said and I’ve said many times as well, that when . . . one looks at—he uses the word “spirit of the agreement,” I use the word “expectations of the agreement” . . . there was clear expectations of the parties who were negotiating this nuclear deal . . . which set aside, obviously, a serious threat to the region and to the relationship, and that by doing so this would allow the parties to seek a more stable, peaceful region.”
Remarks at a press availability after a JCPOA Joint Commission meeting, September 20, 2017
There is often a hope that narrow, specific agreements between adversarial parties can create trust and the conditions for the resolution of additional problems or even broad improvements in relations.
In the preface of the JCPOA, the participants “anticipate that full implementation of this JCPOA will positively contribute to regional and international peace and security.”
The word “spirit” is used twice in the JCPOA (in Paragraph vii of the preamble and Paragraph 28 of the main text). Both instances refer to sanctions commitments.
Then U.S. president Barack Obama welcomed the deal, underscoring that it would not solve every problem between the United States and Iran, but he added:
“Time and again, I have made clear to the Iranian people that we will always be open to engagement on the basis of mutual interests and mutual respect. Our differences are real and the difficult history between our nations cannot be ignored. But it is possible to change. The path of violence and rigid ideology, a foreign policy based on threats to attack your neighbors or eradicate Israel—that’s a dead end. A different path, one of tolerance and peaceful resolution of conflict, leads to more integration into the global economy, more engagement with the international community, and the ability of the Iranian people to prosper and thrive.
This deal offers an opportunity to move in a new direction. We should seize it.”
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani also indicated his belief that the nuclear deal could lead to greater peace and cooperation:
“Without a doubt, reaching a final nuclear deal will expand our cooperation, and we can cooperate in various fields including restoring regional peace and stability and fighting against terrorism.”
The JCPOA is an extremely detailed technical agreement designed to constrain the proliferation threat from Iran. Its provisions were laid out in exceptional detail precisely because the level of trust between many of the participants was very low, and negotiators wanted to minimize, to the extent possible, the scope for ambiguity in interpretation. In other words, the JCPOA does not currently have a “spirit.”
At this time, the JCPOA should be judged on compliance by all participants with their specific and detailed commitments. To judge the deal a failure because broad, hortatory language in a nonbinding preface has not been achieved in two years is to misstate its entire purpose. Perhaps, in the future, the JCPOA will develop a “spirit” if—and only if—all the participants meet their obligations and so develop trust in one another’s ability to negotiate on complex issues and then abide by their commitments.
“When the nuclear agreement was signed, the Obama Administration took Iran’s non-nuclear activity—the missile development, the arms smuggling, the terrorism, the support for murderous regimes—and rolled it up into one UN Security Council resolution—2231 . . . [The Iranians] are clearly acting in defiance of UN Resolution 2231 by developing missile technology capable of deploying nuclear warheads.”
“Remarks on Iran and the JCPOA,” American Enterprise Institute, September 5, 2017
“We have to recognize the broad range of Iranian destabilizing behavior and we can’t allow this deal to enable that. Their missile programs, for example, the way they are seeding this Iranian network with more and more destructive capability that places all their neighbors at risk.”
Interview on Fox News Sunday, September 17, 2017
Iran’s ballistic missiles, currently armed with nonnuclear warheads, pose a threat to states in the region, and there are concerns that Tehran may want to extend their range. Nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles magnify each other’s dangers since nuclear-armed ballistic missiles would be both exceptionally destructive and very difficult to intercept.
Iran has an advanced ballistic missile program despite decades of UN condemnations and prohibitions. It is currently violating the missile prohibitions in Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2231, the same resolution that enacted the nuclear deal. Although this resolution terminates previous Security Council resolutions, which imposed sanctions on Iran’s ballistic missiles in addition to its nuclear program, it has housekeeping language to keep earlier restrictions on ballistic missiles in place (which underscores that the country’s ballistic missile program was not part of the JCPOA).
Even a cursory reading of the JCPOA makes clear that it is a deal on Iran’s nuclear program, not its ballistic missile program.
The first sentence of the JCPOA states that the deal “will ensure that Iran’s nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful.” The deal does not identify resolving disagreements on Iran’s ballistic missile program as an objective.
Paragraphs 1 to 17 of the JCPOA and the fifteen-page Annex I lay out very detailed restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program as well as requirements for monitoring and transparency. There are no restrictions on ballistic missiles. In exchange for Iran’s limiting its nuclear program, the United States, the EU, and the UN lifted nuclear-related sanctions.
Iran’s ongoing ballistic missile program is a violation not of the JCPOA, but of UNSCR 2231—as Iran’s ballistic missile program was in violation of previous Security Council resolutions. (One of the authors has argued elsewhere that the United States and its partners were not positioned to get a good deal on ballistic missiles.)
The JCPOA, however, does make Iran’s ballistic missile program less dangerous by dramatically reducing the risk that Iran’s missiles will be armed with nuclear warheads. Iran’s missile program remains nonnuclear, catalyzed by lessons Tehran learned during the Iran-Iraq War about air force operations and over-the-horizon strike capabilities.
UNSCR 2231, like the Security Council resolutions it replaced, is not just a symbolic condemnation of Iran’s ballistic missile program. It provides an international legal basis for third countries to counter trade and finance supporting this program. Many key countries—including those that sell components important for ballistic missiles or that are important shipping centers—require an international legal basis to enable law enforcement cooperation on interdiction and other practical steps to counter Iran’s ballistic missile program. Experience does not bear out Haley’s assertion that countries are not implementing these UN Security Council requirements. While Iran may ignore Security Council prohibitions on ballistic missiles, many key countries do take these restrictions seriously and are highly cooperative on efforts to slow the progress and raise the costs of Iran’s missile program.
Jarrett Blanc
Former Senior Fellow, Geoeconomics and Strategy Program
Jarrett Blanc was a senior fellow in the Geoeconomics and Strategy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Jessica T. Mathews Chair, Co-director, Nuclear Policy Program
Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Carnegie India does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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