In an interview, Ishac Diwan looks at the merits and flaws in the draft legislation distributing losses from the financial collapse.
Michael Young
{
"authors": [
"Anirudh Burman",
"K.P. Krishnan"
],
"type": "other",
"centerAffiliationAll": "",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"Carnegie India"
],
"collections": [],
"englishNewsletterAll": "",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie India",
"programAffiliation": "",
"programs": [],
"projects": [
"Political Economy"
],
"regions": [
"India"
],
"topics": [
"Domestic Politics",
"Economy"
]
}Source: Getty
Statutory regulatory authorities are bound by the same principles of administrative law as other government agencies, as defined by the judiciary from time to time.
Source: Hart Publishing
A number of statutory regulatory authorities have emerged in India since the 1990s. Statutes that have established regulators focus broadly on: (a) the design of the apex decision-making body (board or authority); (b) the substantive powers of the regulator, and; (c) accountability mechanisms such as audits, accounting and reporting. Such statutes are usually ‘thin’ on guidance to regulators on how to conduct their administrative functions. Consequently, statutory regulatory authorities are bound by the same principles of administrative law as other government agencies, as defined by the judiciary from time to time. However, independent regulators perform their functions in ways that are distinct from government departments.
First, statutory regulatory authorities concentrate legislative (regulation-making), executive (monitoring and supervision) and judicial (issuing orders) powers in contrast to the normal structure of government departments.1 This structure potentially violates the principle of separation of powers and affects the design of statutory regulatory authorities. Second, the frequency and volume of regulation-making is significantly higher due to the responsibility of regulators to react to dynamic market requirements. Third, there is an independent and specialised appellate mechanism against the regulatory actions of most regulators.
This book chapter was originally published by Hart Publishing.
1 See generally Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission, ‘Report of the Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission’, 2013, https://dea.gov.in/sites/default/files/fslrc_report_vol1_1.pdf.
Former Associate Research Director and Fellow, Carnegie India
Anirudh Burman was an associate research director and fellow at Carnegie India. He works on key issues relating to public institutions, public administration, the administrative and regulatory state, and state capacity.
K.P. Krishnan
K.P. Krishnan is the secretary of the Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship of the Government of India.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
In an interview, Ishac Diwan looks at the merits and flaws in the draft legislation distributing losses from the financial collapse.
Michael Young
Mustaqbal Misr has expanded its portfolio with remarkable speed, but a lack of transparency remains.
Yezid Sayigh
Arab diaspora business communities in Egypt often mirror the same systemic challenges facing Egyptian businesses.
Nur Arafeh, Yezid Sayigh, Qaboul al-Absi, …
Largely characterized thus far by a single-minded focus on extractivism, Riyadh must commit to greater equitability in its approach to investment and development deals with Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea.
Hesham Alghannam
Once Israel’s war in the territory is brought to an end, the foundational principles guiding reconstruction should be Palestinian self-determination, local agency, and sovereignty.
Nur Arafeh, Mandy Turner