• Research
  • Diwan
  • About
  • Experts
Carnegie Middle East logoCarnegie lettermark logo
LebanonIran
REQUIRED IMAGE

REQUIRED IMAGE

Article

Does Moscow Know Something That Washington Doesn't?

The Russian Atomic Energy Agency announced on September 1 that additional troops had been dispatched to guard nuclear facilities throughout Russia.The troop move is a sign that Russia recognizes that the threat to its nuclear facilities. US programs to assist Russian nuclear security also need to recognize that the threat has changed and move to accelerate and expand ongoing efforts.

Link Copied
By Jon Wolfsthal
Published on Sep 2, 2004

The Russian Atomic Energy Agency announced on September 1 that additional troops had been dispatched to guard nuclear facilities throughout Russia. The move comes in the wake of a series of attacks from Chechen rebels, including the downing of two Russian aircraft, a subway bombing in downtown Moscow and a recent school seizure. The troop move is a sign that Russia recognizes that the threat to its nuclear facilities is growing and that additional steps must be taken to protect its stocks of nuclear materials and weapons. US programs to assist Russian nuclear security also need to recognize that the threat has changed and move to accelerate and expand ongoing efforts.

Despite these risks, as well as statements from top officials, the United States has not been doing all it can to protect Russian nuclear materials and weapons. While some important initiatives have been launched, the recent legacy of nuclear security programs in Russia has been disappointing. According to a major Harvard University study, fewer Russian nuclear materials were secured in the two years after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 than in the two years prior to the attacks. Moreover, at its current pace, US-assisted security upgrades will not be completed until well into the next decade, even though the government states it will complete them by 2008.

More Security, Deeper Cuts
In addition, the Bush administration arms reduction policies have increased the risk of Russian nuclear weapons being stolen. The President’s fateful decision not to include verification procedures or requirements for warhead elimination in the Treaty of Moscow means that Russia is retaining a larger nuclear arsenal than it needed and storing those weapons longer than it wants as a hedge against possible US rearmament. The Moscow agreement codified the decision in both countries to reduce their strategic deployed offensive arsenal to no more than 2200 weapons. Despite statements at the time, the Bush administration has made no efforts to follow up on the 2002 agreement with deeper cuts, to reduce tactical nuclear weapons, or to enhance the treaty’s verification procedures.

Even though the nature of the threat to Russia’s nuclear complex is increasing, US and international efforts to assist Russia to improve nuclear security are not keeping pace. Business as usual will not protect Russia’s nuclear materials or weapons, or American security. Programs now being implemented were designed to protect against insider theft and lightly armed attacks against Russian facilities. The growing sophistication of the attacks in Russia means that current programs may be addressing only one part of a more complex problem. Russia appears to have recognized this fact and is taking some modest steps to increase its own efforts. The US and its allies need to do the same by speeding up efforts to protect nuclear and chemical weapons sites, and take a more comprehensive approach to helping Russia eliminate its excess materials and warheads. This, finally, should include steps to accelerate the reductions called for in the Treaty of Moscow, verify those cuts, and eliminate the warheads slated for withdrawal from deployment. Anything less is courting disaster.

About the Author

Jon Wolfsthal

Jon Wolfsthal
North AmericaUnited StatesCaucasusRussiaForeign Policy

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center

  • Commentary
    Diwan
    Where is the Groundwork for Lebanon’s Negotiations With Israel?

    A prerequisite of serious talks is that the country’s leadership consolidates majority national support for such a process.

      Michael Young

  • Commentary
    Diwan
    A Military Balance Sheet in the U.S. and Israeli War With Iran

    In an interview, Jim Lamson discusses the ongoing regional conflict and sees an unclear picture when it comes to winners and losers. 

      Michael Young

  • Commentary
    Diwan
    Lebanon Needs a New Negotiating Strategy with Israel

    Unless Beirut lowers expectations, any setbacks will end up bolstering Hezbollah’s narrative.

      Mohanad Hage Ali

  • Commentary
    Diwan
    Egypt’s Discrete Role in the Ceasefire with Iran

    Cairo’s efforts send a message to the United States and the region that it still has a place at the diplomatic table.

      • Angie Omar

      Angie Omar

  • Commentary
    Diwan
    Realism and the Lebanon-Israel Talks

    Beirut’s desire to break free from Iranian hegemony may push it into a situation where it has to accept Israel’s hegemony.  

      Michael Young

Get more news and analysis from
Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center
Carnegie Middle East logo, white
  • Research
  • Diwan
  • About
  • Experts
  • Projects
  • Events
  • Contact
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
Get more news and analysis from
Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.