Carnegie China continues to assess how different countries perceive and respond to the evolving role China is playing in the region and in the world. As part of this effort, we launched an opinion roundup series to highlight the regional perspectives from Asia on key issues related to China.
In recent weeks, China has signaled its intent to play a more active role in international conflict meditation with the release of its twelve-point position paper on Ukraine and the brokering of the reestablishment of Saudi-Iran diplomatic ties. Beijing has historically been reluctant to engage in international disputes, but under its new Global Security Initiative (GSI), that may be changing. In this context, there is ongoing debate on the significance of the recent Saudi-Iran deal and the role that China played in bringing the deal to fruition. Therefore, we invited six scholars from different Asian countries to discuss China’s emerging role.
From the responses below, Bilahari Kausikan puts China’s achievement in the Saudi-Iran deal into broader perspective, while Broto Wardoyo assesses the deep economic ties China has with the two Middle Eastern countries. Endy Bayuni illustrates how China can strengthen its credentials as a peacemaker and a responsible superpower. And Ngeow Chow Bing walks through the development of China’s Global Security Initiative. Charmaine Misalucha-Willoughby, on the other hand, provides a more cautious perspective from the Philippines regarding China’s global role. Finally, Tong Zhao explains the ambitions behind China’s expanding global footprint.
Paul Haenle
Maurice R. Greenberg Director’s Chair
Carnegie China
Two Cheers for China
The resumption of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran was undoubtedly a diplomatic coup for China. But it is not a game-changer.The decision to reopen embassies in Riyadh and Tehran and to implement a 1998 economic agreement and a 2001 security agreement is essentially a return to the status quo ante of seven years ago, when Riyadh broke ties after a mob sacked its embassy in Tehran. It leaves the sources of the deep mistrust that divides Saudi Arabia and Iran untouched.
The Beijing deal was the icing on a cake baked after more than two years of quiet, high-level mediation and confidence-building by Oman and assisted by Iraq. It would not have been possible without this crucial preparatory process in which regional states played the most essential roles. Middle Eastern states are too often regarded as lacking agency. But of all regions, the Middle East is where the tail most often wags the dog, whether for good or ill.
If Saudi Arabia and Iran had not, for their own reasons, wanted to stabilize relations, there would have been no deal. Iran is facing serious internal political and economic problems, and Iran’s supreme leader is reportedly sick. Interestingly, the day before the Beijing statement, Riyadh leaked to U.S. media that it was prepared to sign the Abraham Accords and recognize Israel if Washington provided it with security guarantees and a nuclear cooperation agreement that would allow it to master the nuclear fuel cycle.
It will not be easy for the custodian of the two holiest Muslim sites to recognize Israel. But clearly the Beijing deal was a step in an indirect bargaining process between the Saudis and the United States, driven, paradoxically, by continuing Saudi fears of Iran. Riyadh has made clear that if Iran goes nuclear, it will not be far behind.
None of this is to denigrate China’s achievement, only to put it in perspective. The regional states would probably not been able to go the last hundred yards without the strategic weight of a major power behind them, and there was really no other choice than China. Russia, engaged in aggression against Ukraine and the chief prop of the pro-Iran regime of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria, was a nonstarter, as was the United States with the baggage of more than forty years of hostility with Iran.
It was good that China stepped up. But what was unusual was only that Beijing had not earlier played a significant diplomatic role to stabilize a region that is so important to its energy security. Whether it can continue to do so in situations where local—often tribal—dynamics are the key drivers of conflict is an open question. Yemen will be an early test. In the meantime, two cheers for China. We should be thankful for small mercies in a region where small mercies are all we are likely to get.
The Chinese way: analyzing the invisible road towards normalization
China’s successful mediation of Saudi-Iran diplomatic ties has been widely viewed as a sign of its growing role in the Middle East. As the United States slowly shifts its focus away from the region, many experts wonder whether China will eventually replace the US as the region’s leading power. However, China will only replace the United States when it becomes more involved in the political and security issues of the Middle East rather than focusing primarily on economic engagement.For the past two decades, China’s involvement in the Middle East have coincided with rising energy demand and economic interests. To date, China has signed comprehensive strategic partnership agreements with five Middle East countries and strategic partnership agreements with eight Middle East countries, many of whom are Gulf oil-producing countries.
China’s diplomacy in the Middle East also has trodden cautiously and selectively by avoiding involvement in politics and military issues. China has not conducted military intervention in regional conflicts, such as in Iraq, Yemen, or Syria. To manage regional conflicts, China prefers to adopt a “quasi-mediation” role. By doing so, China has been able to balance its economic and energy interests without being consumed by complex political quarrels.
In Saudi Arabia, China has boosted investment, mostly in strategic infrastructure projects, through the Belt and Road Initiative. China-Saudi trade volumes have increased significantly, jumping from $4.1 billion in 2002 to $87.4 billion in 2021. Currently, China is Saudi Arabia’s largest trading partner, the largest importerof its oil, and one of its most important investors. Media reports suggest that China and Saudi reached agreement on $30 billion worth of Chinese investment in technology, green energy, and other sectors in the kingdom during Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Riyadh last year.
From Riyadh’s perspective, with the introduction of Saudi Vision 2030 in 2016, the kingdom intended to diversify its economy, starting with foreign investment in non-oil sectors. This suggests that Saudi’s motivation to establish closer relations with China is mainly economic in nature.
China-Iran relations also revolve around economic and energy issues. While official data is lacking, China currently is believed to be Iran’s largest oil consumer. Even when Iran was under international sanctions, China consumed Iran’s oil by using third parties to rebrand Iranian exports. Relations between China and Iran, unlike those between China and Saudi Arabia, go beyond economic and energy issues. China was believed to have distributed various weapon systems to Tehran even while Iran has faced sanctions, although no public records have confirmed this accusation. China has been adept at navigating close ties with Iran, despite sanctions, while avoiding overt displays of support for Iran’s military. Finally, the two countries share anti-U.S. sentiment, which only serve to strengthen their relations.
Normalization between Saudi Arabia and Iran suggests that the two countries value their relationship with China. It also shows that China is capable of maximizing the benefits of its ties with Saudi Arabia (economically) and with Iran (economically and politically). China’s mediation success adds another benefit to its diplomatic credibility. Nonetheless, China’s diplomatic moves, with respect to both China-Saudi and China-Iran relations, remain cautious and selective, in keeping with China’s tradition of avoiding security-related issues in the Middle East.
The normalization between Saudi and Iran will surely impact other areas where the two countries are in conflict, such as in Yemen, Syria, and Iraq. Going forward, however, China may not necessarily be interested in getting itself involved in these other disputes unless it could bring economic benefits to Beijing.
Superpower China and Peace Credentials
The restoration of diplomatic ties between Saudi Arabia and Iran has revealed a side of China not previously known: peacemaker. But it is a role that is widely expected of any superpower, and China has certainly become one today. China can use its newfound power to further expand its political and economic hegemony, but it can also put it to effective use to end wars and conflicts.While everyone, including the United States as the leading superpower, has welcomed the peace deal, we should temper our expectations. The new kid on the block will have to get used to its peacemaking role and learn that with great power comes great responsibility.
The Saudi-Iran rapprochement has eased tensions, with the possible payoff of ending their many proxy wars, including in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. It will be interesting to follow what Beijing’s role will be beyond brokering the establishment of diplomatic ties. We know China is heavily invested in the Middle East, since Iran and Saudi Arabia are both important suppliers of its crude oil needs.
Now everyone must take China’s GSI seriously if we are looking for clues about its intentions as a peacemaker. President Xi Jinping revealed the initiative in a speech in April last year and a concept paper in February, which gave more details. The Saudi-Iran deal shows Beijing can offer an alternative solution to peace when others, including the United Nations and the United States, fail.
Naturally, there is now growing expectation for Beijing to use its power to resolve other conflicts around the world, such as its plan for Ukraine. Although we are not getting any clear signal of acceptance from Moscow or Kyiv, based on the Saudi-Iran experience, China could be negotiating with the belligerents privately before announcing a diplomatic achievement that few would see coming. So there is still hope. Beijing’s role also will be most welcome in the context of the Israel-Palestinian conflict. This is a war that has dragged on for too long with no solution in sight and the emergence of a peace broker like China could give a new impetus to peace.
China likely cannot address current tensions in the Indo-Pacific region, since it is party to the many conflicts—including in the South China Sea, where it has territorial disputes with several Southeast Asian countries and where it is at loggerheads with the United States and its allies over the questions of freedom of navigation. But Beijing could go a long way in pacifying countries in the region if it agrees to the longstanding demand from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to sign a binding code of conduct in which countries denounce the use of military power to resolve disputes in the South China Sea. This will strengthen China’s credentials as a peacemaker and a responsible superpower.
China’s GSI
Xi announced the GSI in 2022, but the ideas underpinning the GSI are not new. In many ways, these ideas can be tracked back to the New Security Concept that China first proposed in the mid-1990s. The core notions of “common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security” were already the standard frame whenever Xi and the Chinese government spoke about security cooperation in the 2010s.The term “indivisible security” was new in the GSI discourse (apparently copied from the Russian notion), although “indivisible security” was not that substantively different from the notion of “common security,” under which it is argued that countries should not seek “absolute security” at the “expense of the security of others” and “take the legitimate security concerns of all parties seriously.” Needless to say, in China’s view, the security order practiced by the United States and its allies is incompatible with “common security,” as China sees these alliances as seeking “absolute security at the expense of the security of others,” and that they do not “respect and accommodate the legitimate security concerns of all parties.”
The GSI is unsurprisingly met with widespread skepticism, if not rejection, in the West, but its appeal to countries in the Global South should not be underestimated. China was adept, astute, and creative in touting the Saudi-Iran deal as a successful example of utilizing the GSI concept, even if it was only reaping the fruits of peace mediation played by others. If Saudi-Iran rapprochement proves durable, China could certainly derive credit too, and some countries could be drawn to seek out China’s help in finding solutions to other seemingly intractable conflicts.
One potential case could be Myanmar. Two years since the coup, the military junta has only become more intransigent, leaving ASEAN embarrassed with its inability to tackle the issue. China has only passively stated that it supports ASEAN’s efforts but otherwise carries on its business-as-usual, if not opportunistic, dealings with the junta. However, if ASEAN is to enlist China to be more involved in this issue, China might find that this could provide another opportunity to demonstrate the usefulness of its GSI approach, notwithstanding that the Myanmar conflict is more a domestic rather than an international dispute, albeit with transnational implications.
China and the Philippines
In 2022, China announced its GSI to eliminate the root causes of international conflicts, improve global security governance, encourage joint international effort, and promote peace and development. China’s recent actions with Ukraine and Russia and Saudi Arabia and Iran portend a new role in conflict mediation. Even so, the Philippines has reasons for skepticism.In the 2023 iteration of the State of Southeast Asia, the Philippines’ score indicates its high distrust of China because its economic and military power could threaten the Philippines’ interests and sovereignty. The irony is that while the Philippines is embedded on Chinese supply chains and needs funding for infrastructure across the country, its insecurity is heighted because of China’s unceasing occupation of certain features in the West Philippine Sea. It is in this context that 36.4 percent of Filipinos who participated in the survey view China as the most influential regional economic power, compared to 26.3 percent who favor the United States. However, despite China being the top economic player, an overwhelming 83.3 percent of Filipino respondents are worried about China’s growing influence. The Philippines displayed little confidence that China would “do the right thing” in upholding global peace, security, prosperity, and governance (36.4 percent). The number starkly contrasts with the 52.5 percent confidence rating toward the United States as a strategic partner and provider of regional security. The deep distrust that the Philippines displays toward China is compounded by Beijing’s unceasing occupation of features in the West Philippine Sea and its notorious reliance on gray-zone tactics, including information and influence campaigns.
Since the standoff in Scarborough Shoal in 2012 that led the Philippines to file a arbitration case against China, the latter has continued to occupy some features within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone. Likewise, it has built artificial islands and militarized them at the expense of the ecological integrity of the marine and coastal environments. China has also been known to use its maritime militia to chase Filipinos away from traditional fishing grounds, affecting their catch volume and forcing many to resort to illegal fishing methods.
Furthermore, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s state visit to Beijing in January reaped opportunities for China-Philippines economic cooperation. However, the incident a month later involving the Chinese Coast Guard aiming a military-grade laser at a Philippine Coast Guard vessel carrying food and supplies to troops stationed in the Ayungin Shoal highlights the inconsistency of China’s position and contributes to the Philippines’ high distrust.
Another factor that exacerbates skepticism toward China’s new role in conflict mediation is how it shapes narratives through information campaigns. Beijing’s influence operations engender a defeatist narrative in the Philippines by using local interlocutors to exploit domestic dynamics. One narrative argues that China’s occupation of the West Philippine Sea is a posture meant for the United States and not for the Philippines. In this telling, the Philippines has nothing to fear from China. Another is that, should a full-fledged conflagration occur in the South China Sea, China would overwhelmingly achieve victory due to its military superiority, in contrast to the Philippines’ armed forces that have yet to achieve complete modernization. According to this narrative, it is futile for the Philippines even to consider fighting.
Given these two factors, considerable doubts exist over China’s newfound role as a conflict mediator. If anything, its recent actions harbor suspicions about its intentions in the Taiwan Strait. The possibility of that scenario materializing is precisely why the Marcos administration has been keen to reinvigorate its alliance with the United State.
China’s Ambitions
China’s growing interest in international mediation goes hand in hand with an increasingly anti-American stance in its management of foreign policy and domestic public opinion. The Chinese leadership appears to have concluded that the Chinese dream of national rejuvenation can only be achieved by winning a long-term strategic competition with the United States, which includes gradually eroding American global influence and eventually replacing American-dominated international institutions with better alternatives that incorporate significant Chinese input. China’s decision to openly compete with existing Western institutions, such as through the establishment of the International Organization for Mediation in Hong Kong, demonstrates its hardened ambitions.China has been willing to take a more active role in areas where American influence is waning. Chinese diplomats have had some early successes, such as the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Admittedly, this recent achievement was more a result of Saudi and Iranian maneuvering to advance their own geopolitical interests amid rising U.S.-China competition, rather than a reflection of Beijing’s ability to provide a superior alternative to Washington in managing regional struggles. Nevertheless, China’s increasing global power is likely to lead to more opportunities and perhaps even invitations for Beijing to get more deeply involved in geopolitical affairs in other regions.
China’s desire to challenge American influence does not contradict the fact that Beijing genuinely believes it can provide better global leadership and a better alternative to Washington in achieving peace, stability, and prosperity in other parts of the world. According to Beijing, the inherent hegemonism of the United States has led to U.S.-dominated regional orders built solely to maximize American interests and perpetuate American control over local countries, often at the expense of their interests. Viewing itself as embracing more neutral interests and a more benign intention, Beijing feels an opportunity, as well as a responsibility, to accelerate the demise of what it sees as unpopular and unjust American dominance.
While this Chinese view may seem overly simplistic, it is a product of a closed political system that indulges in self-righteous thinking. The best way for such a system to develop a more nuanced and balanced view about existing regional orders and the American role in them is for China to engage directly and take responsibility for making good things happen. As the saying goes, it’s easy to criticize, but difficult to create. So far, China’s foreign policy is driven by vague concepts such as “community of common destiny for mankind,” the GSI, and the Global Civilization Initiative, which lack concrete proposals or substantive ideas. The international community should encourage China to transcend its focus on anti-Americanism and take up responsibilities of delivering concrete and sustainable results to advance regional peace and stability while providing transparency and accepting international scrutiny during the process.
China faces a steep learning curve before it can grow into a constructive, accountable, and humble international power. It is also in the interest of the United States and the international community to support China in transforming its international ambitions into opportunities for self-opening, self-reflection, and the readjustment of its relationship with the rest of the world in line with international expectations.
