This article, which examines Thailand’s approach to Ukraine and China, is part of an ongoing series on U.S. statecraft and the Global South developed by the Carnegie Endowment’s American Statecraft Program. For other articles in the series, click here.
In the summer of 2022, Thailand received two high-level visits from Washington in the span of two months. U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Secretary of State Antony Blinken each visited Bangkok and pledged to help Thailand modernize its military, strengthen interoperability with U.S. forces, and expand technological and climate cooperation.1 Bangkok welcomed this effort to revamp the U.S.-Thai alliance after Washington effectively shunned them for years due to democratic backsliding. But despite its status as one of the United States’ oldest Asian allies, Thailand feels little obligation to deepen ties with the United States at the expense of ties with China; instead, it guards its ability to maintain multiple alignments and adapt quickly to changing circumstances. This flexible position is unlikely to change anytime soon.2
Thailand’s Approach to the War in Ukraine
The war in Ukraine has limited importance for Bangkok despite the fact that the conflict has increased inflation and fuel prices while reducing tourism, its key industry.3
Soon after Russia’s February 2022 invasion, Thailand’s then prime minister Prayut Chan-o-cha announced that his country would remain neutral. He insisted that Thailand would “keep a balance” and adhere to ASEAN’s neutral stance on the war.4 Bangkok opted not to impose sanctions on Russia nor to send weapons to Ukraine. Its leaders have avoided condemning Russia, but Thailand voted in favor of three UN resolutions condemning Russia’s invasion and calling for a full Russian withdrawal from Ukraine’s recognized territory and an end to the war.5
Nonetheless, Thailand abstained on three other resolutions that called to suspend Russia from the UN Human Rights Council, declare Russia liable for war reparations, and condemn Russia’s illegitimate annexation of Ukrainian territories. Abstentions were common for the Human Rights Council and war reparations resolutions, but Thailand’s abstention on the resolution regarding annexations surprised Bangkok watchers.6 Bangkok may have concluded that the resolution would reduce “the chance for constructive engagement” with Moscow to end the war.7 Thailand was also gearing up to host the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit, and had been hoping for Russian President Vladimir Putin to attend.8 This likely influenced Thailand’s decision to abstain.
Bangkok, however, had little to lose in its relations with Moscow. Russia is not a key trading partner nor an important source of arms. The most likely motive for Thailand’s puzzling stance is its concern with maintaining an independent foreign policy that is not beholden to any power or coalition. Ultimately, Thailand is positioned far enough away from the war for its stance to matter far less to the United States than the positions of other allies.
Thailand’s Approach to China
In recent years, Thailand has embraced U.S.-led regional economic and security initiatives. But it has also welcomed similar engagements with China. Observers have long compared Bangkok’s foreign policy to a “bamboo bending with the wind,” suggesting a policy that is “always solidly rooted, but flexible enough to bend whichever way the wind blows in order to survive.”9 Thailand navigates U.S.-China competition carefully given the economic and security interests at stake in its relations with the two greatest powers in the Indo-Pacific—Thailand’s ambassador to the United States described his country’s approach to Washington and Beijing as a “diplomatic balancing act.”10
Thailand’s security ties with Washington are far more robust and well-established than with Beijing. Thailand has been an American ally since it signed a Treaty of Amity and Commerce in 1833. The United States and Thailand further reinforced their alliance with the 1954 Manila Pact, whereby Thailand joined the former Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). During the Cold War heyday of the U.S.-Thai relationship, Washington viewed Bangkok as a buffer state against communism in Indochina and used its U-Tapao Air Base as a launching platform for its war in Vietnam. The relationship was mutually beneficial—Thailand counted on active U.S. support against what it saw as a serious threat from Soviet-backed communist expansion near its borders.
But in many ways, the closeness that Washington and Bangkok enjoyed during the Cold War was an anomaly brought about by a shared fear of communist expansion in Southeast Asia. Thailand’s current foreign policy tends to prioritize strategic autonomy, harkening back to a long-standing tradition of balancing ties between great powers. It is also part of a broader regional trend in which Southeast Asian nations seek good relations with both China and the United States.
Still, security cooperation between the United States and Thailand, including joint military drills, advanced weapons sales, and military training and education, has oriented the alliance’s focus for decades. Each year, the two countries cohost Cobra Gold, the region’s largest and longest-running multinational military exercise. They engage in more than 400 joint military exercises and engagements annually.11 The U.S.-Thai economic relationship also remains very important for Thailand. The United States is Thailand’s largest export market (as of 2021) and its third-largest source of FDI.12
Thailand nevertheless does not share Washington’s perception of China as a threat.13 Unlike so many other regional players, it has no territorial disputes with China. Beijing and Bangkok have thus increased military cooperation in the last decade, especially after the U.S. downgraded its relationship in response to Thailand’s coup d’états of 2006 and 2014.14 China and Thailand held their first joint air exercise in 2015, and Thailand signed up to buy Chinese tanks, armored vehicles, and submarines.15 Chinese arms exports to Thailand increased four-fold between 2014 and 2018 compared with the preceding five years.16 China is now Thailand's top source of arms, and the two militaries regularly engage in joint military drills.17
Beijing has also boosted its economic role in Thailand; Thailand joined the Belt and Road Initiative and pledged to complete a Chinese high speed rail project linking Bangkok to the new Laos-China rail line in northern Thailand.18 Thailand has allowed Huawei to roll out 5G mobile internet nationwide.19 But Chinese investment in the country still lags behind Japan and the United States.20 Bangkok also rejected a Chinese proposal to clear a rocky section of the upper Mekong River for navigation, and has refused to allow Chinese-led sub-regional law enforcement river patrols to enter Thai territory.21
Under President Joe Biden’s administration, the United States has shown a renewed interest in its relationship with Thailand. In 2023, Washington sent its largest contingent in a decade to the annual Cobra Gold military exercise.22 Even stronger military-to-military cooperation and joint economic and technological initiatives could be on the horizon. For example, Washington has offered to help Thailand update its aging fleet of fighter jets.23 And although Thailand continues to hold joint military exercises with China, it adheres to its agreement with the United States banning the use of F-16 and F-5 fighters in these drills.24 Bangkok also seeks deeper defense relationships with many other partners, including India, Israel, Sweden, and South Korea.25
Despite its cooperation with China, Thailand is not at all ready to endorse a China-led order, much less attenuate ties to the United States. Like many countries, it hopes to reap the benefits of economic ties and security cooperation with both powers concurrently. But it would be overly optimistic to expect Thailand to take Washington’s side in a conflict over Taiwan. Most assessments assume that Thailand would remain neutral in a Taiwan contingency and would not allow the United States basing access as it did during the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.26 Thailand is uninterested in becoming a pawn in a military confrontation between China and the United States.27 U.S. requests for access to the U-Tapao military airport, even for humanitarian missions, have so far only induced suspicion.28
Thai foreign policy under the Prayut administration was notably conservative and passive, even on regional issues and within ASEAN. The new government might well seek to resume the country’s role as a major player in ASEAN and particularly in mainland Southeast Asia, but Bangkok will stay committed to its diplomatic flexibility. It will pursue close relationships with Beijing and Washington, as well as with middle powers such as Australia, Japan, India, and South Korea. It will aim thereby to diversity its sources of security to mitigate any negative consequences in an era of heightened geopolitical competition.
In the words of former Thai foreign minister Thanat Khoman, Thailand will “maintain the policy of equidistance – not leaning too much towards anyone who will tie us so tightly that we cannot breathe comfortably.”29 That does not mean that Thailand will be equidistant from Washington and Beijing at all times and on all issues. Rather, it will lean more toward one or the other power on specific issues, while redoubling efforts to strengthen relations with other powers as a way of reducing pressure from the two big power rivals.
Notes
1 U.S. Department of Defense, “Readout of Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III Meeting With Thailand Prime Minister and Minister of Defence Prayut Chan-o-cha,” June 13, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3060226/readout-of-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-meeting-with-thailand-prime/#:~:text=Austin%20III%20traveled%20to%20Thailand,defense%20personnel%20working%20in%20Thailand; “Blinken Hails Thai Help in U.S. Push to Asia,” Bangkok Post, July 10, 2022,
https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2343337/blinken-hails-thai-help-in-us-push-to-asia.
2 Greg Raymond, “Srettha Thavisin’s Election Raises Questions for Thailand,” East Asia Forum, September 17, 2023, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2023/09/17/srettha-thavisins-election-raises-questions-for-thailand/.
3 Somruedi Banchongduang et al, “War Economy,” Bangkok Post, February 20, 2023, https://www.bangkokpost.com/business/2510564/war-economy.
4 “Neutral on Russia-Ukraine: PM,” Bangkok Post, March 2, 2022, https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2272191/neutral-on-russia-ukraine-pm
5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Thailand, “Thailand’s Statement on the Situation in Ukraine,” February 24, 2022, https://www.mfa.go.th/en/content/statement-24-feb-22?cate=5d5bcb4e15e39c306000683e; “Thailand Will Not Rush to Condemn Russia Over Ukraine, says Foreign Minister Don,” Thai PBS World, March 1, 2022, https://www.thaipbsworld.com/thailand-will-not-rush-to-condemn-russia-over-ukraine-says-foreign-minister-don/.
6 Sebastian Strangio, “Why Did Thailand Abstain on This Week’s UN Vote on Ukraine?,” Diplomat, October 13, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/10/why-did-thailand-abstain-on-this-weeks-un-vote-on-ukraine/.
7 “For Many, Thailand’s UN Vote on Russia is Still a Puzzle,” Thai PBS World, October 16, 2022, https://www.thaipbsworld.com/for-many-thailands-un-vote-on-russia-still-a-puzzle/.
8 “Thailand Hopes Putin Will Attend 2022 APEC Summit in November,” Philippine News Agency, September 7, 2022, https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1183093 ; David Hutt, “Thailand: Russia-Ukraine Tensions Spill Over to APEC,” DW, November 18, 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/thailand-russia-ukraine-tensions-spill-over-to-apec/a-63807806
9 Arne Kislenko, “Bending with the Wind: the Continuity and Flexibility of Thai Foreign Policy,”Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis 57, no. 4 (2002).
10 Adrienne Ross, “Ambassador Tanee Sangrat Defines Thailand’s U.S.-China Balancing Act,” Washington Diplomat, July 10, 2023, https://washdiplomat.com/ambassador-tanee-sangrat-defines-thailands-us-china-balancing-act/.
11 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesperson, “The United States-Thailand Relationship,” July 9, 2022, https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-thailand-relationship/.
12 Ibid.
13 Michael J. Mazarr et al, "U.S. Major Combat Operations in the Indo-Pacific: Partner and Ally Views," RAND Corporation, 2023, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA967-2.html, 100 ; Scott W. Harold, Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga, and Soo Kim, Assessing the Prospects for Great Power Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific (Washington, DC: RAND, 2023), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA597-2.html, 56.
14 Congressional Research Service, “Thailand: Background and U.S. Relations,” Updated June 17, 2020, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10253/11.
15 Murray Hiebert, Under Beijing’s Shadow: Southeast Asia’s China Challenge (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020), 284.
16 Stockholm Peace Research Institute, Arms Transfers Database, https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers.
17 Cyril Ip, "China and Thailand to Expand Military Ties Amid Asia-Pacific 'Security Challenges,'" South China Morning Post, June 10, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3223655/china-and-thailand-expand-military-ties-amid-asia-pacific-security-challenges; Zhao Ziwen, "China and Thailand Launch Air Combat Drills as Beijing Shores up Military Ties in Southeast Asia," South China Morning Post, July 10, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3227189/china-and-thailand-launch-air-combat-drills-beijing-shores-military-ties-southeast-asia#:~:text=An%20annual%20joint%20air%20combat,state%20news%20agency%20Xinhua%20reported.
18 Zsombor Peter, “Thailand Sets 2028 Target to Finish High-Speed Rail Link with China,” Voice of America, July 17, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/thailand-sets-2028-target-to-finish-high-speed-rail-link-with-china/6662154.html.
19 Patpicha Tankasempipat, “Thailand Launches Huawei 5G Test Bed, Even as U.S. Urges Allies to Bar Chinese Gear,” Reuters, February 8, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-huawei-thailand-idUSKCN1PX0DY.
20 Murray Hiebert, “The United States Makes Up Critical Terrain in Thailand,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 2, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/united-states-makes-critical-terrain-thailand#:~:text=Blinken%20and%20Thai%20foreign%20minister,support%20Thailand%20against%20communist%20threats.
21 Panarat Thepgumpanat, “Thailand Scraps China-Led Project to Blast Open Mekong River,” Reuters, February 5, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-thailand-china/thailand-scraps-china-led-project-to-blast-open-mekong-river-idUSKBN1ZZ1T6.
22 "U.S. Sends Largest Contingent in a Decade to Cobra Gold," Royal Thai Embassy in Washington, DC, https://thaiembdc.org/2023/03/09/u-s-sends-largest-contingent-in-a-decade-to-cobra-gold/#:~:text=In%20a%20clear%20signal%20of,hosted%20annually%20with%20the%20Kingdom.
23 “Thailand Air Force Says U.S. Has Denied Request to Buy F-35 Jets,” May 25, 2023, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/thailand-air-force-says-us-has-denied-request-buy-f-35-jets-2023-05-25/.
24 Wassana Nanuam, “Thailand, China Holding 3 Joint Military Exercises,” Bangkok Post, July 17, 2023, https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2612821/thailand-china-holding-3-joint-military-exercises.
25 Rezaul H. Laskar, “India, Thailand Agree to Boost Cooperation in Defence and Security,” Hindustan Times, August 17, 2022, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-thailand-agree-to-boost-cooperation-in-defence-and-security-101660752394811.html; Hiebert, “The United States Makes Up Critical Terrain in Thailand.”
26 Michael J. Mazarr et al, “U.S. Major Combat Operations in the Indo-Pacific: Partner and Ally Views,” RAND Corporation, 2023, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA967-2.html, vi ; Raymond Bonner, “Thailand Tiptoes in Step with the American Antiterror Effort,” New York Times, June 8, 2003, https://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/08/world/threats-responses-southeast-asia-thailand-tiptoes-step-with-american-antiterror.html.
27 Hiebert, Under Beijing’s Shadow, 314.
28 Prasanth Parameswaran, “Thailand Mulls New US Aircraft Basing Request,” Diplomat, May 28, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/05/thailand-mulls-new-us-aircraft-basing-request/.
29 Pongphisoot Busbarat, “’Bamboo Swirling in the Wind’: Thailand’s Foreign Policy Imbalance Between China and the United States,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 38, no. 2 (August 2016): 233–257.
