Following the end of the Cold War, Western elites dreamed of a liberal world order based on democracy, the rule of law, and a liberal market economy. But the brutal resurgence of geopolitics at the beginning of this century killed off this dream and forced the West to reframe its foreign policies. Led by the United States, the West turned to two political concepts. Firstly, a rules-based order was meant to rally the broadest possible group of countries against the disruptors, namely China and Russia. Second, a defense of democracy narrative also aimed at alerting domestic audiences to the challenge from authoritarian rivals and strengthening the bond with Western allies.
The rules-based order enjoys considerable support, including from some non-Western governments. By contrast, the United States’ narrative concerning. An epochal global struggle between democrats and authoritarians as exemplified in the 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy found only lukewarm buy-in, even among Western allies. Going forward, the former frame will remain relevant, as it deals with the crucial question of whether a multipolar world can still be rules based. The latter, however, will need considerable rethinking, even if it survives the 2024 U.S. presidential election.
The Uses of Political Frames
Throughout history, leaders have framed their foreign and military policies in ideological terms. Some leaders have deployed such ideas cynically to disguise their real motives of maximizing power and remaining in charge, but others have been true believers ready for great sacrifices to promote their ideals. For a long time, religion was a main source of such framings, as were claims of dynastic destiny. More recently, the ideas of progress, liberty, and nationalism gained prominence.
Whatever their substance, political framings fulfill several crucial functions. They provide coherence for the policies of a state, rally citizens behind the leadership, and strengthen the identity of a political entity. They also sometimes serve to exclude and marginalize outsiders, who are vilified or even dehumanized.
Political frames can be directed primarily to domestic audiences, but they can also serve as instruments of foreign policy, for example by reaching out to allies or intimidating opponents. Depending on the prevailing power constellation, these frames either express an ambition to transform the international environment according to the respective state’s desires or are defensive in character and aim to protect interests and values that are perceived to be under external threat.
Ideological framings reached their peak in the twentieth century. The victory of communism in Russia and the rise of fascism in Europe turned international politics into a battle of ideas. The Soviet Union sought to advance the cause of world revolution by fomenting class struggle and insurrections across the world. The Third Reich based its territorial aggression on the claimed racial superiority of the German people and their purported right to Lebensraum, or space to live. Japan used similar ideas to justify its expansionism in the Pacific and Asia.
The simultaneous onslaught from the right and the left of the political spectrum prompted the remaining democratic countries to develop their own counterbalancing narratives. Defending freedom in its political, societal, and economic dimensions became their central rallying point both in the struggle against fascism and, later, during the Cold War. The latter led to the emergence of the West as a nongeographic concept that encompasses states committed to individual human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and a liberal economic system.
The Rise and Fall of the Liberal World Order
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West entered a brief period of boundless optimism. The confidence that democracy and a liberal market economy would soon spread across the globe found expression in the concept of a liberal world order. However, the difficulty of turning this idea into reality soon became apparent. In 2002, shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, then U.S. president George W. Bush designated Iran, Iraq, and North Korea an “axis of evil” and accused them of sponsoring terrorism and seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The War on Terror became another prominent frame of U.S. foreign policy.
As the years passed, it became evident that not only the evil axis, but also other large parts of the world, were unwilling to buy in to the concept of the liberal world order. Russia turned into an aggressive revisionist power committed to reversing its losses of the 1990s through territorial conquest and an extensive sphere of influence. Moscow came to consider the United States and its allies as Russia’s geopolitical opponents, the culprits of its earlier humiliation, and an obstacle to its return as a world power.
China continued its spectacular rise, but contrary to earlier Western expectations, greater prosperity did not go together with political liberalization and convergence with Western values. On the contrary, Beijing became more authoritarian internally and more assertive in its external policies. Through its Belt and Road Initiative and its massive trading and investment power, China ramped up its global influence. More than two decades after China’s 2001 accession to the World Trade Organization, which was seen at the time as a commitment to a rules-based global regime, China is striving to reshape the international political and economic order in line with its own interests. It is also rapidly building up its military strength, pressuring Taiwan, and pursuing aggressive policies in the South China Sea.
The first quarter of the twenty-first century has thus been marked by the emergence of a multipolar global system, centered on the U.S.-China rivalry, but in which India is rapidly rising and Russia is struggling to remain in the first rank of major powers. EU leaders have expressed geopolitical ambitions, but the bloc so far lacks the coherence and hard power to deliver on these claims. However, multipolarity has also allowed several middle powers from Indonesia to Turkey to become significant geopolitical actors in their own right.
Under the pressure of geopolitics, the global economy shows signs of fragmentation amid a surge of protectionism in many places and the widespread weaponization of economic relations. And the hope for further progress in the spread of democratic governance has been disappointed, as international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are now reporting eighteen years of democratic backsliding and rising authoritarianism in many parts of the world.
From Liberal to Rules-Based Order
Thus, the world developed rather differently than Western politicians and pundits had expected in the 1990s. Paradoxically, this meant that the political concept of the West staged a comeback. At a time when the universal triumph of democracy and a liberal market economy was widely expected, the word “West” seemed about to be reduced to its geographic connotation. But with major parts of the world moving on a different track, North America, EU member states, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand once again became aware of their distinctive characteristics.
The G7 grouping, which comprises the biggest Western economies, also returned to prominence. Certainly, it is no longer the centerpiece of the global economic order that it was in the 1980s—the group’s collective share of the world’s GDP has declined from over 65 percent then to about 40 percent today—but it has turned into a major platform of political coordination. Most of the sanctions imposed on Russia after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine were first discussed in this framework. The organization of G7 summits, however, has evolved. In recent years, leaders of major non-Western countries, such as Brazil, India, and Turkey, have been regularly invited to parts of the meetings. This is meant to mitigate the risk that these events are perceived as reunions of the ancien régime.
The profound changes in the global balance of forces had a clear impact on the way the West frames its foreign policies. The first victim was the liberal world order. As liberalism was retreating in many places, the concept no longer seemed realistic. Pretending to build a world order based on principles held only by a minority merely antagonizes everyone else. But as liberal went out of fashion, a new adjective came to the fore. Western politicians now promote the idea of a rules-based world order in many speeches and documents on international politics.
In the United States, the administration of president Barack Obama began using the concept widely around 2008. During the presidency of Donald Trump, whose all-dominating political frame was to Make America Great Again (MAGA), the rules-based order appeared rarely, but it staged a comeback under Biden. The concept also enjoys strong support in Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea. Major Western organizations, including the EU and NATO, have committed themselves to this objective.
Significantly, some countries that are not part of the traditional Western camp have also signed up to it. A notable case is India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who has referred to the rules-based order in various meetings with Western leaders but usually insists on adding the words “equitable” and “inclusive.” The Association of Southeast Asian Nations has also expressed its support. The particular popularity of this U.S.-coined concept in the Indo-Pacific is very likely related to the dramatic rise of Chinese power in the region.
The Pushback
As a political frame, the rules-based order is clearly designed for international rather than internal consumption. It exhorts governments and nonstate actors to respect the rules that underpin a stable international system. As few actors are openly committed to overthrowing the international order, this frame is meant to find broad support across the globe.
Yet, despite its apparent blandness, the concept was bound to be controversial, as it was developed and deployed in the context of a geopolitical competition. China and Russia both strongly object to the idea. In their view, Western countries are trying to impose their own unipolar model of the world order, in which a small number of countries make the rules and the large majority has to abide by them. Beijing and Moscow emphasize that international rules must be agreed on by all and applied without double standards.
The somewhat amorphous character of the rules-based order has also prompted criticism from experts in the West. Historically, the U.S. approach to international legal norms has often been selective. For instance, the United States has not ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which currently has 124 members. Some international lawyers are concerned that Washington might be promoting the rules-based order as an alternative to international law, based on an interpretation of rules favorable to U.S. interests. The harsh responses of the U.S. and United Kingdom governments to measures taken by international courts against Israel in the context of the ongoing war in Gaza have reinforced this criticism.
The way the rules-based order relates to public international law is indeed somewhat unclear. There is no generally accepted definition of the concept. European governments and the EU often use the term as essentially synonymous with international law and frequently combine the two concepts in the same sentence or paragraph. The U.S. understanding of the rules-based order appears to be broader, encompassing not only international law but also nonbinding norms and standards, potentially including some that are not universally accepted. In statements about the rules-based order, U.S. politicians sometimes evoke broad values, such as respect for sovereignty, self-determination, or human rights, rather than concrete legal norms.
Another problem that limits the attractiveness of the concept for countries in the Global South is the West’s severely damaged reputation. The legacy of the colonial period remains a heavy burden, but it is now combined with accusations of double standards and hypocrisy. For example, the initial reluctance of Western governments to share COVID-19 vaccines triggered a wave of criticism in Africa. Southern governments also contrast the West’s engagement for Ukraine with its neglect of conflicts and challenges in the South. Most recently, Western support for Israel in the Gaza war has further sharpened this resentment. The problem is compounded by persistent economic inequality. From a Southern point of view, Western states continue to impose unfavorable trade and investment rules on the South while turning increasingly to protectionist strategies.
Against this background, it is unsurprising that Western sermonizing about the rules-based order is often perceived as an attempt to shore up an inequitable global status quo based on rules that are shaped by the U.S.-led West and serve to protect its interests and power. And of course, China and Russia are working hard to reinforce this perception.
Enhancing the Appeal of the Rules-Based Order
In spite of these difficulties and problems, the rules-based order as a political frame still has considerable merits. One of the crucial questions in the coming years will doubtless be whether a multipolar world can still be rules based. Will it descend into an unconstrained struggle for global hegemony, accompanied by arms races, attempts to carve up the world into zones of influence, and the weaponization of economic relationships? Or will it be possible to contain the inevitable competition through shared respect for some fundamental rules and, in doing so, preserve a space for common efforts to confront urgent transnational challenges?
The vast majority of governments across the world would certainly go for the second option. They are well aware that the multiple interdependencies of a modern economy require close cooperation based on international rules and institutions. As a universal concept promoting such a constructive approach, the rules-based order makes eminent sense. To broaden its appeal and deal with the problems discussed above, three points seem relevant.
First, it would be useful to reduce the ambiguities in the relationship between the rules-based order and international law. All the basic rules necessary for a stable international system are found in the UN Charter and the multiple treaties anchored in the UN. Clear support for this body of law would allay most of the suspicions about possible hidden motives behind the concept. It would also assist the work of the international courts, which have come under severe strain in the geopolitical era.
Second, Western politicians should underline that the rules-based order is not about protecting and perpetuating the status quo. The rules are not set in stone but should be developed through an equitable process open to all interested parties. The attractiveness of the concept would be much enhanced if its proponents committed to reforming international governance and addressing the legitimate grievances of Southern countries.
Third, and related to the above, promoting the rules-based order should be combined with a credible offer to modernize the existing multilateral system to allow developing countries and emerging economies to participate in a more equitable manner. This would involve fairer representation in multilateral forums and institutions, such as the UN Security Council, the G20, and the international financial institutions; thorough reform of multilateral development banks by ensuring adequate capitalization, improved debt resolution mechanisms, and an updated quota system; and the mobilization of significant additional funding for the climate transition and the achievement of the UN sustainable development goals.
The Defense of Democracy
One of the incurable deficits of the rules-based order as a political frame is that it is not well suited to domestic consumption. For normal citizens, the concept is too abstract to be meaningful and unlikely to inspire them to rally around the flag. This is probably one of the reasons why the Biden administration chose to complement the rules-based order with a second concept, the defense of democracy. This frame has a proud history in U.S. foreign policy, as it served as the central narrative during the struggles against fascism and communism in the twentieth century. By reviving this idea, the U.S. government aims to alert the American public to the seriousness of the authoritarian threat and mobilize democratic allies to confront the danger together.
The 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy devoted a lot of space to the topic and designated the countries that have taken the place of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union as the main enemies of democracy:
The most pressing strategic challenge facing our vision is from powers that layer authoritarian governance with a revisionist foreign policy. It is their behavior that poses a challenge to international peace and stability—especially waging or preparing for wars of aggression, actively undermining the democratic political processes of other countries, leveraging technology and supply chains for coercion and repression, and exporting an illiberal model of international order. Many non-democracies join the world’s democracies in forswearing these behaviors. Unfortunately, Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) do not.
Between 2021 and 2024, the U.S. government organized three Summits for Democracy, at which participants were invited to announce commitments, reforms, and initiatives to defend democracy and human rights at home and abroad. The participation of 110 governments showed Washington’s impressive convening power, but the invitation policy also triggered considerable criticism. The United States excluded some governments with authoritarian tendencies, such as those of Hungary and Turkey, but included others with equally bad or worse records, such as those of Iraq, Pakistan, and Serbia. Clearly, not only the quality of democratic governance but also geopolitical considerations played a role in determining the guest list.
In addressing the first of the summits, Biden chose dramatic words, calling the struggle between democracies and autocracies “the defining challenge of our time.” Western allies of the United States generally supported Biden’s emphasis on protecting and promoting democracy but were reluctant to endorse the U.S. administration’s stark vision of a world divided into an authoritarian and a democratic camp. While European and U.S. views are broadly aligned in denouncing Russian President Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian regime, many European governments are more reluctant to highlight governance issues in China and other rising powers in the South. Altogether, the buy-in of Western allies into the democracy-versus-authoritarianism frame was considerably more muted than their support for the narrative of the rules-based order.
The Flaws in the Democracy-Versus-Authoritarianism Paradigm
In fact, there are several difficulties with the U.S. approach. In the context of the geopolitical rivalry with China and Russia, it is entirely legitimate to highlight the two sides’ different modes of governance. Undeniably, the authoritarianism of these countries is a major part of the problem. However, presenting the current international situation as a Manichaean struggle between the forces of authoritarian darkness and democratic light is neither intellectually coherent nor politically smart.
Unlike in the ideological struggles of the twentieth century, the dividing lines are less clear-cut today. As the reports of leading NGOs in this field show, there is a broad range in the quality of democratic governance and there are many shades of authoritarianism, which escape a simplistic binary categorization. Also, geopolitics compels the United States and other Western governments to seek close cooperation with several clearly nondemocratic regimes. The recent reconciliation between the Biden administration and the Saudi government is just one case among many. The rhetorical commitment to the defense of democracy therefore clashes with the reality of a Western foreign policy, which is often determined by geopolitical considerations. Accusations of hypocrisy and double standards are inevitable.
Democracy promotion, of course, remains an important objective. The Biden administration has significantly increased its aid programs in this area, and there appears to be some convergence with the relevant efforts of EU countries. However, mixing up democracy promotion with the ideological confrontation with China and Russia will probably hurt one objective without much helping the other. Beijing and Moscow will just ramp up their polemics by denouncing the West’s democracy promotion policies as blatant propaganda. Countries interested in staying outside the geopolitical rivalry will likely be more reluctant to engage in Western-supported pro-democracy projects. Moreover, as the rather lukewarm responses of European governments have shown, the motivational effect of the Summits for Democracy has proved modest.
Finally, this is not the best time to vaunt the superiority of democratic governance. In many Western countries, democracy is more fragile and vulnerable than it has been in many years. In the United States, rampant polarization is eroding the common ground that is essential for a functioning democracy. In Europe, too, there are worrying trends, such as democratic backsliding in some EU member states and the relentless rise of radical-right parties. These developments necessarily diminish the persuasive powers of Western politicians who make the case for democracy.
The future fate of this political frame depends on the outcome of the 2024 U.S. presidential election. Should Trump return as president, this framing will be rapidly replaced by a return to MAGA, possibly in an even more aggressive version. Kamala Harris would likely continue many of the Biden administration’s policies. In her August 2024 speech accepting the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination, she promised not to cozy up to tyrants and dictators—in contrast to Trump. But she is also reported to be more cautious than Biden in presenting global affairs as a battle between democracy and tyranny. A Harris administration might thus choose to end the warlike rhetoric and decouple the promotion of democracy from the geopolitical confrontation.
Conclusion
As in earlier centuries, political frames will in the future have an important role in legitimizing foreign policy, rallying populations around the flag, reinforcing bonds with allies, and signaling intentions to rivals. Of the two currently dominant Western political frames—the rules-based order and the defense of democracy—the first has not only received strong backing from Western allies but also found some support beyond them, particularly from countries in the Indo-Pacific that are concerned about the rise of China.
Unsurprisingly, China and Russia have denounced the concept as an effort to perpetuate Western hegemony, but there has been some criticism of the uncertain relationship between the rules-based order and international law. To enhance the concept’s appeal, Western countries should emphasize their commitment to international law as the foundation of such an order and show a credible readiness to reform the multilateral international system through an equitable and inclusive process. Ensuring that a multipolar world can also be based on commonly accepted and respected rules will be one of the crucial challenges of future years. The rules-based order is therefore likely to retain its relevance.
This is less evident when it comes to the second frame, the defense of democracy. The shared commitment to democratic values and the rule of law is—and will remain—a strong bond among the countries of the nongeographic West. Likewise, helping the development of democratic governance in other countries will continue to be an important shared objective. However, Biden’s presentation of the current world situation as an epochal struggle between democracies and authoritarian states is at odds with the facts and politically unwise. This approach has received tepid support from other Western countries and minimal buy-in elsewhere. A new U.S. administration should therefore desist from weaponizing democracy in the geopolitical confrontation and instead strengthen and coordinate Western action in support of democratic governance.