The India-United Kingdom Technology and Security Initiative: Ideas for Change

On July 24, 2024, India and the United Kingdom launched the Technology and Security Initiative (TSI) with the view to “elevate the strategic partnership between the two countries to the next level.” The aim is simple: to find different pathways to cement moonshot strategic technology projects in seven defined technologies from telecoms and critical minerals to artificial intelligence (AI), semiconductors, and biotechnology.¹ “This is not about everyday issues in technology cooperation,” as senior officials have underlined. The TSI is about investing political and administrative energies to lead to major breakthroughs in technology cooperation. It is anchored by the national security advisors (NSAs) in both countries.

India has only two such strategic technology cooperation mechanisms at this time, anchored by the NSA. The first was launched with the United States in January 2023 and was known as the initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET). In February 2025, following Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s working visit to the United States, the iCET was re-christened. A new and ambitious structure called the U.S.–India TRUST (“Transforming the Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technology”) was announced.

The TSI is the second such mechanism. After the iCET was launched, the Indian NSA, on his way home from Washington, DC, stopped by London, where he met with the then UK NSA Sir Tim Barrow. Breaking with protocol, the then prime minister Rishi Sunak dropped in briefly for the meeting. The UK side found the iCET structure attractive, the Indian team was clearly told.² In some ways, the administrative structure of the TSI followed the one that had been designed and tested with the United States for the iCET. In a little more than a year, a formal process was launched.

However, unlike the iCET, a fair bit of work had commenced on the TSI prior to its formal launch, and that work deepened within a year of the first deputy NSA-level meetings in London at the end of January 2025. As we understand it, there will be an NSA-level review meeting of the TSI this coming summer. As the fact sheet produced in July 2024 makes clear, various collaborations have already been struck. Commitments have been made to set up observatories. Pathways have been discussed to lead to research and development (R&D) collaborations in semiconductors, do more with global AI centers, run joint hackathons, and much else. These early-start initiatives do well to kick-start this process.

However, given the structure of the TSI, the process could use both a greater dose of ambition and creative thinking to fuse truly “moonshot” projects. After all, through this structure, there is a possibility to minimize domestic administrative frictions—as it’s monitored at the level of the NSAs—and jump-start strategic possibilities in critical technologies outside of the everyday business of forging research collaborations or building bridges for scientists and technologists to come together. The TSI ought to be more strategic, especially at a time of geopolitical displacement. This is an opportunity to fuse two deep technology ecosystems to co-produce and co-innovate solutions, products, and emerging technologies of the future.

With this verve in mind, the authors of this article organized a closed-door discussion with the Centre for Grand Strategy at King’s College London on the future of the TSI.³ It was attended by sixty participants, including senior government officials, technologists, leading scientists, academics, engineers, entrepreneurs, funders, and investors. In addition, the team spent time in both London and New Delhi speaking to officials, biotechnologists, vaccine manufacturers, semiconductor firms, data center companies, and several others on what more the TSI could do.

This article lays out what we found. There are exciting and even game-changing projects that are possible within and through the TSI and its expected expansions. At this still-early stage, as officials and private sector actors organize around the TSI, these reflections might be kept in mind.

Fleshing Out a Strategic Rationale for the TSI

As it stands, the TSI fact sheet lists several kinds of research-led collaborations and means by which technologists and scientists can work together. While this is promising, what we have not yet detected is a clear assessment of the strategic rationales for the TSI, unlike in the case of the iCET. Breaking barriers for technology cooperation and fostering new ways to co-innovate and co-produce technologies of the future was part and parcel of the iCET. It emerged from a clear understanding between the United States and India at the highest level that this was “the most consequential relationship” of the twenty-first century. It had the attention of both then U.S. president Joe Biden and Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

The U.S.–India TRUST initiative is similarly designed. It will be formally launched later in 2025, but the ambition remains the same: to deregulate, break barriers, and encourage strategic technology cooperation across all major critical technologies. The two countries must reach a trade agreement for this to happen in full force, but the ambition for the TRUST initiative to succeed is more than apparent among officials in the White House.⁴

The TSI seems to be driven at the administrative level. This may result in some wins, but there is a risk that this mechanism for technology cooperation might become yet another science-and-technology bridge that both countries share with several other nations. If real cooperation is expected in areas such as quantum computing, leading-edge R&D on semiconductors, biotechnologies, and, in time, co-producing jet engines and even civil nuclear cooperation, there needs to be a clear and demonstrable buy-in at the political level. The question of why we are doing this ought to produce a clear and uncluttered answer, providing administrators and entrepreneurs in the academy and in the private sector a clear and justifiable reason to make life-changing bets.  

There are clear win-wins embedded in this technology relationship. The United Kingdom is a powerhouse in R&D but suboptimal in manufacturing at scale. India, on the other hand, can address scale issues and provide a ready market for product deployment, yet trails in R&D spending. The TSI could serve as a platform to seek investment from UK firms in manufacturing operations in India using cost-effective R&D and deploying their products at scale. In fact, India’s talent in innovation can solve challenges, not just within the country but across the world—in vaccine development, developing low-cost, safe solutions, and so on. These are the kinds of pacts that will make a difference. To be sure, India’s level of engagement with the TSI would depend on investment and the technological benefits it gains from its partnership with the United Kingdom, where the Indian industry is currently making large investments. From the UK end, the win seems clear.

A Project-Oriented Approach

While organic business-to-business cooperation and joint academia collaboration should continue unhindered under the TSI and/or existing administrative mechanisms, a set of joint moonshot projects could serve as a template on how both countries can marshal their ecosystems to achieve ambitious targets. These were highlighted to us for the biotechnology sector in the form of in vivo gene editing—not scalable as of now, but on the brink of a medical breakthrough. A joint project could help both countries take the lead in this area. Similarly, for semiconductors, it was highlighted that graphene and 2D semiconductors could be another moonshot project. Here, the novel nature of 2D materials allows for the creation of a hybrid and unique structure that lends itself to customized design.

The Centre for Nano Science and Engineering at the Indian Institute of Science (IISc) in Bangalore has clean rooms that help remove roadblocks when it comes to achieving 2D fabrication for semiconductors. Similarly, the National Graphene Institute at the University of Manchester works on this technology and has significant funding to the tune of $100 million.⁵ Since both the IISc and the University of Manchester offer joint PhDs, this could be another area where they could cooperate to develop the next generation of 2D semiconductor devices. From a UK perspective, according to various stakeholders engaged in the biotechnology sector, clear projects, items, and opportunities would help when navigating the export controls required for the success of such collaborations.

The “Catapult” Model for India

The “Catapult” model has been highlighted by biotechnology and semiconductor industry experts as a promising venture to consider when incubating new technologies and providing them a roadmap toward business applications. Under the Innovate UK Catapult Network, the Catapult model provides a combination of R&D facilities and technical expertise to support business innovation. These serve as accelerators to ensure that promising research and new technologies are scaled up and deployed in the market. Currently, in the United Kingdom, the Catapult Network comprises nine areas of technology and has more than sixty-five locations in the country. These nine areas are cell and gene therapy, compound semiconductor applications, connected places, digital, energy systems, high-value manufacturing, medicines discovery, offshore renewable energy, and satellite systems.

A similar model could be replicated in India. This would not only strengthen research collaborations between the two countries but also provide a valuable platform for researchers from both nations to stay informed about the latest advancements and innovation landscapes. The key suggestion made by industry leaders is to reuse what the United Kingdom has rather than rebuild it in India.

The Need to Simplify Export Control Issues

Predictably, export control issues are different depending on the stakeholder one speaks to. From a university point of view, navigating export controls is markedly different from that of the UK industry. Academics in the United Kingdom argue that it is an “extremely onerous” challenge to foster R&D cooperation between universities in the United Kingdom and India. While companies work with well-defined technologies and a clear scope of applications, with academic output, it is not possible to get export control licenses beforehand since the technology itself is not yet completely developed, and its end use remains unclear. The larger threat posed to the UK innovation ecosystem by its challenging export control rules was also highlighted by several experts. It was acknowledged that tough-to-understand export controls could risk isolating the United Kingdom from global academic research if they are not simplified.

Furthermore, the United Kingdom’s challenge in export controls is different from that of the United States. While the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) are challenging to comply with, they nevertheless have a long chain of precedents that help applicants gauge the likelihood of their export control applications being successful before they apply. On the other hand, the Export Control Joint Unit (ECJU) of the United Kingdom, which administers its export control system for both military and dual-use items, has a relatively shorter track record when it comes to giving approvals for exports, as its legislation governing export controls was first enacted only in 2002, with subsequent legislations being passed over the years. The ECJU does provide an exemption when it comes to items with low Technological Readiness Levels of 1 and 2, but even this is fairly subjective.

Biotechnology as an Area with Multiple Promising Verticals for Collaboration

Experts argue that biotechnology presents a significant opportunity for collaboration between India and the United Kingdom, with multiple areas poised for joint R&D. Even though the United Kingdom is an R&D powerhouse in the health tech space, its manufacturing capabilities are relatively weak. This is where India’s strength lies, as seen in the case of generic drug and vaccine manufacturing. Advancing molecular biology technologies to develop climate-resistant crops is crucial for sustainable agriculture. Additionally, bioremediation and waste recycling can play a key role in addressing environmental challenges. In healthcare, AI-driven drug discovery can accelerate innovation, while cost-effective pharmacological interventions are essential for expanding preventive healthcare services.

The TSI can also drive progress in nutrition science, tackling malnutrition and metabolic diseases through advanced microbiome research, AI analytics, and affordable GLP-1 treatments to control blood sugar levels. Furthermore, efforts should focus on reducing the cost of monoclonal antibodies and optimizing in vivo gene editing, which can be used to develop a cure for sickle cell disease.

For gene sequencing initiatives to succeed, both nations must establish a robust framework for secure data storage and management. In addition, physical sciences methods are not being used enough for vaccine development as of now. This could be worked upon. Genomics, precision medicine, and biotherapeutics are also some key areas to be considered. In terms of regulatory alignment, senior government officials advocated that both nations streamline regulatory processes as it will be crucial for creating life-saving solutions. Lastly, both countries could ensure ready access to tech for the companies in this sector.

Opportunities in Quantum Collaboration

Experts argue that a joint lab on quantum is low-hanging fruit. Both sides could create a joint lab that is not government-to-government (G2G) operated but one that operates through academia/industry collaboration in two different time zones—GMT and IST—in two distinct shifts for researchers, so as to ensure a twenty-four-hour lab operation time. Furthermore, both India and the United Kingdom have agreed to identify their current strengths in quantum that they could take advantage of. For example, it was noted that the United Kingdom has strength in theoretical aspects, while India has some capabilities in quantum photonics. Promoting regular scientific visits and exchanges between both countries is key, as is using quantum technology for education and communication purposes, in addition to other areas such as healthcare and security. 

Both countries have fairly ambitious quantum strategies—India with the National Quantum Mission from 2023 to 2031 and the United Kingdom with its National Quantum Strategy that sets out a plan from 2023 to 2033. Together, both countries have an opportunity to develop intermediate-scale quantum computing, also known as Noisy Intermediate Scale Quantum (NISQ) era, and characterized by 1,000 qubit processors. Here, quantum key distribution, a method of exchanging encryption keys between parties using quantum mechanics, is also important. Lastly, along with NISQ, a quantum key distribution, both countries should also work jointly under the TSI toward quantum algorithms.

The key takeaway is that leveraging the United Kingdom’s strength in quantum should be looked at closely. On quantum, there is already a simulation hub at Oxford University—UK Quantum Technology Hub in Computing and Simulation—set up in 2019 and subsequently succeeded by the Hub for Quantum Computing via Integrated and Interconnected Implementations (QCI3). Around the same time in 2019, India started its quantum ecosystem. However, the United Kingdom is seen as having a “non-trivial ecosystem” in quantum. Quantum computing was a theoretical concept invented in the United Kingdom, after all, and the country has a vast talent pool working on both quantum computing and quantum cryptography. Despite this fact, there is scope to work on quantum applications downstream through quantum software. Here, the UK firm Riverlane is a good start. It is building the Quantum Error Correction Stack: Deltaflow to reduce logical error rates, enabling quantum computers to scale up and tackle problems. On quantum engineering, the United States is the perceived powerhouse, but the United Kingdom also has small firms working in this area. India, on the other hand, is seen to have “obvious” advantages in quantum photonics. Impedance matching, or creating a mechanism to increase power transfer between electronic devices, could also be an area of cooperation.

Lastly, in the quantum computing world, there are UK firms that are just starting out and are not yet close to bringing a product to market. However, in quantum cryptography and quantum timings, these firms are not far from a realization in terms of market solutions. Therefore, there are a range of quantum technologies that are verging on market deployment for UK firms, and there are learnings here for Indian quantum firms as well.

Expanding upon Collaboration in the Telecom Sector

Both countries are currently collaborating on satellite constellations for communication purposes. Bharti-backed OneWeb, a satellite company based in the United Kingdom, is looking to offer telecom services in India. Building on these areas of collaboration, both countries can build and design communication satellites and launch them on India’s launch vehicles, even though the United Kingdom has budding launch capabilities of its own. A UK–India space bridge could also act as an opportunity for both countries to leverage their respective strengths in space capabilities. This space bridge could serve as a framework to work closely together—whether through G2G collaboration on space programs, jointly funding research projects, or working together on space regulation. Furthermore, it is integral that both countries cooperate in international forums like the International Telecommunication Union and the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to ensure the development of best practices and norms toward space sustainability.  

Semiconductor Cooperation

The Government of India has so far allocated $8.8 billion under its India Semiconductor Mission (ISM) program. Three semiconductor units comprising a total investment of $14.5 billion have been set up. Micron Technologies, Applied Materials, and LAM Research have invested as well. But there are synergies that could be exploited with the United Kingdom as well—both countries should leverage existing infrastructure and repurpose existing fabrication units through brownfield fabs. Silicon photonics is another big area for cooperation.

As we learnt, AI and semiconductors need a strong “marriage.” Currently, the cost of training models is high and has a large carbon footprint. However, both sides should be trying to figure out how to generate money through AI in the current scenario—“making chatbots alone won’t cut it,” an expert argued.⁶ AI needs infrastructure—something like the United States’ Stargate Project. The United Kingdom and India can build something together—India has the ability to manufacture cost-effective chips, and the United Kingdom has the R&D expertise.

Our view here is that the current Indian semiconductor fab incentive scheme does not discriminate between brownfield and greenfield facilities. When it comes to infrastructure support to potential applicants, the scheme states that the Indian government may extend the benefits of the earlier Modified Electronics Manufacturing Clusters (EMC 2.0) Scheme for the development of the infrastructure as well. Under the EMC 2.0 Scheme, existing infrastructure could be upgraded. Therefore, by extension, the fab incentive scheme acknowledges that semiconductor companies with existing facilities may be able to apply under it so long as they meet the operational experience criterion and the capital investment thresholds.

Both sides should also consider extending their focus to refurbished equipment. If brownfield fabs are to be modernized, with most of them being older fabs, their systems and components will likely also require upgrades in a timely and cost-effective manner. This is all the more significant when one considers that the cost of refurbished or secondary equipment is sometimes only 20 to 30 percent of a new part, and ready availability also reduces the lead time for delivery of the secondary equipment. Considering that most secondary equipment comes with the requisite warranties, this is an option that India can entertain. In the United States, this option is already being considered seriously. In the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s summary of responses to the U.S. Department of Commerce Request for Information, it was stated that “existing fabs” need to be utilized more since they already “have an experienced team, existing customers, processes, infrastructure etc. and as such, should be more likely to sustain economic viability.” Perhaps there is a market for secondary equipment providers for such legacy fabs.

Funding

It was noted that while the TSI has strong government backing and such partnerships do require strong B2B relationships, they need long-term stable funding and, equally importantly, equitable approaches as well as a shared approach to risk. Accordingly, the takeaway here is that funding bodies in both the UK and in India could think of different ways in which joint funding proposals can support the seven pillars of the TSI.

Mobility

The topic of mobility perhaps seems to undergird all other suggestions on bilateral technology collaboration under the TSI. It is pointed out by various funding organizations that they have already been promoting the ease of connecting with each other’s innovation ecosystems. Most funding organizations have funded various fellowships across different career stages and collectively invested in a lot of institutions toward hosting these fellows. This was highlighted as a positive example of “brain gain” for India as well. However, realizing that Indian talent has avenues for mobility in other countries, a challenge often faced by organizations, particularly in the realm of emerging technologies mentioned in the TSI factsheet, is the uncertain nature and trajectory of development in these technologies.

Future developments are hard to predict, even for many leading institutions that are at the frontier of technology development in the concerned areas. Accordingly, these institutions have to compete aggressively with their counterparts in other countries and must provide a long-term vision of the technologies being invested in—if they are to enhance their prospects when it comes to courting top Indian talent. Furthermore, certain sectors were hampered in their efforts to recruit top-tier talent from both countries since larger technology firms (collectively known as Big Tech) aggressively recruit from the same talent pool. Lastly, visa and immigration issues are also integral domains where both countries could create trust. Although this is already being tackled at the level of Ministry of External Affairs and the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, further capacity is needed by both the institutions to take on these issues in a time-bound manner.

The Way Ahead

1. Strategic Trade Dialogue (STD): Much like in the case of the iCET, which built an STD structure led by the Indian foreign secretary and undersecretaries in the United States, it would be crucial to create a similar institutional structure between the United Kingdom and India within the ambit of the TSI. Export controls should not be treated as a residual matter but as central to achieving a truly common innovative ecosystem.

2. Export Control Workshops: Learnings from the iCET make clear that export control workshops co-run by think tanks, industry bodies, the Department of Defense, the Bureau of Industry and Security in Commerce, and the State Department went a long way to demystify export control regimes for both sides. Such workshops could be conducted between the United Kingdom and India.

3. Catapults: As indicated above, a TSI project could involve setting up two catapults in India on semiconductors and in biotechnology. And as we learned, industry leaders and funding agencies are willing to work on this.

4. Funding: Between the Royal Society, the Gates Foundation, Wellcome Trust, UK Research and Innovation, and the British Academy, there are existing opportunities to create TSI fellowships and set out grants to take the initiative’s objectives forward. This could be focused on moonshot projects. The Indian counterparts—Tata Trusts, Biocon Foundation, Bharti Foundation, Reliance Foundation, along with others—could be encouraged with speed to enter partnerships with those in the UK. At the same time, funding calls through the Biotechnology Industry Research Assistance Council, the Department of Biotechnology, and the Ministry of Education in India can be made available within the country for mobility and grants.

5. Startup Ecosystem: The India-U.S. Defense Acceleration Ecosystem, or INDUS-X, has worked well to build a joint ecosystem for venture capital firms, startups, primes, and governments to come together, forge deals, and respond to challenges. Something similar can be created under the TSI banner, such as “TSI innovation X,” which seeks to bring together the ecosystem in areas of promise such as biotechnology, semiconductors, AI, and quantum computing. It could be anchored by Invest India in India and a counterpart in the United Kingdom. The Innovation X Summit could be hosted in each country every year; funded joint challenges could be announced; and fellowships could be funded by grant-giving bodies (to connect academics with the process). This could be more expansive and better designed than the INDUS-X, along with being structured toward clear outcomes. Most importantly, pathways such as these would help create a genuine innovation ecosystem that connects different lines of effort under the TSI and tracks growth in the same.

6. Connecting National Missions: The India Semiconductor Mission, the National Critical Mineral Mission, and the IndiaAI Mission could be more clearly connected with the TSI. This connection is not always visible in the iCET or the EU-India Trade and Technology Council. The missions in India could be tied more firmly to the growing TSI ecosystem.