Depleted financial reserves and a shrinking tax base mean it is no longer possible to simultaneously deliver high defense spending, price stability, and economic growth.
Alexandra Prokopenko
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Source: Pro et Contra
This article orginally appeared in Russian in "The Power of Oil and Gas" edition of the Pro et Contra journal (Volume 10, Nos. 2-3, 2006), published by the Carnegie Moscow Center.
It is not wholly appropriate to apply the term "petrostate" equally to all larger exporters of oil, as if they were identical. "Petrostates" can be clearly divided into two unequal groups: those countries where the population is sufficiently small to live well off of hydrocarbon exports, and those countries where such income is barely sufficient to cover the most basic needs of the population and the appetites of government bureaucrats. A large population and a significant domestic demand for energy effectively mean that Russia can never become an "oil paradise." For all intents and purposes, the question of funding Russia 's broad modernization on the back of its energy potential can be considered moot. It is impossible, and there are not sufficient resources for such an endeavor.
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Vladimir Milov
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
Depleted financial reserves and a shrinking tax base mean it is no longer possible to simultaneously deliver high defense spending, price stability, and economic growth.
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