Commentary
The Russian army is not currently struggling to recruit new contract soldiers, though the number of people willing to go to war for money is dwindling.
Dmitry Kuznets
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Source: Getty
In The Media
Russian Prime Minister Visits China
The balance in Sino-Russian economic relations has shifted heavily in favor of the Chinese, and Moscow’s long-term strategy toward China will likely seek to make their relationship more equal.
Published on Oct 13, 2011
Source: China Radio International's People In the Know
Trenin pointed out that over the last several decades, the economic balance between the two nations has shifted heavily in favor of the Chinese. Whereas Russia was once an exporter of technology and machinery to its Asian neighbor, now the tables have turned, with Russian exports consisting mostly of raw materials. This worries Moscow, Trenin said. Indeed, as China invests in Russia’s Far East, Trenin posited that the Kremlin will be weary of “overexposure” to Chinese labor and investment, reluctant to leave itself vulnerable. Trenin argued that Moscow’s long-term strategy toward China will likely seek to make their relationship more equal.
Trenin recognized that China is an important economic and political partner for Russia, but Moscow is also seeking other partners in the region. While China, for example, is the key energy consumer in the region, Russia would benefit greatly from diversifying its energy exports to other major economies such as Japan and South Korea. All in all, Trenin assessed the relationship as good, but not exactly where the Russians would like it.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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