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Collective Wisdom

On June 27, the 9/11 Public Discourse Project, an extension of the 9/11 Commission, heard urgent testimony from three of America’s top proliferation experts. Convening in Washington, D.C., former Senator Sam Nunn, Harvard University’s Ashton Carter, and Monterrey Institute Deputy Director Leonard Spector made independent but complementary recommendations on how to better protect the United States from the threats of a nuclear terrorist attack and the global spread of nuclear weapons.

Responding to the testimony, Carnegie Endowment Director for Non-Proliferation Joseph Cirincione said, "If we would implement these recommendations over the next four years, America would be far safer than we have been in the four years since 9/11." The proposals made by these experts parallel many of the policies detailed in the recent Carnegie study, Universal Compliance. A summary of their recommendations follows. (Read More)

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By Joshua Williams
Published on Jun 28, 2005

On June 27, the 9/11 Public Discourse Project, an extension of the 9/11 Commission, heard urgent testimony from three of America’s top proliferation experts. Convening in Washington, D.C., former Senator Sam Nunn, Harvard University’s Ashton Carter, and Monterrey Institute Deputy Director Leonard Spector made independent but complementary recommendations on how to better protect the United States from the threats of a nuclear terrorist attack and the global spread of nuclear weapons.

Responding to the testimony, Carnegie Endowment Director for Non-Proliferation Joseph Cirincione said, "If we would implement these recommendations over the next four years, America would be far safer than we have been in the four years since 9/11." The proposals made by these experts parallel many of the policies detailed in the recent Carnegie study, Universal Compliance. A summary of their recommendations follows.

Sam Nunn

Emphasizing that we are in a race between international cooperation and nuclear catastrophe, Senator Nunn argued that we have not done all we can to address the threat. As he put it, if "a terrorist group gains access to nuclear material, builds a weapon and blows up one of the great cities of the world…what would we wish we had done to prevent it?" These are the elements of his answer:

  • Commit to the Nunn-Lugar program and upgrade the security of all nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material in Russia and the former Soviet Union in three to four years.
  • Presidential involvement is imperative to overcome the suspicions and bureaucratic roadblocks that inhibit many essential Nunn-Lugar programs, including the plutonium disposition program. Presidents Bush and Putin should resolve the dispute surrounding the plutonium disposition program within 30 days.
  • Accelerate the Global Threat Reduction Initiative for a "global cleanout" of all HEU.
  • Increase bilateral transparency to better account for and secure tactical nuclear weapons.
  • Fully fund and aggressively implement the G8’s Global Partnership.
  • Stop international commerce in HEU.
  • Take U.S. and Russian weapons off hair-trigger alert in order to give each President more decision making time in the event of an apparent nuclear attack.
  • Ensure the high quality of both Russian and U.S. early warning systems in order to prevent the possibility of an accidental launch.
  • Both the U.S. and Russia must visibly reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and enhance the Treaty of Moscow by adding verification mechanisms and an obligation to eliminate warheads.
  • Develop a coordinated carrot-and-stick approach to both Iran and North Korea.
  • Establish a nuclear cartel of all states with nuclear fuel cycle facilities to guarantee nuclear fuel at favorable rates to other states in return for those states not developing their own nuclear fuel cycles.
  • Because the threat is not only nuclear, but also radiological, it is imperative to conduct a global inventory of vulnerable radioactive sources and to secure them.
  • Properly equip and prepare first responders.
  • Educate the public about how to cope with a radiological attack.

Ashton Carter

Ashton Carter argues that, thus far, almost all U.S. efforts have targeted the "worst people" rather than the "worst weapons." With the proper focus, however, Carter believes that the following steps can lead to the complete eradication of nuclear terrorism:

  • Commit to Nunn-Lugar in order to secure all fissile material at its source.
  • Stop the production of any fissile material that cannot be sufficiently safeguarded.
  • Close the loophole in the Non-Proliferation Treaty that allows states to gain the ability to produce HEU and separated plutonium.
  • Develop effective strategies for North Korea and Iran.

Leonard Spector

Leonard Spector identifies four major nuclear terror threats (terrorist theft of a nuclear weapon; terrorist theft of fissile material and subsequent construction of a crude nuclear device; attacks on nuclear facilities; and a radiological, or dirty bomb, attack). To confront these four threats, he argues that we must take six major initiatives:

  • Secure all fissile material at its source by strengthening the Nunn-Lugar programs.
  • Give security of HEU greater priority than that of plutonium.
  • Accelerate the Global Threat Reduction Initiative.
  • Develop programs to manage a dirty bomb attack, including public education, first responder preparedness, and standards on what levels of contamination we can live with if such an event were to occur.
  • Promote continuity of government in Pakistan and decreased tensions with India, while also encouraging the moderation of Pakistani society to isolate its jihadist elements.
  • Cease the production of HEU and separated plutonium.


Related Links:

"The Day After an Attack, What would we Wish We Had Done? Why Aren't We Doing It Now?" Testimony by Sam Nunn, Co-Chairman, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Before the 9/11 Public Discourse Project, 27 June 2005

Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security, Carnegie Report, March 2005

About the Author

Joshua Williams

Joshua Williams
United StatesIranPakistanSouth KoreaCaucasusRussiaNuclear Energy

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

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