The Russian army is not currently struggling to recruit new contract soldiers, though the number of people willing to go to war for money is dwindling.
Dmitry Kuznets
Source: Getty
As the global recovery gains momentum, policy makers are signaling intentions to begin phasing out emergency stimulus measures. However, the risks of reversing policies too soon continue to outweigh those of exiting too late.
As the Asian-led global recovery consolidates and job shedding in industrial countries slows, central banks and finance ministries in several countries are signaling intentions to begin phasing out emergency stimulus measures. At the same time, authorities in the large economies hit hardest by the crisis—including the United States, the UK, and Japan—emphasize that expansionary monetary policy and fiscal stimulus measures will remain necessary well into 2010, or even longer. For now, the risks of reversing policies too soon continue to outweigh those of exiting too late, but the time for a general policy shift may come sooner than markets are expecting.
Stimulus Withdrawal Has Begun Selectively
Some central banks are phasing out emergency measures and sending signals that monetary policy will tighten soon.

On the other hand, several other central banks plan to maintain low rates and inject more liquidity. New fiscal stimulus measures are also being introduced.
What Factors Support a Moderation of Stimulus Now?
Stimulus policies are becoming less necessary in Asia as manufacturing continues to recover, consumer spending improves, and strong job growth resumes. Recent U.S. data also points to a stronger-than-anticipated fourth quarter, and banking sectors across the United States and Europe are returning to health.
Why Wait?
Despite these signs of strength, global aggregate demand remains fragile and reliant on stimulus policies. Growth is still sluggish in some mature economies.
What Should Policy Makers Do?
As always, country situations vary and there is no one-size-fits-all answer. Given the weakness in aggregate demand, the downside risk associated with maintaining moderate fiscal stimulus—a marginal increase in already high government debt levels—is small. The contribution to growth of a constant stimulus injection tends to decline over time, and additional fiscal measures may be warranted.
Additionally, the large industrial countries are not in a position to raise interest rates yet. The risks of abandoning loose monetary policy too early—a second dip into unemployment and slow growth—continue to outweigh those of tightening too late—inflation and asset bubbles. However, the liquidity overhang is already large, and long, unpredictable lags occur between rate changes and their economic effects. As a result, the downside risk of overly loose monetary policy must be carefully managed, particularly in emerging markets that are seeing high inflation and/or large surges in asset prices.
In countries where inflation remains low and there is no clear evidence of asset bubbles, a useful rule of thumb may be that monetary policies should become less expansionary as soon as the unemployment rate (a lagging indicator) is seen to be on a firmly downward path.
Looking Ahead
For the latest monetary policy decisions, look for Norway’s announcement on December 16 and Israel’s on December 28.
This analysis was produced by the editorial staff of the International Economic Bulletin, including Shimelse Ali, Vera Eidelman, Bennett Stancil, and Uri Dadush.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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