During the Ukraine war, Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials have, with unprecedented frequency, invoked and evoked the risk of nuclear war. Which (if any) of these “nuclear manipulations” were genuine threats to use nuclear weapons, and which (if any) were allusions and gestures? Who have been the primary targets of these manipulations, and for what purposes? How have the United States and other NATO states perceived and responded to them? What lessons should be learned by nuclear manipulators and their targets—whether for deterrence, compellence, public reassurance, or the strengthening of opposition to the threat or use of nuclear weapons?

Since the end of Cold War, most commentators have believed that the United States’ missile defense policy went either too far or not far enough. Critics questioned the feasibility of defending against even North Korean attacks. Advocates believed the United States should try to defeat limited or possibly even large-scale Chinese and Russian attacks against the homeland. The new U.S. administration seems to have sided decisively with those advocates. Is comprehensive defense the way forward? What kind of programs should the United States prioritize? How might China and Russia respond? What role does missile defense play in assuring allies? Should the United States be willing to put missile defense on the table in any future arms control negotiations? 

Any nuclear war would have global effects. Depending on the number of weapons used, and their yields and targets, these might include trade disruptions, the spread of radioactive fallout to populated areas, and climatic changes resulting in famine. Because the consequences of nuclear use would transcend national borders, third parties that were entirely uninvolved in the conflict could bear a significant brunt of the suffering. What responsibilities do nuclear-armed states have toward nonbelligerent states? Specifically, in developing their nuclear postures and policies--and in making any decision to use nuclear weapons--to what extent should nuclear-weapon possessors consider global interests alongside their own and those of their allies? How, if at all, should they change those postures and policies to reduce harms to bystanders?   

Fears in the 1960s of a highly proliferated world largely dissipated following the formation of the global nonproliferation regime. Today, there are just nine nuclear-armed states, not dozens. There is, however, surging interest in nuclear weapons among various states in Europe and Asia, in addition to long-standing concerns about proliferation in the Middle East. What are the most important drivers of contemporary explorations of proliferation? To what extent are these drivers region-specific or the result of global trends? Are public expressions of interest in nuclear weapons indicative of real proliferation potential or more a reflection of perceived insecurity? What developments might suggest when and where proliferation could actually occur?

Organized by the Center for Space Policy Strategy
The United States in the process of fundamentally changing its approach for missile warning and strategic satellite communications, the two core pillars of space-based nuclear command and control. For missile warning, DOD is transitioning to large numbers of satellites across a diversity of orbits. For strategic satellite communications, the department is “disaggregating” to largely separate spacecraft supporting nuclear operations from those supporting conventional operations; it will be the first time that the United States deploys strategic satellite communication satellites that are not designed to serve tactical missions. Meanwhile, although details are scant, Russia is modernizing its early warning satellites, and China is developing its first space-based early warning system. This panel will discuss these developments for space-based nuclear command and control missions, examine the factors causing these developments, and explore their implications on the potential for conflict and nuclear escalation in space.

Organized by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
In recent years, the nuclear policy community has taken steps to remove barriers to access and advancement in the field, allowing for a broader range of talent to tackle the challenges we face. Still, with increasingly complex threats and generational shifts on the horizon, the need for new experts to join the community is more urgent than ever. However, the current political climate presents challenges, if not outright resistance, to such work. This panel will discuss practical tools that individuals and organizations can use as we continue to grow the field. The speakers bring expertise in community building, cybersecurity, legal strategies, and organizational leadership from both inside and outside of nuclear policy.

As geopolitics and the climate heat up, there is an emerging rush to significantly expand nuclear power. Shuttered nuclear plants are being rehabilitated, vendors are seeking to construct new advanced and modular designs, and private technology companies looking to power AI and data centers are emerging as key advocates and financiers. How might the anticipated renaissance in civilian nuclear programs affect nuclear weapon proliferation risks, including the potential spread of enrichment or reprocessing capabilities? What are the implications for international safeguards, safety, and security? How should the putative benefits be shared with developing countries? What technologies, including small modular reactors and fusion plants, or policies could mitigate--or exacerbate--the risks of deployment? What are the effects of leadership by private technology companies rather than traditional utilities? 

During the Cold War, a shared interest in stymying proliferation motivated extensive cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Since its end, however, the great powers have become increasingly interested in bolstering alliances at the expense of nonproliferation. China supports Pakistan’s nuclear program. Russia is formalizing its partnership with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and shielding Iran’s nuclear program from international censure. And, as the U.S.-India deal and the AUKUS submarine initiative exemplify, the United States’ wants exceptions to the rules it originally championed. What are the implications of this fraying great power commitment for nonproliferation? Are there circumstances that might revive cooperation? Can the nonproliferation regime be upheld in the absence of great-power consensus and what role might non-nuclear weapons states play? 

All nuclear-armed states appear to have military doctrines that include at least some role for limited nuclear strikes. At one end of the spectrum, France envisions a “final warning”—a single limited nuclear strike—before launching a massive attack; at the other, both Russia and the United States appear to plan for a protracted nuclear exchange. In all cases, nuclear-armed states assess that the ability to conduct less than all-out nuclear attacks enhances their capacity to deter nuclear and non-nuclear aggression. But what would happen if deterrence failed and nuclear weapons were used in a limited way? What pressures would leaders face to further escalate toward all-out nuclear war? To what extent would the fear of such an outcome help prevent escalation?  Is there a version of nuclear planning for limited strikes—French-style, U.S./Russian-style, or something else—that better achieves the goal of deterrence?

Russia recently revised its nuclear doctrine by broadening the range of circumstances in which it might use nuclear weapons. According to U.S. officials, Russian is developing a space-based nuclear-armed anti-satellite weapon, which also suggests an expanding role for Russian nuclear weapons. How well understood are the circumstances in which Russia might use nuclear weapons and the purposes that such use might serve? To what extent do changes in Russia’s nuclear strategy impact European and global security as well as the risks of escalation? And how should the United States, NATO, and other states respond to such changes?

Evidence shows that bringing alternative perspectives and different skills sets to bear helps organizations achieve their goals more efficiently and effectively. But, when it comes to nuclear policy, might it also change those goals?  For example, would nuclear policy communities that reflected more viewpoints affect how governments deal with proliferation threats or the environmental legacy of nuclear-weapons production and testing? Or would it affect policies toward nuclear power or radioactive waste management? What factors shape whether the views of those involved in policy processes are representative of the populations they serve? 

Saudi Arabia has ambitious plans to stand up a nuclear energy program and wants to enrich uranium to fuel its future reactors. But enrichment technology can also be used to build nuclear weapons, as Saudi leaders have threatened to do if Iran crosses the proliferation threshold. Washington has reportedly considered relaxing the conditions it usually imposes on nuclear cooperation, and even building an enrichment plant in Saudi Arabia, as a way to strengthen relations with Riyadh at China’s expense, incentivize Saudi rapprochement with Israel, and create commercial opportunities for the U.S. nuclear industry. Should the United States support Saudi Arabia’s nascent nuclear program? If so, in what ways? What are the implications of Washington’s policy toward Riyadh for the nonproliferation regime? How might other regional powers react?

Rapid changes in the size of China’s nuclear arsenal, its development of new nuclear capabilities, and the persistent opacity about its goals have fueled speculation about Beijing’s motives. Is China abandoning its traditional posture of minimal deterrence and seeking to develop a nuclear arsenal that it can wield for aggressive purposes? Is it primarily interested in bolstering its status as a great power Or, does it simply seek to ensure the survivability of its nuclear forces? Finally, how—if at all—should the answer to these questions influence policy and military planning for the United States and its allies? 

Organized by the French Institute of International Relations
As China’s nuclear arsenal expands—potentially reaching 1,500 warheads by 2035—the U.S. faces a historic challenge: deterring two nuclear peers, Russia and China, simultaneously. This “two-peer competition” fuels intense debate in Washington, shaping strategic postures, arms programs, and alliance dynamics. While extended deterrence in East Asia is widely discussed, its implications for Europe remain largely overlooked. Yet, with U.S. forces stretched across two potential conflicts, American nuclear and conventional deployments in Europe could become an adjustment variable. Meanwhile, European nations, particularly France and the UK, must reassess their roles in this evolving nuclear landscape. With Donald Trump’s re-election raising uncertainties about U.S. commitments, this session will explore how Europe should position itself in the face of growing nuclear competition between Washington and Beijing.

Organized by the Nuclear Threat Initiative
In this dynamic conversation, panelists will discuss how nuclear security advocates can engage public audiences and shift beliefs in ways that can transform political incentives to pave the way for policy progress—even now. Panelists will share lessons from other social movements. They’ll also spotlight members of the nuclear policy field and its allies who have demonstrated innovative ways to push new narratives or use cultural organizing to seed progress on nuclear risk reduction and disarmament while capturing new audiences outside the beltway that are critical to winning fights in DC.