China’s Inflation Linked to Domestic Problems—Not Trade Surplus; Undermines Views of China as Currency Manipulator
China’s growth and inflation risks are not trade-related but are instead driven by domestic forces. This more accurate picture supports the Treasury Department’s recent stance, once again declining to cite China as a currency manipulator, reflecting continued doubt by U.S. government experts that China’s currency is a major factor behind global commercial imbalances.
Link Copied
Published on Jan 14, 2008
WASHINGTON, Jan 14—New research challenges conventional wisdom in Washington on China’s economy—the importance of its trade surplus, the size of its GDP, and the scale of its poverty. A newly updated Carnegie report by Senior Associate Albert Keidel confirms that China’s growth and inflation risks are not trade-related but are instead driven by domestic forces. A recent World Bank announcement also confirmed Keidel’s findings that China’s economy and GDP per capita are 40 percent smaller than earlier analysis had asserted, and that Chinese poverty levels involve 300 million people under the World Bank’s dollar-a-day standard rather than 100 million as previously thought. This more accurate picture supports the Treasury Department’s recent stance, once again declining to cite China as a currency manipulator, reflecting continued doubt by U.S. government experts that China’s currency is a major factor behind global commercial imbalances.
InChina’s Economic Fluctuations: Implications for its Rural Economy,Keidel updates his previous analysis to show that China’s recent inflation surge is the product of domestic rural structural problems, not excessive monetary growth linked to trade surpluses or foreign reserves. The fundamental response to China’s inflation risk should be to raise bank deposit and lending rates to match inflation; failure to do so in the past has caused damaging swings in inflation, output growth, and social unrest.
Other key findings include:
U.S. government analysts need to correct the popular misperception that Chinese growth is export-led and hence exchange-rate dependent—it is not. U.S. commercial and diplomatic thinking regarding China’s commercial behavior and long-term prospects needs to shift to account for this conclusion.
Because China’s growth has not been export-led, the United States should concentrate on improving domestic components of its own international competitiveness rather than focusing so heavily on alleged Chinese violations of international commercial norms.
The World Bank’s newer, more accurate picture of China as a smaller, poorer economy should encourage the United States to redouble its efforts to engage China in ways that contribute to solving its domestic growth and poverty challenges.
China’s reticence to import grain leads to pressure on Chinese farmers to plant more grain—often a loss-making venture. China should increase its fine grain imports over time to improve rural standards of living through product diversification and to strengthen overall Chinese domestic consumption demand.
"As China’s longest-running high-growth period continued through 2007, warning signs of possible inflationary overheating became apparent. This report’s analysis of past inflationary cycles argues that major macroeconomic management steps need to be taken in 2008 to avoid the repetition of not only inflation but also of subsequently necessary macroeconomic tightening measures and the risk of social dissatisfaction and even unrest that have characterized similar sequences in the past.”
This report was produced in collaboration with Dr. Jianxing Liu of the International Cooperation Center in China’s National Development and Reform Commission, with substantial support from the Ford Foundation.
Albert Keidelis a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment, where he specializes in China economic issues and related U.S. policy. He formerly served as deputy director and acting director at the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of East Asian Nations. Before that, he was senior economist at the World Bank office in Beijing.
The Carnegie China Programin Beijing and Washington provides policy makers in both countries with a better understanding of the dynamics within China and between United States and China. In late 2005, the Carnegie Endowment established a joint Program in China on globalization and international relations with the China Reform Forum, a leading Chinese think tank. The mission of the program is to advance research on the impact of globalization on foreign policy making and promote scholarly exchange between the two countries.
The Carnegie China Program has a number of online resources to communicate its research findings and policy insights to interested parties worldwide. ChinaNet,our Chinese-language website, features international affairs content produced in Chinese and translated from Carnegie publications, including Foreign Policy magazine. The material includes articles on economics, Chinese social and political change, Chinese foreign policy, and U.S.-China relations, often not available from any other source in China. The China Program also produces Carnegie China Insight Monthly, a Chinese-language e-newsletter. The Hong Kong Journal, an online quarterly edited by Robert Keatley, former editor of the Asian Wall Street Journal, covers political, economic, and social issues on Hong Kong and its relations with mainland China, the United States, and other governments and international organizations.
Reframing China Policy: The Carnegie Debates: The series aims to candidly discuss the most pressing issues in U.S.-China relations and to provide the most authoritative information possible to policy makers on Capitol Hill who are shaping U.S. foreign policy. Since its inception in Fall 2006, the China Program has hosted seven debates on the most critical—and controversial—issues involving China's economic, socio-political, and military evolution and their policy implications.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
The nuclear relationship between China and the United States is increasingly shaped by widening perception gaps rather than deliberate strategic design.
China’s banking crisis in the 2000s was resolved by transferring the costs to households through financial repression—a decision that recapitalized the banks while exacerbating the structural imbalances that continue to shape the Chinese economy today.
Chinese biotech companies have been on the receiving end of U.S. economic coercion. Yet their responses have differed significantly because firm and state interests are not uniformly aligned. For Washington, treating all Chinese tech firms the same, irrespective of their actual interests, risks pushing them farther into Beijing’s corner.
China’s latest energy plan explicitly calls for integrating data centers into the electricity system, particularly connecting them to green energy. It appears Beijing wants to use compute as a source of domestic demand to absorb renewables excess capacity.
