- +1
Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Oriana Skylar Mastro, Yukon Huang, …
{
"authors": [
"Yukon Huang"
],
"type": "legacyinthemedia",
"centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
],
"collections": [],
"englishNewsletterAll": "asia",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"programAffiliation": "AP",
"programs": [
"Asia"
],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"East Asia",
"China"
],
"topics": [
"Economy",
"Trade",
"Foreign Policy"
]
}Source: Getty
Incentives for U.S.-China Cooperation
The United States and China can work together to find common economic ground on issues such as trade imbalances, the value of the renminbi, and technology transfers.
Source: Real Clear World

Of the economic issues currently dominating the U.S.-China relationship, the trade imbalance between Washington and Beijing still receives the most attention, although technology transfer and market access are likely to become more contentious in the future. The trade gap became a noticeable problem between 2005 and 2008, when booming U.S. fiscal deficits and high U.S. household spending thanks to excessive borrowing drove its trade deficit to record levels. The mirror image of the U.S. deficit was China's large trade surplus. As a result, the sense in Washington that China prospered at the expense of the United States is strong.
Despite the heated political rhetoric in America, China's trade surplus has actually declined over the last few years-from 8 percent of GDP in 2006 to 3 percent in 2010-and may fall further this year. Rather than harping on the need for China to revalue the renminbi and to export less, Washington should focus on ways to increase China's imports. Focusing on imports would not only help reduce the trade gap but build wider trust on economic issues-and benefit the Chinese consumer, too.
Washington also needs to rethink its approach on the renminbi. China's currency has appreciated by 3 percent since June when Beijing allowed greater flexibility, and is unlikely to appreciate by more than 5 or 6 percent this year. Despite conventional wisdom, an appreciation of China's currency is not necessarily in the best interest of the United States and isn't guaranteed to reduce its trade imbalance.
A major appreciation of the renminbi could even hurt the U.S. trade imbalance if the cost of imports rise and the production of goods shifts to emerging economies-and not to the United States. Raising China's exchange rate would not solve the trade problem because most of the high-value parts of U.S. imports from China actually come from other Asian countries-so the U.S. trade deficit with China is really a trade deficit with Asia. The United States should instead seek a multilateral solution that looks at Asia as a whole.
There are growing questions about whether China will move to internationalize the renminbi. While in the past China wanted to wait until its financial institutions gained sufficient strength, the vulnerability of its $2.8 trillion in reserves-due to declines and volatility in the major international currencies, including the dollar-has led it to begin taking small steps to use the renminbi to settle trade balances. If the renminbi became an international reserve currency, China would gain greater say in international financial policy and reduce its reliance on the West.
Washington has some reservations, however, as internationalization of the renminbi could reduce U.S. flexibility to run trade deficits at will and allow the renminbi to emerge as a competitor with the dollar as the world's dominant reserve currency. But internationalization of the renminbi serves America's interests as well because it will encourage the currency to move more in line with market forces and capital to move in and out of China with fewer restrictions. Such a move would benefit both countries.
A growing issue will be the transfer of technology. American companies don't like being required to pass along high technology production processes when they enter the Chinese market as they are concerned about their intellectual property rights. But China wants to move up the technology ladder - from labor-intensive production to high-technology goods - and thinks that the acquisition of new technologies from foreign companies is essential.
Both sides, however, can gain from more transparency and rules-based processes - and there are options in green technologies that can benefit both countries, for instance, by pairing America's innovation with China's productive capacity.
While there are several areas of tension, the two countries seem to increasingly understand that discussions framed as win-lose are unproductive, and that win-win issues will help them tackle the more divisive issues. Rather than engaging in a blame game, the United States and China should look for ways to find common economic ground-they will both emerge stronger for their efforts.
About the Author
Senior Fellow, Asia Program
Huang is a senior fellow in the Carnegie Asia Program where his research focuses on China’s economy and its regional and global impact.
- What to Watch When Trump and Xi Meet in WashingtonQ&A
- Three Takeaways From the Biden-Xi MeetingCommentary
Yukon Huang, Isaac B. Kardon, Matt Sheehan
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Carnegie China
- The Plaza Accord and Its Relevance for ChinaCommentary
The Plaza Accord was not an externally imposed punishment of Japan but part of a broader restructuring that Japanese economists and policymakers themselves recognized was necessary. Its effects were undermined, however, when Tokyo responded to the resulting slowdown with policies that exacerbated investment, credit expansion, and the very imbalances the adjustment was intended to resolve.
Michael Pettis
- Untangling the Nuclear Knot: A Constructive Agenda for Managing China’s Nuclear Relations with the United States and Its AlliesPaper
The nuclear relationship between China and the United States is increasingly shaped by widening perception gaps rather than deliberate strategic design.
Tong Zhao
- Who Paid for China’s Last Debt Cleanup, and Who Will Pay for the Next?Commentary
China’s banking crisis in the 2000s was resolved by transferring the costs to households through financial repression—a decision that recapitalized the banks while exacerbating the structural imbalances that continue to shape the Chinese economy today.
Michael Pettis
- Caught in the Middle: Chinese Biotech Firms’ Divergent Responses to U.S. SanctionsCommentary
Chinese biotech companies have been on the receiving end of U.S. economic coercion. Yet their responses have differed significantly because firm and state interests are not uniformly aligned. For Washington, treating all Chinese tech firms the same, irrespective of their actual interests, risks pushing them farther into Beijing’s corner.
Xue Gong
- Are Data Centers the Solution to China’s Renewables Excess Capacity?Commentary
China’s latest energy plan explicitly calls for integrating data centers into the electricity system, particularly connecting them to green energy. It appears Beijing wants to use compute as a source of domestic demand to absorb renewables excess capacity.
Damien Ma