• Commentary
  • Research
  • Experts
  • Events
Carnegie China logoCarnegie lettermark logo
{
  "authors": [
    "Moisés Naím"
  ],
  "type": "legacyinthemedia",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
  ],
  "collections": [
    "Arab Awakening"
  ],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "ctw",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
  "programAffiliation": "SAP",
  "programs": [
    "South Asia",
    "Middle East"
  ],
  "projects": [],
  "regions": [
    "Middle East",
    "North Africa",
    "South Asia",
    "Afghanistan",
    "Pakistan"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Political Reform",
    "Security",
    "Military"
  ]
}

Source: Getty

In The Media

Is Al Qaeda Obsolete?

While al-Qaeda remains a global threat, regional changes and the erosion of government support have left it diminished. It is likely to be replaced by ideas and causes that are more aligned with the realities of the twenty-first century.

Link Copied
By Moisés Naím
Published on May 11, 2011

Source: Huffington Post

Is Al Qaeda Obsolete?Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda he led are both so last century. The current al Qaeda, and whoever becomes bin Laden's successor, will have a hard time adapting to the twenty-first century. Today's al Qaeda has different capabilities and constraints and also faces different strategic challenges from the organization bin Laden founded in 1988.

Of course, the spectacular attacks of 2001 and the recent killing of Osama occurred in this century, but the ideas and the circumstances that shaped him and his organization were formed in the twentieth century. In the decade since 9/11, much has changed in the world and within al Qaeda: the structure of the group and its leaders, the source of its members and funding, the main theaters of operations, the tactics, and even its enemies and rivals.

The original al Qaeda was an operational organization and all its cells were subject to a significant degree of centralization. Who, how, and when to attack, where and how to raise funds, how to spend them, the recruitment and promotion of leaders, and all the most-important decisions were made by bin Laden, his second in command Ayman al Zawahiri, and a small group of lieutenants.

In contrast, the new al-Qaeda is more of a franchise than an organization which is acting upon orders from headquarters. Its influence and its future no longer reside in its organizational structure, but in its ability to inspire new jihadists to train, plot, plan, and act autonomously against targets that they themselves have selected.

This does not mean that the "old" al Qaeda is gone. In the coming days and months it will no doubt try to show the world that bin Laden's death does not mean the death of the institution he created. And we know that until his final days bin Laden was occupied planning new attacks. Recently, German police arrested a Moroccan immigrant, who, thanks to al-Qaeda, had traveled to the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan for training in the use of explosives.

Surely there are more like him. But this is not the ideal candidate for the post bin Laden al-Qaeda. Their ideal terrorist was born and still lives in America, Europe, or Asia and is acting on his own, without ever having had direct contact with the organization. Yet, this person will no doubt pop up and plant a bomb on behalf of al Qaeda in a crowded place in a major city.

On the other hand, the supply of these spontaneous terrorists may have dwindled. Al Qaeda is now facing surprising and more inspirational competitors: the anti-dictator movements in the Arab world.

Before the Arab Spring the al Qaeda message was as powerful as it was easy to convey: we fight against the repressive, impious, and unjust dictators in the Arab world who keep their people in poverty while they enrich themselves thanks to their collusion with the hated and even more impious American Empire. For a young man with no job, no future, and no other way to channel his energy, frustrations, and hopes, this call to battle used to be irresistible. Today, that same young man has the choice to go out and fight, not by killing innocents in faraway countries but by making a difference in his own. And the rewards can be obtained here and now -- not in some future paradise shared with suicide martyrs promised by al Qaeda.

The other problem confronting al-Qaeda is that it has to repair its brand in the Islamic world. An organization that has killed more Muslims than Americans or Europeans has much to explain. A further handicap is that while in the twentieth century al-Qaeda could have relied on the enthusiastic support of some countries -- Afghanistan under the Taliban, for example -- or funding from certain governments, that has now become more difficult.

Being openly allied with al Qaeda has become prohibitively costly for any government. The Pakistani government's contortions in trying to explain its ignorance of bin Laden's lair, or the contradictions among the leaders of Hamas in discussing al Qaeda, show just how toxic the group has become. In the case of Hamas, its leader Ismail Haniyeh denounced the attack on bin Laden, saying he ''condemned the killing of any holy Muslim warrior" even though days earlier he had ordered a similar attack against an al-Qaeda cell in Gaza, killing two of its members.

The erosion of government support for al Qaeda does not mean that its geographical scope has been reduced. From Algeria to Chechnya and from Somalia to Indonesia the globalization of al Qaeda cells has continued, although less and less aided by governments or its allies within them.

In short, al Qaeda remains a threat. But it is diminished, discredited, and faces more competition than ever before. It will eventually be replaced by ideas and causes that are more aligned with the realities of the twenty-first century.

About the Author

Moisés Naím

Distinguished Fellow

Moisés Naím is a distinguished fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a best-selling author, and an internationally syndicated columnist.

    Recent Work

  • Research
    The World Reacts to Biden’s First 100 Days
      • +10

      Rosa Balfour, Frances Z. Brown, Yasmine Farouk, …

  • Commentary
    View From Latin America

      Moisés Naím

Moisés Naím
Distinguished Fellow
Moisés Naím
Political ReformSecurityMilitaryMiddle EastNorth AfricaSouth AsiaAfghanistanPakistan

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie China

  • Commentary
    Neither Comrade nor Ally: Decoding Vietnam’s First Army Drill with China

    In July 2025, Vietnam and China held their first joint army drill, a modest but symbolic move reflecting Hanoi’s strategic hedging amid U.S.–China rivalry.

      • Nguyen-khac-giang

      Nguyễn Khắc Giang

  • Commentary
    China’s Mediation Offer in the Thailand-Cambodia Border Dispute Sheds Light on Beijing’s Security Role in Southeast Asia

    The Thai-Cambodian conflict highlights the limits to China's peacemaker ambition and the significance of this role on Southeast Asia’s balance of power.

      Pongphisoot (Paul) Busbarat

  • Trump and Xi on a red background
    Commentary
    Emissary
    China Is Determined to Hold Firm Against Trump’s Pressure

    Beijing believes that Washington is overestimating its own leverage and its ability to handle the trade war’s impacts. 

      • Sheena Chestnut Greitens

      Rick Waters, Sheena Chestnut Greitens

  • Commentary
    A Second Trump Term: Will Southeast Asia Tilt Toward China?

    Tapping our network of China experts in the region, Carnegie China offers this latest “China Through a Southeast Asian Lens” report to offer preliminary assessments of whether the U.S. effort to reshape the global trading order will lead countries in the region to tilt toward Beijing. 

      • +6

      Selina Ho, Khin Khin Kyaw Kyee, Joseph Ching Velasco, …

  • Research
    China Through a Southeast Asian Lens

    Because strategic, economic, and ideological perceptions of China contain multiple, sometimes contradictory facets in Southeast Asia, receptions of and responses to Beijing diverge across and within state lines.

      Evan A. Feigenbaum, Chong Ja Ian, Elina Noor

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie China
Carnegie China logo, white
Keck Seng Tower133 Cecil Street #10-01ASingapore, 069535Phone: +65 9650 7648
  • Research
  • About
  • Experts
  • Events
  • Contact
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie China
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.