• Commentary
  • Research
  • Experts
  • Events
Carnegie China logoCarnegie lettermark logo
{
  "authors": [
    "C. Raja Mohan"
  ],
  "type": "legacyinthemedia",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
    "Carnegie India"
  ],
  "collections": [],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "ctw",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie India",
  "programAffiliation": "SAP",
  "programs": [
    "South Asia"
  ],
  "projects": [],
  "regions": [
    "Asia",
    "South Asia",
    "India",
    "East Asia",
    "Japan"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Economy",
    "Foreign Policy",
    "Trade"
  ]
}

Source: Getty

In The Media
Carnegie India

Raja-Mandala: A New Way to Act East

India’s unfolding partnership with Japan allows Delhi to respond more effectively to China’s One Belt, One Road initiative.

Link Copied
By C. Raja Mohan
Published on Dec 15, 2015

Source: Indian Express

Although very understated, there is no ignoring the hopes of Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Shinzo Abe to develop their own version of the Silk Road in response to China’s expansive “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) initiative in Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific.

In a statement issued at the end of their talks in Delhi over the weekend, Modi and Abe pointed to “the synergy between India’s ‘Act East’ policy and Japan’s ‘Partnership for Quality Infrastructure’”. The tongue-twisting acronym, PQI, will of course never compete with the OBOR for public attention.

But Abe is betting that the attractive financial terms and the high quality of investment associated with Japan’s PQI, first articulated last May, will more than compensate for the lack of sex appeal associated with China’s Silk Road initiatives.

Abe’s PQI might not be as sweeping as Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ambition to expand rail, road and pipeline networks across Eurasia and promote maritime connectivity between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. But Japan, with its much longer experience in supporting infrastructure development in other countries, has finally begun to lend a strategic dimension to its very large overseas economic assistance.

For Modi, Abe’s initiative could not have come at a more opportune moment.

India has watched warily as Xi laid out bold plans to develop the $46 billion China-Pakistan economic corridor running across the Karakoram mountains to the Arabian Sea. India has finessed a proposal to build the so-called K2K corridor that connects Kolkata in the eastern subcontinent with Kunming in China’s southwestern province of Yunnan through Bangladesh and Myanmar. New Delhi has also been nervous about Beijing’s rapid modernisation of transport infrastructure in Tibet and its plans to extend road and rail networks into Nepal and Bhutan.

If Xi put all his political prestige behind the OBOR, India has been unwilling to say either yes or no to these initiatives.

Nor did it have the resources or the capability to develop alternative proposals, notwithstanding some facile talk about “Project Mausam”, “Spice Route” and “Cotton Route”.

The unfolding development partnership with Abe, however, allows Modi to respond more effectively to China’s OBOR. That Abe has his own reasons to compete with China on infrastructure exports has brought the interests of Delhi and Tokyo in alignment on promoting regional connectivity.

Abe’s agreement with Modi on building a high-speed railway system between Ahmedabad and Mumbai is a big boost to the Japanese strategy to promote infrastructure exports. Tokyo had recently lost the bidding war for a high-speed railway project in Indonesia and was not pleased with Beijing wrapping similar contracts in Thailand.

The ambitions of Modi and Abe go beyond linking Ahmedabad with Mumbai. As their joint statement noted, “the two prime ministers decided to develop and strengthen reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructures that augment connectivity within India and between India and other countries in the region”.

And therein lies the big difference between Chinese and Japanese plans. Beijing’s plans, naturally, are about connecting China’s continental economy to India’s smaller neighbours. All roads in the OBOR lead to China. Tokyo, in contrast, is ready to promote India’s integration with its neighbours in the subcontinent and beyond. If Delhi can flesh out credible projects for regional economic connectivity within and across the subcontinent, it can now count on Japanese support.

Of special import are the very attractive financial terms that Japan has offered to fund the $15 billion high-speed railway system between Ahmedabad and Mumbai. The Japanese are offering $12 billion at very low interest rates, a liberal repayment schedule and the promise to produce some of the equipment in India.

These generous terms will inevitably be compared with those of China’s OBOR projects. In many countries, including Sri Lanka, there is strong concern that the long-term costs of Chinese assistance for infrastructure projects might be high and hidden.

Mindful of the widespread speculation about high-level corruption in the award of infrastructure contracts to Chinese companies, Modi and Abe insisted that they will advance “industrial networks and regional value chains with open, fair and transparent business environment in the region”. While few nations would want to dump the OBOR in favour of the PQI, the Japanese are improving their capacity to bargain with Beijing.

Modi and Abe also promised to enhance “their cooperation and coordination bilaterally and with other stakeholders to realise this strategic initiative”. If it is serious about a joint strategic regional infrastructure initiative with Japan, India must ask itself two big questions. Why is Delhi putting Indian taxpayer rupees into Beijing-led financial institutions like the BRICS Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, if it is politically uncomfortable with Chinese Silk Road projects in the neighbourhood? Might India be better off pooling its limited financial resources with Tokyo that promises to mobilise $110 billion behind the PQI?

This article originally appeared in the Indian Express. 

About the Author

C. Raja Mohan

Former Nonresident Senior Fellow, Carnegie India

A leading analyst of India’s foreign policy, Mohan is also an expert on South Asian security, great-power relations in Asia, and arms control.

    Recent Work

  • Article
    Deepening the India-France Maritime Partnership

      C. Raja Mohan, Darshana M. Baruah

  • Commentary
    Shanghai Cooperation Organization at Crossroads: Views From Moscow, Beijing and New Delhi
      • Alexander Gabuev
      • +1

      Alexander Gabuev, Paul Haenle, C. Raja Mohan, …

C. Raja Mohan
Former Nonresident Senior Fellow, Carnegie India
EconomyForeign PolicyTradeAsiaSouth AsiaIndiaEast AsiaJapan

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie China

  • Commentary
    The Spring and Autumn of Chinese Politics

    China’s political future will be shaped between now and next October. As the Communist Party enters its intense “campaign season” to prepare for a major political transition in 2027, reading Beijing's actions and responses may become more difficult as domestic politics weigh on its behavior more than usual.

      • Damien Ma

      Damien Ma

  • Article
    Can China Turn Its Small Modular Reactor Ambitions into Commercial Reality?

    China has showcased its engineering prowess with small modular reactor demonstration projects. But turning these technological achievements into commercial success will be a greater challenge.

      Tong Zhao

  • Commentary
    China Financial Markets
    The Plaza Accord and Its Relevance for China

    The Plaza Accord was not an externally imposed punishment of Japan but part of a broader restructuring that Japanese economists and policymakers themselves recognized was necessary. Its effects were undermined, however, when Tokyo responded to the resulting slowdown with policies that exacerbated investment, credit expansion, and the very imbalances the adjustment was intended to resolve.

      Michael Pettis

  • The nuclear missile formation passes through Tian'anmen Square during a military parade on September 3, 2025 in Beijing, China.
    Paper
    Untangling the Nuclear Knot: A Constructive Agenda for Managing China’s Nuclear Relations with the United States and Its Allies

    The nuclear relationship between China and the United States is increasingly shaped by widening perception gaps rather than deliberate strategic design.

      Tong Zhao

  • Commentary
    China Financial Markets
    Who Paid for China’s Last Debt Cleanup, and Who Will Pay for the Next?

    China’s banking crisis in the 2000s was resolved by transferring the costs to households through financial repression—a decision that recapitalized the banks while exacerbating the structural imbalances that continue to shape the Chinese economy today.

      Michael Pettis

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie China Review
Carnegie China logo, white
Keck Seng Tower133 Cecil Street #10-01ASingapore, 069535Phone: +65 9650 7648
  • Research
  • About
  • Experts
  • Events
  • Contact
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie China Review
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.