Ashley J. Tellis
{
"authors": [
"Ashley J. Tellis"
],
"type": "other",
"centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
],
"collections": [],
"englishNewsletterAll": "ctw",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"programAffiliation": "SAP",
"programs": [
"South Asia"
],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"North America",
"United States",
"South Asia",
"India"
],
"topics": [
"Foreign Policy"
]
}Source: Getty
Not a Military Alliance Pact
The signing of the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement by India and the United States is the most recent step in the transformation of their bilateral relationship, but it does not create a military alliance.
Source: Hindu
On Monday, India and the U.S. signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) that will give the militaries of both countries access to each other’s facilities for supplies and repairs. The agreement has been a controversial one, and two previous governments – led by A.B. Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh – did not sign it though it has been on the table since 2002.
Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace explains what the pact is and what it does to India-U.S. defence ties:
Is this a case of “overcoming the hesitations of history” as Prime Minister Narendra Modi said about India-U.S relations? Or a natural progress in the course set with the civil nuclear deal?
It represents both: the nuclear deal was the epitome of overcoming the hesitations of history on both sides. The signing of the LEMOA is a small — actually quite trivial — example of the continuing transformation of the bilateral relationship.
Does this put India and the U.S. on the path to becoming military allies?
No, it does not make India either a de jure or a de facto ally. All the LEMOA does is that it allows both countries to seamlessly pay for military goods, services, and supplies consumed during their exercises and other interactions. The decision to engage in any of these activities remains a sovereign decision of each government — nothing in the LEMOA changes that. So the issue of India becoming an ally of any sort does not arise.
No military bases, both countries say. What IS it then? Could you please give one or two scenarios in which LEMOA will come into play?
I am mystified by this obsession with bases. The U.S. has LEMOA agreements with over 100 countries but basing agreements — which are different — with only a fraction of those partners. Two examples of the LEMOA’s utility: A U.S. carrier battle group steams from the Persian Gulf to the western Pacific through the Straits of Malacca. Along the way, Indian Navy ships operating off Cochin are authorised by the GOI to conduct a previously unprogrammed passing exercise with the U.S. flotilla. During the exercise, the U.S. vessels offload fuel and supplies from their Indian counterparts. Instead of having to pay in cash for the victuals, India simply maintains a ledger balance for the transactions, which is cleared in one go at the end of the fiscal year. Similarly, an Indian naval vessel suffers a maintenance problem while visiting the U.S. for an exercise. The repairs are done at an American port. The LEMOA will permit the costs of the repairs to be defrayed against any comparable debts the U.S. may owe India for supplies and services received in other circumstances through a simple “balancing of the books” at the end of the fiscal year.
About the Author
Former Senior Fellow
Ashley J. Tellis was a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Multipolar Dreams, Bipolar Realities: India’s Great Power FuturePaper
- India Sees Opportunity in Trump’s Global Turbulence. That Could Backfire.Commentary
Ashley J. Tellis
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Carnegie China
- Malaysia’s Year as ASEAN Chair: Managing DisorderCommentary
Malaysia’s chairmanship sought to fend off short-term challenges while laying the groundwork for minimizing ASEAN’s longer-term exposure to external stresses.
Elina Noor
- When It Comes to Superpower Geopolitics, Malaysia Is Staunchly NonpartisanCommentary
For Malaysia, the conjunction that works is “and” not “or” when it comes to the United States and China.
Elina Noor
- Neither Comrade nor Ally: Decoding Vietnam’s First Army Drill with ChinaCommentary
In July 2025, Vietnam and China held their first joint army drill, a modest but symbolic move reflecting Hanoi’s strategic hedging amid U.S.–China rivalry.
Nguyễn Khắc Giang
- Today’s Rare Earths Conflict Echoes the 1973 Oil Crisis — But It’s Not the SameCommentary
Regulation, not embargo, allows Beijing to shape how other countries and firms adapt to its terms.
Alvin Camba
- China’s Mediation Offer in the Thailand-Cambodia Border Dispute Sheds Light on Beijing’s Security Role in Southeast AsiaCommentary
The Thai-Cambodian conflict highlights the limits to China's peacemaker ambition and the significance of this role on Southeast Asia’s balance of power.
Pongphisoot (Paul) Busbarat