• Commentary
  • Research
  • Experts
  • Events
Carnegie China logoCarnegie lettermark logo
{
  "authors": [
    "Marc Pierini"
  ],
  "type": "legacyinthemedia",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
    "Carnegie Europe",
    "Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center"
  ],
  "collections": [
    "Europe’s Southern Neighborhood"
  ],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "ctw",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Europe",
  "programAffiliation": "EP",
  "programs": [
    "Europe"
  ],
  "projects": [],
  "regions": [
    "Europe",
    "Türkiye",
    "Middle East",
    "Iran"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Foreign Policy",
    "EU",
    "Political Reform"
  ]
}

Source: Getty

In The Media
Carnegie Europe

Turkey Needs the EU—The Question Is How Much Its Relationship Will Cost

Turkey crucially needs EU markets, funds, and investment to prosper. This in turn requires the rule of law, not the rule of the arbitrary. Choices will have to be made in Ankara.

Link Copied
By Marc Pierini
Published on Sep 3, 2018

Source: Euronews

European governments are currently witnessing a seemingly positive move by Turkey’s leadership toward the EU. On the surface, this makes sense: Turkey’s economy is in very dire straits (and still depends on European markets and financial flows); the Lira is plummeting; hurtful sanctions have recently been imposed by the United States (and more may be coming); and Russia is having it its way in Syria (which will probably end up not being Turkey’s way).

As a result, the Turkish foreign ministry is issuing statements. The “EU Reform Action Group” met on August 29 and promised reforms of the judiciary and more. The Turkish president will soon go to Berlin, while the economy and finance minister has just visited Paris.

But words and visits are not policy, and Turkey’s rejuvenated feeling toward Europe is not very credible for two major reasons (other than its obvious anti-U.S. motivation.

First, for years President Erdoğan has based his electoral strategy on sharp criticisms of Europe. In 2017, he even pelted EU leaders with offensive remarks, including references to “Nazis” and “gas chambers,” a total anathema in European politics. No politician in Berlin, Paris, The Hague, or Vienna will easily be convinced that these were passing, innocuous campaign words. They are seen as part of a carefully crafted nationalist narrative, and they have lasting effects.

Second, a return to the rule of law in Turkey is in principle conceivable but will not happen. President Erdoğan’s power system (the new constitution, the judiciary under control, the 50,000 people in jail, the 150,000 presumed Gülenists sacked from their jobs, the absence of media freedom, the policy of taking foreign hostages) is a road of no return. Any move toward the independence of the judiciary, for example, would either have to be fake or, if real, would sap Mr. Erdoğan’s grasp on power. On top of this, the suspension of EU of accession negotiations exonerates the Turkish leadership from “EU impositions” (read: EU governance standards) and therefore, despite the formal statements against the suspension, constitutes a win for the Turkish leader.

Looking at the European side of the story, a striking sea change on Turkey’s accession has taken place over the past year or so. Now, not only has France ruled out accession, but the Austrian, Dutch, and German governments have made “no accession” one of the pillars of their coalition agreements. Add to this the EU’s rule of unanimity for all enlargement issues, and it becomes obvious that accession will not happen—not even preparatory work toward accession, as stated by the European Council in June.

This being said, European governments consider Turkey a strategic partner for a host of reasons and want to maintain strong ties with the country, particularly in the commercial, economic, military, counterterrorism, and humanitarian fields. Therefore, even if a political alliance—once embodied in the accession ambitions of Turkey—is now out of the question due to Ankara going down the autocratic path, a substantial strategic partnership is possible. The domains for cooperation that were just outlined by the EU Reform Action Group are primarily on the Customs Union and visas, and this is in itself positive. Yet, Turkey will have to demonstrate some improvements in its governance system if it wants to see progress in these limited areas.

Progress or not, it seems likely that the atmosphere of EU-Turkey relations will remain tense, for reasons mostly related to Turkey’s domestic politics. President Erdoğan’s political fortunes are now linked to the goodwill of the nationalist party, the MHP, which itself is not pro-European and backs the ultra-presidential system now in place. This means that Turkish politics will uphold the one-man-rule system and will not steer the country toward European democratic standards.

The key challenge for Turkey is not the form of its relationship with the EU, but the fact that it crucially needs EU markets, funds, and investment to prosper. This in turn requires the rule of law, not the rule of the arbitrary. Choices will have to be made in Ankara.

This article was originally published by Euronews.

About the Author

Marc Pierini

Senior Fellow, Carnegie Europe

Marc Pierini is a senior fellow at Carnegie Europe, where his research focuses on developments in the Middle East and Turkey from a European perspective.

    Recent Work

  • Commentary
    Europe Doesn’t Like War—for Good Reasons

      Marc Pierini

  • Commentary
    The Iran War’s Dangerous Fallout for Europe

      Marc Pierini

Marc Pierini
Senior Fellow, Carnegie Europe
Marc Pierini
Foreign PolicyEUPolitical ReformEuropeTürkiyeMiddle EastIran

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie China

  • Commentary
    China Sells Stability Amid American Volatility

    US unpredictability has allowed China to capitalize on its positioning as the “responsible great power”. Paradoxically, the more China wins the perception game, the more likely expectations will rise for Beijing to deliver not just words but to demonstrate with its deeds.

      Chong Ja Ian

  • Vietnam's Top Leader To Lam meets with young representatives from China and Vietnam participating in the "Red Study Tours" at the Great Hall of the People on April 15, 2026 in Beijing, China. T
    Commentary
    Why Vietnam Is Swinging in China’s Direction

    Hanoi and Beijing have long treated each other as distant cousins rather than comrades in arms. That might be changing as both sides draw closer to hedge against uncertainty and America’s erratic behavior.

      • Nguyen-khac-giang

      Nguyễn Khắc Giang

  • Commentary
    China’s Energy Security Doesn’t Run Through Hormuz but Through the Electrification of Everything

    Across Asia, China is better positioned to withstand energy shocks from the fallout of the Iran war. Its abundant coal capacity can ensure stability in the near term. Yet at the same time, the country’s energy transition away from coal will make it even less vulnerable during the next shock.


      • Damien Ma

      Damien Ma

  • Commentary
    Malaysia’s Year as ASEAN Chair: Managing Disorder

    Malaysia’s chairmanship sought to fend off short-term challenges while laying the groundwork for minimizing ASEAN’s longer-term exposure to external stresses.

      Elina Noor

  • Commentary
    When It Comes to Superpower Geopolitics, Malaysia Is Staunchly Nonpartisan

    For Malaysia, the conjunction that works is “and” not “or” when it comes to the United States and China.

      Elina Noor

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie China
Carnegie China logo, white
Keck Seng Tower133 Cecil Street #10-01ASingapore, 069535Phone: +65 9650 7648
  • Research
  • About
  • Experts
  • Events
  • Contact
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie China
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.