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China, Russia, and Iran

Stronger diplomatic action on Iran depends heavily on the policies of Russia and China. The actions that either country takes next should be understood in light of their threat perceptions, economic interests, and the strength of the U.S.-French-German coalition.

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By Jill Marie Parillo
Published on Apr 21, 2006

Stronger diplomatic action on Iran depends heavily on the policies of Russia and China.  According to two senior associates at the Carnegie Endowment, the actions that either country takes next should be understood in light of their threat perceptions, economic interests, and the strength of the U.S.-French-German coalition.

 

In a candid April 18 interview, Director of the Russian & Eurasian Program Andrew Kuchins and Director of the China Program Minxin Pei gave their perspectives on Russia and China’s foreign policy views of Iran.

 

Threat Perceptions  

“Russia views Iran as a partner in the region,” explained Andrew Kuchins.  He said that Iran never criticized the war in Chechnya and Russia does not feel threatened by radical Shia Islam or Iranian-sponsored terrorism. Russia supported the United States in Afghanistan, because the Taliban and radical Sunnis coming out of Pakistan are what actually threatens Russia

 

“When China looks at Iran they see oil and gas, not a threat” said Minxin Pei. Approximately 17 percent of China’s oil is imported from Iran, he added. As Russia, China is not threatened by radical Shia Islam. 

 

Economic Stakes and Sanctions

Russia’s third largest market for conventional arms (behind China and India) is Iran, said Kuchins.  Russia stands to profit off the selling of nuclear reactors to Iran as well.  Russia is 90 percent finished with construction of Iran’s Busher power plant which has already cost the Iranians over $1 billion.  Kuchins also mentioned that “the Russians and the Iranians have agreed that Russia build additional reactors.”

 

Both exporters of oil, Russia and Iran have a common interest in keeping global oil prices high. Yet, “the natural gas market differs from oil, and the Russians view the Iranians warily as potential competitors, especially in the lucrative European market.  Russian companies would also like to develop Iranian energy resources, but if the United States were to normalize relations with Iran, lifting current sanctions, than U.S. foreign direct investment could go into Iran’s gas sector,” said Kuchins.

 

China could suffer financially if the Iranian conflict got out of hand, said Pei.  If Iran cut off access to the Strait of Hormuz, China would lose 60 to 70 percent of its oil supply coming from Saudi Arabia. 

 

Global Positioning

Currently out of the 5 permanent members of the UN Security Council, the United States, the United Kingdom and France support sanctioning Iran.  Kuchins said that Russia would like to avoid such measures, but the United States, France, and Germany are tightly united and this may convince Russia to back sanctions.  He said that before the war in Iraq the European-U.S. coalition broke which “gave Russia a way out to do what they thought best.” 

 

There is little chance that China would go along with the West before Russia did, said Pei. In this diplomatic circle, China prefers to stay behind the Russians and would not want to face any negative backlash from Russia down the road.

 

Pei went on to say that relations between China and Russia have never been better.  If the Russians were to agree with the West in the Security Council to sanction Iran, China would not block the vote.  Pei said that the Chinese would abstain in this scenario, as “they would not put their neck out for the Iranians.”

About the Author

Jill Marie Parillo

Jill Marie Parillo
North AmericaUnited StatesMiddle EastIranCaucasusRussiaWestern EuropeSecurityForeign PolicyNuclear Policy

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

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