{
"authors": [
"Jessica Tuchman Mathews",
"James M. Acton"
],
"type": "other",
"centerAffiliationAll": "",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
],
"collections": [
"Japan's Nuclear Crisis"
],
"englishNewsletterAll": "",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"programAffiliation": "",
"programs": [
"Nuclear Policy"
],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"East Asia",
"Japan"
],
"topics": [
"Nuclear Policy"
]
}
Source: Getty
While physical aftershocks from the earthquake that struck Japan on March 11, 2011, have long ceased, societal aftershocks are still reverberating.
Source: Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident
While physical aftershocks from the earthquake that struck Japan on March 11, 2011, have long ceased, societal aftershocks are still reverberating. Most obviously, 110,000 of the evacuees forced to flee from the worst nuclear accident since Chernobyl have yet to return to their homes. For many Japanese - not just the evacuees and their famiilies - their dislocation is an open wound.
At the same time, Japanese society has gained a new interest in its country's governance. Until the accident, it had been willing to let bureaucrats make most key policies with a minimum of interference. Now, a wave of public involvement, which was started by dissatisfaction over energy policy, is having effects in unrelated areas, such as pensions.
A robust and engaged civil society is surely a welcome development. Japan has been in a sustained economic slump for almost two decades, partly as a result of a political system devoid of imagination and unable to innovate. (Although, hopefully, Japan's new prime minister's signature economic policy of "Abenomics" will turn out to be an exception to that rule.) It may be painful for the Kasumigaseki bureaucrats, but an injection of energy from civil society could - perhaps - be a turning point....
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
The Kremlin will only be prepared to negotiate strategic arms limitations if it is confident it can secure significant concessions from the United States. Otherwise, meaningful dialogue is unlikely, and the international system of strategic stability will continue to teeter on the brink of total collapse.
Maxim Starchak
The collapse of the Budapest summit is an inevitable result of the Russian system of artificially creating foreign policy crises in order to achieve a desired outcome.
Alexander Baunov
It is not just that Russia has started the largest war in Europe since 1945, it is also that Moscow signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement with North Korea that—from Tokyo’s perspective—makes Russia an accomplice to a regime that openly threatens Japan.
James D.J. Brown
Russia could compensate for “nuclear losses” to its aviation by strengthening other elements of its nuclear triad. At a time when control mechanisms are not functioning, there is a risk of strategic uncertainty emerging over the development trajectory of Russia’s nuclear forces.
Maxim Starchak
Moscow isn’t exactly thrilled by the prospect of sanctions against Iran being lifted, but if a new Iranian nuclear deal is inevitable, then the Kremlin is prepared to play an active role in it.
Nikita Smagin