Baku may allow radical nationalists to publicly discuss “reunification” with Azeri Iranians, but the president and key officials prefer not to comment publicly on the protests in Iran.
Bashir Kitachaev
{
"authors": [
"Yezid Sayigh"
],
"type": "other",
"centerAffiliationAll": "",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center",
"Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center"
],
"collections": [
"Civil-Military Relations in Arab States"
],
"englishNewsletterAll": "",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center",
"programAffiliation": "",
"programs": [
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"regions": [
"Levant",
"Syria",
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}Russia faces opportunities and challenges as it seeks to restructure and reform the Syrian armed forces, which it sees as a key to concluding the civil war on terms favorable to the Assad regime, containing Iranian involvement, and winding down Russia’s combat role.
As many great powers have found when intervening to support the military of a client state, Russian expectations in Syria have not been entirely met. The lessons that Russia has learned, both positive and negative, speak to the complexity of the situation on the ground in Syria, and to the ever-shifting character of modern warfare. Russian officials keep their cards close to their chest, but this dossier explores what is known about the perceptions and perspectives they bring to the task of standing up the Syrian Arab Army.
Syrian Politics Trump Russian Military Reforms, Yezid Sayigh
The Efficiency of the Syrian Armed Forces: An Analysis of Russian Assistance, Anton Lavrov
Russia and Syrian Military Reform: Challenges and Opportunities, Alexey Khlebnikov
Russia’s Role in Reforming Syrian Special Services, Kirill Semenov
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
Baku may allow radical nationalists to publicly discuss “reunification” with Azeri Iranians, but the president and key officials prefer not to comment publicly on the protests in Iran.
Bashir Kitachaev
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